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Duelo, or the Cryptic Translation of Mourning: Friendship Between Languages

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Abstract | The experience of loss and the possibility to overcome mourning has been a concern for both psychoanalysis and philosophy. Loss is also important in the practice of translation; Walter Benjamin and Jacques Derrida, among other thinkers, have insisted on the complication between texts in translation and the concepts of life, death, survival, and love and friendship. This paper follows these complications to argue that the word *duelo* in translation, as well as translation itself, enacts and symptomizes the frictions that arise between languages and friendship. By closely reading Sigmund Freud's and Nicholas Abraham and Maria Torok's psychoanalytic theories of mourning, melancholia, love object, and crypt, the paper traces loss of meaning *in translation* and translation as a work of mourning. The word *duelo* in Spanish is a homonym that comes from two different roots in Latin, one corresponding with the term mourning, *dolus,* and the other with duel, *duellum*. By reading two of Jorge Luis Borges's short stories about different *duelos* the paper shows how translation embodies the loss of meaning between languages that is also present in friendship and love. This paper reads friendship *between* different languages and examines how the idea of friendship is transformed in translation. In this sense, this work takes *duelo* as the struggle between languages to suggest a cryptic translation, a seemingly contradictory task based on friendship that aims to highlight the nuances of the text in translation. This paper wants to insist on friendship and alterity between languages as part of the dynamic that translation entails, not an ideal or diplomatic friendship, but one that is complicated and involves love, mourning, and combat. To translate cryptically, to maintain a *duelo* in translation, would mean to resist the impulse of one language comprehending or dominating the other, and strive for a loving friendship.

Keywords | Mourning, *duelo*, translation, crypt, friendship, love, Jorge Luis Borges, Jacques Derrida, Sigmund Freud

> The thing is that all work of translation, like seduction, takes time. Seduction does not occur in the 'crush' but in the courtship, in the loving development of a dialog that goes beyond the verbal. Translation also matures little by little, in the midst of a difficult (intolerable) friendship with another language; it advances thanks to the indispensable resistance offered by the other language […] There is a share of intimacy with everything that is translated.[1]
>
> —María Fernanda Palacios, *Saber y sabor de la lengua*

The word *duelo* in Spanish is a homonym that comes from two different roots in Latin, one corresponding with the term mourning, *dolus*, and the other with duel, *duellum*. With this difficulty of translating the word *duelo* from Spanish to other languages, this paper argues that translation symptomatizes the frictions between languages when exposed to each other and explores the experience of loss, mourning, and the (im)possible love between languages. These concepts and ideas have been a concern for both psychoanalysis and philosophy, but also in the practice of translation and in the sole experience of alterity. This paper will follow Walter Benjamin, Jacques Derrida, and other thinkers' insistence on the complication between texts in translation, the task of translators, fidelity, love, and the concepts of life, death, and survival. By closely reading Sigmund Freud's, and Nicholas Abraham and Maria Torok's psychoanalytic theories of mourning, melancholia, love object, and crypt, this paper will emphasize the need to recognize not only the experience of loss, but also the intimacy between languages and texts, involved in the process of translation. Thinking through the complication of translating the word *duelo*, the paper highlights the frictions that arise between languages with two of Jorge Luis Borges's short stories about *duelo*. This work dwells in the loss of meaning in translation to understand mourning and duel as related to the concepts of friendship, love for the other, loss, and rivalry.

A translation practice that takes language systems as complete and penetrable means erasing the nuances and singularities of texts, aiming for a full decryption and dominance from one language to another. That is why, where more automatized linguistic systems and literary indexes demand transparency and equivalence in translations, this paper turns to the possibility of cryptic translation, a seemingly contradictory task that signals a form of reading within alterity. To write about life, death, and translation perhaps means to be already thinking with Walter Benjamin's famous essay "The Task of the Translator." This essay and the foreword to his own translation of Baudelaire's *Tableaux Parisiens* work as a very intricate introduction which talks less about

[1]Translated by author.

Baudelaire and more about the complexities of poetic language in translation. Benjamin insists on how translation is not about transmitting information or simply communicating one idea in one language to another, in fact he highlights how this premise of transmission is the "hallmark of bad translations" (253). In the essay, Benjamin seems to be after something else in translation, a task that goes beyond the exchange of words and is deeply related to loss—and even more so loss in poetic language.

In Benjamin's text, the terminology frequently elevates the task of the translator to the level of dealing with sacred language, as he says towards the end of the essay where he suggests that the greatest texts already hold their potential translation, like the Scriptures that serve as a prototype for all translations (263). In this regard, Paul de Man suggests that Benjamin echoes a sacred language to repair certain loss of uniqueness implied in modernity.[2] Benjamin studies Baudelaire as the writer who registered the "Loss of Halo" ("Perte d'auréole") of the poet in modernity, the ruins of an aura.[3] For Benjamin, translation implies a loss that has to be incarnated (to continue with the sacred language) in the task of the translator who tries to bring back or to reconstitute the words that are *already* lost in the original, like the halo of the poet lost with modernity. Benjamin's famous translation metaphor of the broken vessel, where the pieces fit each other to be glued but the pieces are not identical to each other, attest to this conception of translation where communication or imitation is not at the center (260). The task of the translator is to "lovingly and in detail incorporate the original's way of meaning" (260), writes Benjamin, making both original and translation recognizable parts of the vessel. In this loving action, one text does not cover the other, but both texts constantly reflect the "longing for linguistic complementation" from each other (260). That is to say, there is no completeness in the original nor in the translation, one is the reminder of the loss of the other.

In his essay, Benjamin carries out two major tasks, that of translating poetry from French and that of introducing the work of a poet, which we could consider to be already a form of translation. Benjamin's language is pregnant with impossibility, longing, debt, loss, and the attempt to make sense of what is already broken. It is in this context that words like *life*, *survival*, and *death* appear. Benjamin states:

> Just as the manifestations of *life* are intimately connected with the phenomenon of *life* without being of importance to it, a translation issues from the original — not so much from its life as from its *afterlife* [*Überleben*]. For a translation comes later than the original, and since the important works of world literature never find their chosen translators at the time of their origin, their translation marks their stage of *continued life* [*Fortleben*]. The idea of life and *afterlife* [*Fortleben*] in works of art should be regarded with an entirely unmetaphorical objectivity. (254; emphasis added)[4]

Harry Zohn translates both the words *Fortleben* and *Überleben* here as afterlife, and on some occasions *Fortleben* is rendered as continued life. The two words are related, and

[2]de Man follows Gadamer's take on modernity which is the evocation of loss and reads this motif in Benjamin's introduction to Baudelaire (17).
[3]Aura is another word that signals loss and decay in many of Benjamin's writings.
[4]The terms in German are inserted from Benjamin's "Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers." *Gesammelte Schriften*, pp. 9–21.

both contain *leben*, but each of them produces a different meaning or effect in the text. In his essay, "Des Tours de Babel," Derrida delves into the difference and relation between these two terms using the French translation of Benjamin's text by Maurice de Gandillac, who also conflates both words in one, *survivre* (202). *Überleben*, then, means survival, afterlife, or life after death and *Fortleben* is closer to *living on* or *continued life*. For Derrida, both terms—welcoming Gandillac's confusion as productive—are forms of survival and bring a certain untimely rhythm to the relationship between the original and translated text. Benjamin's insistence on the life and death of works in translation can be understood in its articulation within a more complex flow that he calls history: "The philosopher's task consists in comprehending all of natural life through the more encompassing life of history. And indeed, isn't the afterlife [*Überleben*] of works of art easier to recognize than that of living creatures?" (255). Here Benjamin is drawing parallels between the translator, the philosopher, and perhaps the art historian, as all these tasks are related to the life, survival, and the time of works.

A translation, then, goes beyond the life and death of the original, it makes both texts survive and, at the same time, it lovingly promises its continuation and enhancement. Not only is translation the carryover of life after death, but the prefix *Über* also brings the idea of a plus or a magnification, and also of something in transit, like *trans*lation and *trans*ference in German *Übersetzung* and *Übertragung*, correspondingly. Translation brings not only life to texts after death, but also a continued and better life. The relationship between the original and its translation, as Derrida suggests while reading Benjamin's essay, is that of survival even before death: "Such sur-vival gives a surplus of life, more than a surviving. The work does not simply live longer, it lives *more and better*, beyond its author's means" ("Des Tours" 203; emphasis in original).

Even when Benjamin seems to establish a progression between the original and its translation—one comes after the other—his metaphors, like the vessel, often illustrate or translate this relationship dynamically, denoting some sort of contact between them (254). As Benjamin articulates: "Whereas content and language form a certain unity in the original, like a fruit and its skin, the language of the translation envelops its content like a royal robe with ample folds. For it signifies a more exalted language than its own and thus remains unsuited to its content, overpowering and alien" (258). If there is a contact or a relation between the original and the translation, it is like a royal robe covering, preserving, and exalting the king's body, the original. The king's clothes in their royalty only highlight his body. The robe, in a sense, will survive the king's life, but his possible nakedness demands clothes while he is ruling, while he is alive. Translation invokes a form of contact that implies the loss of the original (of meaning and words) and also its survival or living on (*Überleben/Fortleben*); translating involves a transit between two languages where the original body never arrives complete but, at the same time, is preserved and exalted.

If we follow Benjamin's insistence on life then translation is a form of survival, but, as Derrida points out, this survival does not imply a definitive separation between original and translation; in fact, it can hardly guarantee a sequence between the two:

> Isn't this what a translation does? Doesn't it guarantee these *two* survivals by losing the flesh during a process of conversion [*change*]? By elevating the signifier to its meaning or value, all the while preserving the mournful and debt-

> laden memory of the singular body, the first body, the unique body that the translation thus elevates, preserves, and negates [*relève*]? Since it is a question of a travail—indeed, as we noted, a travail of the negative—this relevance is a travail of mourning, in the most enigmatic sense of this word […] A faithful and mournful memory. ("Relevant" 199; emphasis in original)

Derrida highlights the possibilities of *survival* of the text in translation working through Benjamin's words: *Fortleben*, living on or living better; and *Überleben*, life after death or survival.[5] This implies exalting the words to preserve the body of the original. But it is not only the preservation of the body, it is also the *mournful and debt-laden memory* of that body. In other words, survival is the loss of the original body and the preservation of its memory or its aura at the same time. A relevant translation, for Derrida, must deal with the notion of *relève*: the arrival or replacement of a new element for an old one, a substitution or a relay in translation, but the word *relève* is also linked to work and value. A relevant translation is a matter of work, a task; it is a work of mourning, of preserving its memory and its aura already lost. In translation there is a re-enlivening of the dead text through preserving its memory. With loss and mourning, there is already an interrogation of the linear chronicity of life and death, and thus, the life of translations.

The concepts of mourning and loss inevitably take us to psychoanalysis. In Sigmund Freud's essay from 1917, "Trauer und Melancholie" ["Mourning and Melancholia"], he describes these two possible outcomes or syndromes in reaction to loss. For Freud, loss is considered a natural process in life, and patients present two different ways of coping with it: a healthy or normal response in the form of mourning and a pathological reaction called melancholia. Freud states:

> Mourning is regularly the reaction to the loss of a loved person, or the loss of some abstraction which has taken the place of one, such as one's country, liberty, an ideal, and so on. In some people the same influences produce melancholia instead of mourning and we consequently suspect them of a pathological disposition […]. We rely on its being overcome after a certain lapse of time. (243–44)

It seems that both conditions are similar or have similar symptoms, which are difficult to differentiate. Perhaps their likeness is the main reason Freud indexes the concept of mourning in contraposition to melancholia, as delimitated different processes: one normal and the other abnormal. Mourning is an in-passing healthy reaction that will be over after a certain period, while melancholia is an ongoing pathology that supposes a more permanent condition.

Mourning, for Freud, is related to a real or identifiable loss. Since the death of a loved one, for example, is recognizable, the self will just need time to adapt. This means that once the subject gets over it and eventually understands that the love object no longer exists, the phase will end successfully and "all libido shall be withdrawn from its attachments to that object" ("Mourning and Melancholia" 244). When loss is overcome the attachments or cathexis will be recovered or regained by the self, thus the self is

[5]In his article "Jacques Derrida, Un Plus de Vida," Javier Pavez emphasizes the importance of a "surplus" or "plus" in Derrida's notion of survival. It is not just life after death but an excess of life, more than life or "plus que vie" (102).

reconstituted and regains its integrity. In Freud's theory, the self works economically, namely, the self *invests* libidinal energies or cathexis in love objects. When the loss happens, the investments are still attached to the lost love object within the mournful self but, once this phase is over, the investments must go back to the self.

Freud acknowledges that in both mourning and melancholia the *confusion of the self*, or the impossibility to distinguish between what is lost in the love object and what the self entails, appears as the love object. However, because mourning is just a transitory phase, it would successfully have a resolution and the self would regain the investments and integrity, it would know its limits again, or as Freud puts it, "when the work of mourning is completed the ego becomes free and uninhibited again" ("Mourning and Melancholia" 245). Melancholia, on the contrary, is a much more complex pathology where the loss cannot be simply contrasted with reality. In melancholic cases, it is not as if the patient is not aware of the loss that provoked the melancholia, but as Freud puts it, the patient "knows *whom* he has lost but not *what* he has lost in him" (245; emphasis in original). Melancholia implies certain awareness and, more importantly, a complex unconscious process, a narcissistic confusion that reality cannot resolve, whereas in the mourning process, "there is nothing about the loss that is unconscious" (245). Freud emphatically does not want to see a pathology in mourning; he writes, it is "because we know so well how to explain it [mourning] that this attitude does not seem to us pathological" (244). It is as if the clarity of the situation would make the condition obvious and healthy, even transparent, as if loss does not need any unconscious mediation or translation to be overcome by the subject.

This insistence on only conscious loss in mourning—as Freud states that nothing regarding loss during mourning is unconscious—is noteworthy, especially coming from the thinker of the unconscious *par excellence*. If we think about dealing with the death of the love object as entirely conscious, then the love for that object would operate entirely in the realm of consciousness too. It is as if the self is not touched unconsciously at the moment of the death, or before. The word *love* that composes the formulation *love object* seems to do nothing to the unconscious part of the self before or after the loss. Not only death is simplified here, but also the notion of love and life, particularly if we think for a moment again of all the words that Benjamin uses that include life: *Leben, Überleben, Fortleben.*

But how are these ideas about mourning and love related to translation? Melancholy, as the state of continuation, if we were to apply it from Freud and follow Benjamin, should be the way we translate, a melancholic work of translation that has an ongoing relationship with the text. But Derrida in his essays insists on mourning and its relation to death. However, we cannot take directly from Freud what Derrida calls the work of mourning as the very task of the translator; instead, we would have to resort to Derrida's translation of mourning. Psychoanalysts Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok, whose elaborations on loss were extremely provocative for Derrida's work, complicate the whole notion of loss—and especially mourning—through two crucial mechanisms: introjection and incorporation ("New Perspectives in Metapsychology" 125). For them, mourning is no longer always just a healthy reaction: what they call successful mourning implies introjection, while pathological mourning may lead to incorporation. Incorporation implies a difficulty and refusal to reclaim parts of the self placed in the love object that is now lost, and as Abraham and Torok insist, introjection is "the refusal

to acknowledge the full import of the loss, a loss that, if recognized as such, would effectively transform us" (127). Namely, incorporation as a mechanism to cope with loss would act as the refusal to introject into the self what was lost with the death of the love object.

In their psychoanalytic language Abraham and Torok elaborate on how loss and the recognition of loss, not only affect, but are constitutive of the self. Loss contributes to the formation of the self and pierces it in its very core. This is a polemic assertion since it means that the self is always already incomplete and formed by the loss of the other, it is not an untouchable whole. This is connected to the notion of the original as a complete and ideal text, that both Benjamin and Derrida destabilize by complicating the relationship between the original text and its translation. In their practice of translation, the original already lacks and it is always incomplete without translation. Similarly, Abraham and Torok elaborate on how the loss of the other carries the potential of transforming the self through introjecting the other and its loss. But if this loss cannot be recognized, the self would swallow the other or incorporate it without being able to introject it. In this sense, Freud's mourning may be a misunderstanding or simplification of the complexity of loss and its repercussions in the self. That is why the term introjection is key to understanding this dynamic, especially for Torok who carefully describes the difference between introjection and incorporation.[6] When introjection fails, there might be a refusal to mourn, and in consequence, the need of the subject to incorporate or swallow the love object.

In some cases—like in Freud's Wolf Man[7]—a shameful memory is associated with the loss and not only is the other incorporated, but a crypt is formed, a "*secretly perpetuated* topography" ("New Perspectives in Metapsychology" 125; emphasis in original) where the loved one and their secrets are kept. Abraham and Torok describe this kind of cryptic grieving as a total isolation of the experience within the self where the grief cannot be discussed or even be accounted for, "the words that cannot be uttered, the scenes that cannot be recalled, the tears that cannot be shed—everything will be swallowed along with the trauma that led to the loss […]. Inexpressible mourning erects a secret tomb inside the subject" (130). The crypt appears only when the shameful memory is the other's doing and when this other is not only a love object but serves as an ego ideal for the subject (131).

The crypt is then the reaction to a trauma, a wound, where the loved one is preserved inside the self in a sort of tomb that seals the secret or shameful memory of the other. The exceptional cryptic infrastructure divides the subject since before the death of

[6]In her article from 1968, "The Illness of Mourning and the Fantasy of the Exquisite Corpse," Torok elaborates on the genealogy of introjection and demonstrates how Freud and other psychoanalysts misused the term or confused it with incorporation.

[7]Freud's case Wolf Man is described as a severe infantile neurosis where a series of dreams or nightmares were affecting the patient ("From the History of an Infantile Neurosis" 16–30). Freud concludes that the dreams are related to a sexual trauma in early stages of childhood ("From the History of an Infantile Neurosis" 104).

In *The Wolf Man's Magic Word: A Cryptonymy*, Abraham and Torok reinterpreted this case and go beyond what Freud concluded, they introduce the concept of *the crypt* and sustain that the patient statements were hiding other statements (49). They say that the secret with the older sister and the Wolf Man were encrypted to both preserve and forget the issue and the way this manifested was in his bi-lingual background and with wordplays between Russian and German (17).

the other and when the actual loss happens, this division remains there. It is interesting how psychoanalytic terminology strives for language metaphors when trying to explain the work of the psyche. In this regard, it is widely known that Jacques Lacan states that "*the unconscious is structured like a language*" and that we use signifiers and signified to organize human relations which need encoding and decoding (20; emphasis in original).[8] Translation also works here as a metaphor of a relationship and as the actual transit between two languages or subjectivities. But what Abraham and Torok bring with encrypting opens another possibility in a relationship between two unconscious that are separated and in contact, at the same time, in an untimely manner.

Derrida is interested in this pathologic formation where the mortuary process, the encrypting, starts even before the actual loss in a sort of deranged temporality. By reading Abraham and Torok, Derrida elaborates on how loss does not have a discrete occurrence and mourning itself does not take place only once. Encrypting before death, then, represents the possibility of losing the other in an anticipated ongoing mourning. The concept of the crypt as a reaction to loss allows the discussion for a theoretical redistribution that puts emphasis in the division of the self into different forums [*fors*], a "'false unconscious,' an 'artificial' unconscious lodged like a prothesis, a graft in the heart of an organ, within the *divided self*" (Derrida, "*Fors*" xiii; emphasis in original); and the relationship with the other always takes place within that divided (not-complete) self.[9] The crypt of the other is already its death; therefore, the identification of the actual loss is not what could alleviate the symptoms and resolve mourning. On the contrary, if we follow Derrida, mourning continues in an already touched self.

The *topos* of the crypt divides the self into forums [*fors*], "the crypt can constitute its secret only by means of its division, its fracture. 'I' can *save* an inner safe only by putting it inside 'myself,' *beside(s)* myself, outside" (Derrida, "*Fors*" xiv; emphasis in original). In what is described as a pathological formation there is a way of thinking a possible relationship with the other. There can be an inner safe *inside* myself that is *beside* myself: the crypt of the other. For Derrida, mourning is always cryptic, or even melancholic; but dealing with the possibility of loss before is not melancholic in a narcissistic manner because the self is already divided by the other. The other—carried in the crypt—represents a fundamental infrastructural piece of the self.

If we follow Derrida, then mourning's conception cannot be found in its opposition to melancholia, nor in the delimitation of incorporation and introjection.

[8]Lacan's assertion about language is central to his psychoanalytic theory where he brings linguistic formulas and anthropological resources to make sense of the subject and the unconscious. Drawing from anthropology, he resorts to the linguistic structure as a ground that organizes signifiers and shapes human relationships (20). For Lacan, it is the linguistic structure that gives the unconscious the status of something definable (21).

[9]In "Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego," a work posterior to "Mourning and Melancholia," Freud acknowledges a division of the self in the melancholic structure: "these melancholias also show us something else […] They show us the ego divided, fallen apart into two pieces, one of which rages against the second. This second piece is the one which has been altered by introjection and which contains the lost object" (109). Freud will go on to say that this is the mechanism in which an instance like the Superego can be established, another conscience (a critical one) within the Ego, all (including the Id) constitutive parts of the *normal* self. We can read here how a foreign instance within the self is already in Freud's elaborations towards his second topic (Ego, Superego, and Id). Perhaps Freud's second topic already complicates the dynamics of loss described in his earlier article on mourning and melancholia.

Mourning implies the two mechanisms working separately and together, and they fail, for there is never a total incorporation or a total introjection: "I speak of mourning as the attempt, always doomed to fail (thus a constitutive failure, precisely), to incorporate, interiorize, introject, subjectivize the other in me. Even before the death of the other, the inscription in me of her or his mortality constitutes me […] my relation to myself is first of all plunged into mourning" (*Points* 321). The process of *reappropriation* of the other, as other, is always incomplete. In this sense, the notion of mourning supposes a rigorous conceptual and theoretical ambiguity—that is to dissolve the boundaries that separate mourning from melancholia (or incorporation from introjection) and to accept the insufficiency of the concept to account for death acknowledging, at the same time, its efficacy to invoke loss. We would have to mourn the isolation of the concept, but also its total confusion with other terms. If anything, mourning is a contaminated concept. Mourning convokes contamination of different times, different disciplines, and different languages.

Mourning as a constitutive mechanism of alterity requires to think how the self can love an object (the other) to the point of grieving them. Psychoanalyst Sándor Ferenczi, one of Freud's colleagues, very early on in his work puts an emphasis on love, transference, and introjection. For him love is part of the ego, "I considered *every sort of object love* (or *transference)* both in normal and in neurotic people […] as an extension of the ego, that is, as introjection" (Ferenczi 316; emphasis in original). Although Ferenczi firmly believes that love is always narcissistic, namely, the self can only love itself because the love object is always taken into the ego (316), our reading of mourning precisely challenges this psychoanalytic narcissistic love. Instead, our interest resides with how mourning can be a manifestation of love for the other and how it allows a form of alterity between languages; as Benjamin insisted, the task of the translator involves love and longing.

Psychoanalytic literature on relationships and loss calls for a declaration that is worth emphasizing: there is no mourning without love; and we may add, there is no love without survival. Love is frequently studied within the realm of romantic relations or reserved to familial kinship. However, the theory regarding the formation of the self and love objects, and its potential loss, applies to friendship as a form of love—like in romantic relationships, it involves intention and the risk of losing the loved one. To be affected by others before and after death also means to recognize a more porous self that cannot simply recover its integrity by recognizing material loss. Intersubjectivity, or relating to the other, will imply a more complex dynamic of encryption and translation where loss plays an important role. In *The Politics of Friendship*, Derrida points to ongoing mourning as constitutive of friendship because friendship implies love and transference—but not to be swallowed by the ego—and the sole possibility of the death of the other anticipates their survival. As he elaborates: "one can still love the deceased or the inanimate […]. It is indeed through the possibility of loving the deceased that the decision in favour of a certain lovence comes into being" (*Politics* 10). Love and friendship seem to continue in spite of death, in fact the possibility of loss, or the anticipation of it, already signifies friendship. "The anguished apprehension of mourning (without which the act of friendship would not spring forth in its very energy) insinuates itself a priori and anticipates itself; it haunts and plunges the friend, before mourning,

into mourning" (*Politics* 14), Derrida further articulates. Friendship would imply love and loss side by side, an act of anticipated and constant mourning.

We may say that it is precisely *in translation* that the very word "mourning" can interrogate the possibility of mourning as a phase that is successfully overcome after the death of the other. This paper contends that ongoing mourning, where the other is alive *in* the self but preserved *as other*, is implied in the word for mourning in Spanish: *duelo*.[10] This word in Spanish is a homonym that comes from two different roots in Latin, one corresponding with the term mourning, *dolus* (*deuil* in French also comes from this Latin root), and the other with duel, *duellum*.[11] *Duelo*, as mourning, and *duelo*, as duel, are two separate meanings that convey loss, pain, and combat in relation to the other. Two different concepts that coincide and coexist in the same word, related but without synthesis. The possibility of death is implied both in mourning and duel. However, how is a duel relevant to the notion of mourning, how do I fight and mourn in a *duelo*? This takes us back to the process of encryption as anticipation of loss. In the formation of the crypt, it operates a dynamic between preservation and struggle with the other at the same time. This infrastructure within the self is there not only to safeguard the other, but to prevent their complete integration with the self. It is an ongoing combat to preserve the other as other. Thus, *duelo* conveys a form of mourning that encrypts, keeping the other *insid*e me, but also rejecting their total incorporation *into* me.

The transit between the English *mourning* or the French *deuil* and the Spanish *duelo*, may help us insist on an affinity between translation and mourning. There is, on the one hand, the loss of meaning between languages and, on the other, the impossibility of equivalence without residue between the languages. In the translation from English to Spanish, meaning is gained, another association adheres to *duelo*. The homonym dynamic can also be a duel, a battle of two or more meanings over the same signifier, but also a place of ambiguity, of encryption. *Duelo* and *duelo* may help us grasp the paradoxical nature of something like a translation that encrypts. In the very notion of Abraham and Torok's crypt reinterpreted by Derrida,[12] we can see how it operates not only the refusal of loss, but also a resistance to reappropriation:

> With the real loss of the object having been rejected and the desire having been maintained but at the same time excluded from introjection (simultaneous conservation and suppression, between which no synthesis is possible), incorporation is a kind of theft to reappropriate the pleasure object. But that

[10]There are two main definitions of *duelo* in the *Real Academia Española* online (https://dle.rae.es/duelo):
1. From medieval Latin *duellum* 'war,' 'combat.'
"Combat or fight between two, a consequence of a dare or a challenge."
2. From late Latin *dolus*, 'pain.'
"Demonstrations that one makes to manifest the feeling of sorrow for the death of someone."
Definitions translated by the author.

[11]In his book *Faire part: cryptes de Derrida*, Jacob Rogozinski argues that in antique French *deuil* (mourning) was written *duel*, so the connection is also possible in French. I owe this reference to Javier Pavez.

[12]Ivan Trujillo, in one of his seminars called "La Contaminación," linked the ideas of nature (*physis*), love, and encrypting trough Derrida's commentary on Heraclitus' phrase "Nature loves to hide." The phrase can be read—and Derrida reads it that way—as nature loves to encrypt itself pointing to love and encryption in this operation. This emphasis in Heraclitus's phrase appears in *The Politics of Friendship* and "Heidegger's Ear: Philopolemology (Geschlecht IV)."

> reappropriation is simultaneously rejected: which leads to the paradox of a foreign body preserved as foreign but by the same token excluded from a self that thenceforth deals not with the other, but only with itself. ("*Fors*" xvii)

Losing the other, but at the same time rejecting its appropriation, is what Derrida calls ex-appropriation, "appropriation caught in a double bind: I must and I must not take the other into myself; mourning is an unfaithful fidelity if it succeeds in interiorizing the other ideally in me, that is, in not respecting his or her infinite exteriority" (*Points* 321). It is a battle that is implied in love and friendship, a tension between making the other my own and rejecting total incorporation, a *duelo*. When Georg Gadamer died in 2002, Derrida wrote a mournful eulogy to his friend where he approaches mourning as an ethical position towards the other (following Emmanuel Levinas). In this homage, Derrida talks about friendship and death imagining the end of the world with a poem by Paul Celan:

> In-
> to what
> does he not charge?
> The world is gone, I must carry you.
> (Stanza quoted in "Rams" 141)

This last verse is phrased and rephrased throughout the eulogy while remembering Gadamer and Celan, both dead by the time Derrida writes this text. With Celan's poem, Derrida translates what Freud describes as the confusion of the self in mourning and melancholia into carrying the other: "according to Freud, mourning consists in carrying the other in the self" (Derrida, "Rams" 160). Nevertheless, for Freud, this carrying has to end shortly after the loss, but for Derrida if mourning is friendship, it cannot simply have an end. This means, carrying the crypt of the other within oneself before and after the friend's death, even if it is a bit melancholic:

> There is no longer any world, it's the end of the world, for the other at his death. And so I welcome in me this end of the world, I must carry the other and his world, the world in me: introjection, interiorization of remembrance (*Erinnerung*), and idealization. Melancholy welcomes the failure and the pathology of this mourning. But if *I must* (and this is ethics itself) carry the other in me in order to be faithful to him, in order to respect his singular alterity, a certain melancholy must still protest against normal mourning. ("Rams" 160; emphasis in original)

But does this mean that the anticipation of loss, as a sort of melancholy, is implied in love and friendship? Would a depressive or melancholic position towards love and translation be the healthier one? To start answering these questions it is necessary to address the indivisible barrier between mourning and melancholia. Mourning is central here, because from its very conception it was not considered a pathology and supposedly is less concerned with traumatic events. Abraham and Torok, and even Derrida, had to reconsider this phase and its mechanisms to complicate the dynamics of loss and love. Mourning is an ongoing anticipation and a memory, a dislocation of time and an ethical position towards the other. This may be another definition of love: to anticipate loss and to carry the crypt of the other in me, besides me; to both, introject and incorporate.

In melancholy, according to Freud, the confusion between the self and the lost object represents a narcissistic defense, and this narcissism is also what Ferenczi suggests for love, however Derrida insists, "to keep the other within the self, *as oneself*, is already to *forget* the other" ("Rams" 160; emphasis in original). So, it is not a matter of a definitive melancholy, perhaps a certain melancholy that would allow not to forget the other and resist total fusion or total forgetfulness. The ethical demand, "I must," that Derrida repeats in his eulogy appears as the responsibility not to appropriate the other, and in translation this means a translation that is never quite finished. The dueling ground for preserving the other as other, the combat over ex-appropriation, is thus a fight over not forgetting. It is impossible not to hear the echo of Emmanuel Levinas in the ethics that Derrida is invoking, since it this "I must" is not just a presupposed moral ground of laws, it is the ethical demand before any law. Levinas places ethics before thought and philosophy, an ethics that imply an encounter with the other in its otherness before any thematization or understanding, and with this an unavoidable responsibility towards the other. Derrida takes this injunction of *carrying* the other as the ethical implication and responsibility towards the other that he takes from Levinas.

In one of his essays on Levinas, Derrida puts pressure on how Levinas's ethics, at the basis of any philosophy or politics, entirely define the rules of his discourse. "Is it not the Law of laws?" he asks, and argues that by constituting the laws of all laws it closes the doors to the other that it emphatically invokes ("Violence and Metaphysics" 138). But is not Derrida calling for ethics when he is reading Celan's poem? He even sustains that if there is any ethical relation possible, it will be the possibility of carrying the other as other—to mourn the other. In dialogue with Levinasian alterity, even if it imposes itself as the one and only rule, Derrida can find a paradoxical ethical demand; there must be an injunction to welcome the other, but this cannot remain as the *only* law. It is as if Derrida would invite us not to abandon Levinas, Freud, or Benjamin right away, because it is in the mournful translation of their work that we could start opening a welcoming to the other-text.

As Celan's poem declares, there is no longer a world for the other, but the other's world continues in me, because I am carrying their crypt and that world already existed in me. The world ends each time a loved one dies, and many times before with the possibility of that loss; there is no longer *one* end of the world. Following Derrida, Geoffrey Bennington writes how excruciating it is to lose a loved one and realize that "*the world does not end when it ends*, that it simply carries on after its end, has no end, that the end of the world is not the end of the world, that its end in death is also the perspective of an endlessness" (xiii; emphasis in original). The world carries after that ending of *a* world, but I carry the crypt of the other and then it survives that ending.[13] As suggested earlier, this responsibility of friendship, of carrying the other, is a struggle, "but I can no longer carry the other or you, if *to carry* means to include oneself, in the intuition of one's own egological consciousness" (Derrida, "Rams" 161; emphasis in original). If there is any responsibility or ethics towards the other, then, it would be the ethics of *duelo*, which means carrying (loving) the other at the risk of losing them, while

[13]The "I" used here is influenced by the "I" used by Derrida in his reading of Celan, specifically the ethical demand that Derrida condenses in the "I must." The use of the "I" presupposes the implication and responsibility of the first person, as in the "I must" that we read in "I must […] carry the other" ("Rams" 160) and "I must translate, transfer, transport" ("Rams" 162), both as ethical demands.

having a persistent duel to preserve the other besides me. *Duelo* in translation and translation as *duelo* would mourn the loss of the original and guarantee its survival by translating it in an act of love for the word.

We can take a literary detour to trace the word *duelo* in two of Jorge Luis Borges's stories: "El duelo" ("The Duel") and "El otro duelo" (there are two different translations of the title "The other Duel" and, a more imaginative one, "The End of the Duel"). In *Brodie's Report*, one story follows the other as if the two were related by contiguity. In this duplet of stories Borges seems to present two versions of duels or two stories of *duelo*. In "El duelo," the story takes place in Buenos Aires, but the narrator tells us that a different location would not modify the narration; a typical Borgesian assertion. The two protagonists, Clara Glencairn and Marta Pizarro, are friends and artists who endure a friendly rivalry.

The story tells us that Clara decided to be a painter after the death of her husband ("The Duel" 381); she started painting, perhaps—the story insists—because her friend Marta influenced her (382–383).[14] Up to this point, in the Spanish version, one may infer that the word *duelo* in the title refers to Clara mourning her husband. However, the narration quickly develops into a story about Clara becoming an artist and sharing the artistic scene with Marta, who is an inspiration and a rival at the same time (383). There is a third painter, Marta's sister, who was also an artist and was considered by the critics as Clara's artistic contender. The story continues, "perhaps the duel was between those two women" (382), placing the artistic *duelo* momentarily between Marta's sister and Clara. But, after this incursion of a third, the story goes back to the friends, Marta and Clara.

As one reads the story, the notion of *duelo* keeps changing, always contrasting what is being narrated to the title that seems to promise a revelation, the duel or *el duelo*. The friendship between Clara and Marta keeps developing with the particularities of the Buenos Aires' artistic world as Marta ends up working in a cultural administrative position ("The Duel" 383). As soon as she is able to make decisions, she decides to benefit Clara without Clara's knowledge, by including her in exhibitions. Borges writes, "The secret duel [*duelo*] had now begun" (383), as he describes how Marta benefited Clara. Moreover, we read, "Marta had supported her friend, yet the unquestionable if mysterious truth is that the person who bestows a favor is somehow superior to the person who receives it" (383). It seems that the version of *duelo* that Borges wants to develop is not just the artistic competition—which is already complicated—but a more secret and loving devotion between the two friends. Marta's sister, Clara's husband, and the artistic world are possible reasons for *duelos* in the story, but it is the friendship between the two that concerns the secret devotion that the narration seems to be after.

The secret *duelo* involves giving and receiving without necessarily being able to sustain an *equivalen*t exchange between the two friends. We learn that when Clara dies something also dies in Marta as she is unable to find meaning in her painting alone and dedicates her last piece to Clara—a mournful painting, perhaps ("The Duel" 385). The story tells us that in this *duelo* "there were no defeats or victories" (385), it is not a duel

[14]Page references from Borges's short stories in English are from Andrew Hurley's translation, unless otherwise specified.

with guns nor is it just a story about the life of a person after a loved one has died. The *duelo* is an ongoing friendship that includes death, love, admiration, and rivalry. In this very short story, we read how the word *duelo* in translation symptomatizes the ambiguity that is also present in friendship with the anticipation of loss that affected the work of the two friends:

> Life must have its consuming passion. The two women found that passion in painting—or rather, in the relationship that painting forced them into. Clara Glencairn painted *against*, and in some sense *for*, Marta Pizarro; each was her rival's judge and solitary audience. In their canvases, which no one any longer looked at, I believe I see (as there inevitably had to be) a reciprocal influence. And we must not forget that the two women loved each other, that in the course of that private *duel* [*duelo*] they acted with perfect loyalty to one another. ("The Duel" 384–385; emphasis added)

As traced throughout this paper, in friendship there is an implicit love combat: a friend is faithful but must struggle so that faithfulness does not destroy the other by total comprehension, like the crypt that is formed by the secret of the other before death. It is, as Derrida would phrase it, a faithful infidelity. When Borges's story is translated from Spanish to English, the translator must decide which meaning of *duelo* will be haunting the story, since this word corresponds with the title and, since there is a tradition of Argentinian duel and combat stories, the decision is settled but we lose the homonym. This paper contends that "The Duel" is also about mourning as a form of friendship, and here friendship is not a total surrender to the other, but an ambiguous relationship, like the translation of the word *duelo* itself.

The second story, "El otro duelo," is about two gauchos, Cardoso and Silveira, who cannot stand each other ("The Other Duel" 386). They are always competing for the land, sheep, and love of one lady (387). The story is told, like many Argentinian traditional gaucho stories, as if it is the recounting of an old tale. As we learn about their impasses, the revolution "caught" them, and they ended up serving the nation (387). Even as soldiers they hate each other, and the other soldiers know about their feud (388). At the end of the story there is a duel and they cut each other's throats at the same time (389). The narrator says that Cardoso won the duel, but he probably never knew because they both died (389).

Perhaps Borges suggests that a classical duel, in which characters hate each other, would lead to an ideal mutual killing and dying at the same time. But what is interesting here is this story in relation to the first one; in "El otro duelo" the *otro* (other) perhaps implies that this *duelo* is supposed to be different from the first story. But "El duelo," the first story, is not exactly the antithesis of this *other* duel; it does not portray total acceptance and consuming love between the two friends, rather it is an ambiguous relationship with admiration and rivalry. Perhaps the discrepancy between the two English translations might help trace the dynamic between the two stories.

The first translation of "El otro duelo" is rendered as "The End of the Duel" by Norman Thomas di Giovanni and a newer translation by Andrew Hurley reads as "The Other Duel." The first collection was presented as a translation "in collaboration with the

author," perhaps to show fidelity not just to the text but also to the author.[15] The second translation is certainly more accurate, however, there is something interesting in di Giovanni's modification that makes the first and the second *duelos* (stories) the same but in two different stages. As if the first story was the beginning of the duel and the second was the end, suggesting a culmination or resolution.

If translated back into Spanish, di Giovanni's title, "El fin del duelo," could easily be an alternative title to Freud's essay on mourning and melancholia alluding to the end of the mourning phase. Perhaps di Giovanni wanted to put pressure on the ending as death or even the end of the story. Many duels end with a victory and a defeat, or maybe this was a duel with an ending, as opposed to the open-ended duel in the first story. Duels, perhaps, are already an ending or a way to get rid of rivalry. The interesting dynamic between the two stories here is *duelo* as a homonym and the ambiguity of friendship and competition. But the duel, the combat itself, is also interesting in Derrida's elaboration on the topography of the crypt: "A forum is always defined, from the start—and this will be concretely verified in this case—as a politico-judicial instance, something more than a dueling ground, but like a dueling ground requiring a *third*, a witness; a tribunal preparing a case, summoning before it for indictments, statements of counsel, and sentencing, a multiplicity of persons called up by *sub poena*" ("*Fors*" xv; emphasis in original).

The division of the self, the different forums, is not just a combat or a dueling ground. It supposes a politico-judicial instance, as Levinas suggests with a third term (16), more than one other, and more than two others to which the ego must respond to.[16] This division of the self implies a certain notion of sovereignty of the self, one that is divisible and that is not just one or two individuals fighting; it requires a witness. This means the integrity of the self, ironically, is only complete with the other and others, similarly, a language's integrity can only be found in its friction with other languages. The relation with the self entails the other that is not just *an*other, but every other. In Borges's duet of *duelos* and in Derrida's dueling ground of the crypt, there is a *duelo* in translation. It is in translation that we find the notions of duel, mourning, death, and friendship unsettled and incomplete; separated, yet permanently linked in the same word in Spanish.[17]

[15]In 1971, di Giovanni (and Borges) gave a series of seminars in the Writing Program at Columbia University; he later published these seminars as *Borges on Writing* in 1973. The first seminar was on fiction, and they worked on "The End of the Duel" where Borges made a comment on the short story: "For all I know, I was telling the truth. I had to account for the hatred between the two men—after all, that is the story—the fact of two gauchos hating each other in the solemn way they do" (qtd. in di Giovanni 27).

[16]In *Otherwise than Being*, Levinas moves from ethics to politics to insist that this third term is crucial, and this third can be a neighbor, but it could also be the neighbor of the neighbor, not just a fellow or a friend (157), it is every other that comes to this politico-judicial instance.

[17]Jacques Lezra in *Untranslating Machines* proposes a tension between the two concepts "Sovereignty or Translation" (97). By placing that *or* in this formulation he introduces both a decision *or* an equivalence between the two; they could be opposites or synonymous. Translation can be sovereignty, explains Lezra, precisely in the sense in which the translator decides what and how to translate, but also translation emerges as an alternative to imperial sovereignty in the sense that words are in constant transit—a dynamic that perhaps echoes the homonyms in *duelo*. Lezra follows these tensions in early modern literary scenes and *decides* for an undecidable path of defective and untranslating sovereignty. A path where the body of the sovereign or the self or the text is never complete, not quite translated. Invoking Cervantes, Lezra

A crucial element of this ethical dueling ground, then, is the inclusion of a third term both linguistically as well as theoretically echoing Levinas—a third language, Spanish, between this English and French understanding of mourning; a third discipline, literature, between psychoanalysis and philosophy. Levinas's third is not just a matter of the encounter with the other, but also the possibility of justice that arises with a third, as he writes: "To be on the ground of the signification of an approach is to be *with another* for or against a third party, with the other and the third party against oneself, in justice" (16; emphasis in original). Even when the root of *duelo* takes us to a second (duet, double, *dos*), it implies also a third, the very possibility of a witness of the *duelo*.[18] As in Borges's stories, the condition of possibility for these *duelos* are precisely the scenes in which they take place: the artistic world, revolution, and war. Here mourning and ethics are entangled; the double sense of *duelo* always implies more than one or two; the third(s) comes down to the ground of ethics and the political.

In "Living On: Border Lines" Derrida follows Ferenczi's and Freud's notion of transference to write about love and translation. He formulates the following provocation: "I say what must not be said: for example, that a text can stand in a relationship of transference (primarily in the psychoanalytical sense) to another text! And, since Freud reminds us that the relationship of transference is a 'love' relationship, stress the point: one text loves another" (147). In "Des Tours de Babel" Derrida also writes about the love for the physical body of the word and the mourning of the original body. Texts in translation are bodies, says Derrida, but also, texts are in transference, transcription, and translation, with an emphasis on this *trans* or transit.[19] The original and the translation bodies, for Derrida, are untouched but, at the same time, they consummate matrimony; a contradictory relationship that works like the homonym—yet another one—*hymen*, a word that signifies both virginity and consummation of marriage (213–215).

The untouched-consummation tension works like the crypt of the other in me, besides me. In Abraham and Torok's rereading of Freud's Wolf Man, they identify a pre-verbal trauma or wound that is translated into a crypt to protect and love the other. What cannot be processed by language is already translated into symptom or into this architecture that divides the self. Derrida asserts that even the self exists because the possibility of carrying the crypt exists; the division of the self is constituted by the other, and the love for the other works like a pre-condition ("*Fors*" xv–xvi). Everyone is potentially a crypt carrier: *I carry*[20] the other in my crypt and am carried by another;

formulates: "To govern and to interpret entail, in Cervantic modernity, taking on as the condition of political relations what Barataria dramatizes as the spectacle of intolerable indeterminacy: *No acabar de determinarse*, which we can also render as *No acabar de traducirse*not to finish translating/being-translated/translating oneself" (114).

[18]Valeria Campos Salvaterra proposes an interesting thread between Derrida's notion of *différance* and Levinas's ethics and responsibility towards the other in the double meaning of *duelo*. She states: "Subjectivity as responsibility and substitution, although we have observed that it is the closest model Derrida proposes of *différance* as that which always involves more than one and that, cannot be dissociated from an exercise of synthesis of the struggle, of the combat, of the *duelo* [duel and mourning] in its double meaning" (143; translated by the author).

[19]In "Freud and the Scene of Writing," Derrida emphasizes this connection between translation, transcription, and transference, and insists on the preposition *trans* or *Über* (264).

[20]As explained in footnote 13, the "I" used here is influenced by the "I" used by Derrida in his reading of Celan and Levinas in regards to ethics and responsibility for the other.

likewise, all texts are already inscribed in this alterity dynamic with the other-text, they presuppose this contract of untouched-consummation or cryptic-translation with language and with other texts. As María Fernanda Palacios emphasizes in her work on taste and language, reading is a form of translation and translation is a labor that involves love: "The text also communicates through the wound and demands its lover's reading: it demands to be penetrated, to be talked to. It is the double tear what allows access to the other (to the text): a relationship in which no one remains safe because the incidence is double and mutual" (42).[21]

This ambiguous relationship between languages and texts places translation as the most basic linguistic operation and displaces the idea of the original as a simply untouched piece; before any text or verbal speech, there is translation. And translation as a task and as a work of mourning implies love, implies *trans*ference. Derrida writes: "if I love the word, it is only in the body of its idiomatic singularity, that is, where a passion for translation comes to lick it as a flame or an amorous tongue might: approaching as closely as possible while refusing at the last moment to threaten or to reduce, to consume or to consummate" ("Relevant" 175). Similarly, we can revisit the epigraph of this paper where Palacios writes about love, seduction, and intimacy and how these concepts are involved in translation. In translation, Palacios insists, love and intimacy demand certain resistance where the friction between languages can transpire; translation is a work of mourning that requires an active courtship and longing.

Likewise, the relation with the other is a relation *in translation* where the other is preserved intact but at the same time one gets to lick it, to taste it, and to love it. Translation presupposes a permanent mourning and active love that always faces the possibility of loss, losing the original, losing meaning; this means a work of translation is never quite finished or definitive. Translation as mourning is the survival of both texts; survival as *Fortleben* and *Überleben*, to go back to Benjamin. In this regard, Lisa Foran suggests a transit between the other and the other-text in Derrida's work: "The relation to the other as translating is to appropriate the other and hence to *almost* erase, to *as if* murder, their alterity; yet their alterity, the *arrivant* in every other, is precisely that which *remains*" (247; emphasis in original).

But does this rapport with the other mean that the other must always be a friend or a lover? How is love involved before knowing what or who will come? Peggy Kamuf theorizes a certain process of survival that begins only with the promise of a relation:

> "It is impossible that we should each survive the other," [Derrida in "Aphorism Countertime," (422)] and yet no relation to the other begins except with this impossible double, at least double survival, destining and promising the relation to infinite repetition. And it is not only lovers or friends who destine each other to this experience. To every stranger as well is extended, even before one begins to speak, the promise of the word's repetition. The given word binding one to another does not even have to be given "in person," as we say. It binds me as well to all those I never encounter except by responding to an address tendered in mediation, through what is called a text, that is, through any kind of trace left by one to be repeated by another. (55–56)

[21]Translated by author.

Kamuf emphasizes here the promise of the impossibility of survival, of mourning, as the ground for any relationship. This experience of alterity, of the other, is anterior even to speaking—like the crypt for The Wolf Man—and we are bound by this promise to every other in a sort of text that leaves a trace, perhaps precisely, *in translation.*

To go further, texts are cryptic. The crypt arises in this translation or transference to carry and preserve lovingly the original body even after this original body has been translated or touched-untouched. To translate a text means to ensure its encryption. Similarly, translation can also be a form of reading that presupposes the condition of no transparency, dilution, equivalence, or direct understanding. Translation preserves the original text cryptically, it carries its secret—like Clara and Marta's friendship in Borges's story—without total assimilation, and is always indebted to what can never be translated. In translation, the world of the language of the original is carried into the translated text ensuring its survival. Not only this paper wants to insist on friendship and relationships between languages as part of the dynamic that translation entails, but also on a friendship that is complicated, not an ideal or diplomatic one in the pursuit of maintaining an economy of exchange or exploitation from one language over another. To write about friendship *between* different languages, one needs to take into account how the idea of friendship is transformed in translation. In this sense, translation would be a relationship that is marked by mourning (*duelo*) and moved by the impulse to encrypt preserving meaning, yet longing what is lost, while still transporting that encryption. To translate encrypting, to maintain a *duelo* in translation, would mean to love and resist the temptation to decrypt and dominate the text, or place one language over another, to strive for a friendship. When Benjamin insists on translation not being about communication (260), he seems to suggest the unfolding of the potentiality of languages producing meaning. In his metaphor of the broken vessel, the parts need to be lovingly glued and make both original and translation recognizable parts of the vessel, not one the ideal of the other (260).

Duelo, mourning or *deuil*, and their meanings incarnate the difficulty of translation: there is not a unified language or equivalent meanings, there is no unbroken vessel. There are always more than one and more than two languages in translation. If a text is already in translation, it is already in a duel, but not just a combat between two, a duel of ex-appropriation that implies witnesses and the multiplicity of all languages. A permanent mourning or *duelo* in translation implies encrypting to protect the text, thus, translating to ensure its survival from the dueling ground of all languages. To carry the other-text in translation is to know that texts are already indebted, but this debt cannot be repaid. As Derrida writes: "I carry *you* and must do so, I owe to you […] these laws or injunctions remain untranslatable from one to the other, from some to others, from one language to another, but that makes them no less universal. I *must* translate, transfer, transport (*Übertragen*) the untranslatable in another turn even where, translated, it remains untranslatable" ("Rams" 162; emphasis in original).

In other words, the labor of encryption-translation means to mourn a transparent translation or an intact vessel; the text must be transported into the already indebted land of another language. For some psychoanalytic approaches, the idea of a cure, a resolution, or a healthy relationship seems to be the ultimate goal. Even in the relationship between cultures, there can be a desire of total recognition between one and the other, as if it were in fact possible. In a way, this emphasis on healthy conscious processes, has

(unconsciously?) influenced translation with a quest for clarity that tries to comprehend texts completely. In his theory of translation, for example, Antoine Berman seems to suggest that a successful translation can be achieved if a well-trained translator is freed from deformation after undergoing the proper analysis.[22] This method would allow translations to reach the other "real" texts, no matter how foreign any text might be for the translator. In other words, by means of removing any cultural deviations from the translator, one text can actually understand the other in its foreignness.

The work of the translator, for Berman, starts with a healthy practice that can cure the translator, preventing texts from mistranslations or from obscure cryptic meanings. But, mourning as a process that is doomed to fail, or as encryption, makes us think about the complications of concepts like *self* and *other*, or *original* and *translation*, a certain contamination that attempts to destroy their integrity as concepts. In this regard, Abraham and Torok suggest that even Freud in his own description of The Wolf Man's case could not understand how the consequences of the loss of the loved ones kept chasing his patient. Perhaps what eluded Freud came from the theoretical assumption that when real loss is recognized, there is no pathology, a form of conscious dealing with death. But as we have insisted, the sole possibility of losing the other is constitutive of the self in its conscious and unconscious formations. When Derrida discusses the impossible translation or the failure of mourning, this does not mean that we should not translate or mourn. It is quite the opposite: the text and the other call for and resist translation, much like the two painter friends in Borges's story that endure in an artistic rivalry and inspire each other.

Reading *in translation* would mean revisiting concepts precisely to translate from within their own theorization and safeguard their survival. To be able to move between psychoanalysis, philosophy, and literature also implies a certain ethics of the multiple—to move between languages, the possibility of more than one body of text in translation, an ongoing translation that carries more than one crypt. But the place we give to the crypt of the other or the other-text needs to remain undefined—even if we already *know it*—like a translation we cannot anticipate. Attuned to the radical alterity that Levinas proposes, a relationship with the other in translation would make the notions of identity, territory, genre, or language tremble. Translation as a work of mourning, then, would imply the inevitable loss of the original but also its survival, the carrying of an undefined crypt with a topography that cannot be reduced to one language or discipline. To translate cryptically would mean to remain in a *duelo*: to be confronted with an unexpected other (text) that I potentially love and want to preserve but *must* never make my own.

[22]Antoine Berman's theory consists of a list of twelve deformations that can damage translation and for him they occur to try to make the text clearer, less strange. For Berman translation needs to be "The trial of the foreign"; this means that the text needs to feel strange, and the text does not have to be softened or adapted. Even when Berman advocates for a *foreign* translation, his list of deformations work as a prescription for a very specific notion of healthy translation or for curing of the text. Also, in his practice, Berman translated from German and Spanish. Borges is one of the authors he translated.

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