LANGUAGE, LITERATURE, AND INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDIES (LLIDS)

ISSN 2457-0044

www.ellids.com

Post-Brexit Trade (re)Negotiations: Geopolitical Implications for India, UK and EU

Benjamin Duke | University of Leicester
Saumya Tewari | Tata Institute of Social Sciences
http://ellids.com/archives/2022/09/5.2-Duke-Tewari.pdf

Abstract | International relations for the UK are set to change fundamentally. The nation is amidst the process of renegotiating trade relationships with the remaining EU member states and the world. This paper discusses one aspect of the changing geopolitical relationships caused by Brexit: new trade negotiations with Commonwealth countries. Having chosen to leave the EU brings the UK to a critical juncture geopolitically. The new trade relations trajectory is still to be set. The beginnings of the de-colonisation process changed trade ties for the British state in the 20th century. And the UK again looks towards the former colonies for trade. The UK's post-Brexit geopolitical relations provide an ever-evolving framework for researchers who study global trade ties. The UK and Indian perspectives are considered in this paper to interpret the new landscape of the UK's trade relationships. A postcolonial lens is employed in the paper for the critical review of ongoing post-Brexit trade relations with Commonwealth countries. In doing so, the paper delivers a comparative case study, describing the developmental benefits India may receive from new UK trade relations after Brexit. It argues that India's trade relationship with the UK will be uncertain, whilst its position with the EU27 may strengthen.

Keywords | Post-Brexit, Trade Negotiations, Colonialism, Geopolitics, UK, India, Commonwealth Countries

The paper aims to present key narratives and policy suggestions for Commonwealth, Indian, and UK decision-makers. Towards this, the views of key stakeholders, such as elected government representatives or appointed public service officers, and business lobbies who are responsible for negotiating new international trade relationships with foreign countries are studied (Evenett 29). This paper is structured to examine four aspects. First, a literature review is presented where two main principles are discussed: 'preferential access'[1] and 'economic principle'[2] in international trade relations. Preferential access trade arrangements can be difficult to explain and justify to neighbouring members who sell similar products. There could be tension between how the EU's Product Specific Rules of Origin are applied compared with what is permissible, if adopting the 2015 Nairobi Decision on Preferential Rules of Origin for LDCs (World Customs Organisation 6).[3] This position has been complicated by UK Brexit, whilst the UK still remains a WTO member and head of the Commonwealth. There are many economic principles in international trade relations, in passing, our paper touches upon the economic and political damage that would be done by dumping. The UK's ideal to implement a post-Brexit laissez faire economy, of virtually no regulation, or taxation of international trade with other countries is another (Hall 67).

The literature review reflects a critical juncture in the Commonwealth country's historical background and the UK. In this paper, a critical juncture is implied as the view from the historical institutionalists who describe it as a moment of openness for radical institutional change, in which a relatively broad range of options are available and can plausibly be adopted (Capoccia 89; Nwankwo 16; Wood and Wright 832; Rosamond 866). These issues in turn also affect the analysis of the nature of future trade deal policy formulation with the UK post-Brexit. We discovered a paucity of literature in this field written by Indian academics[4] as well as other non-British Commonwealth countries

[1]Preferential access refers to trading agreements or arrangements, which enable a weaker partner to trade with a stronger body. In practice, preferential access trade agreements "provide non-reciprocated preferential market access for projects originating from developing countries and least developed countries (LDCs)" ("EU initiate WTO dispute complaint").

[2]Economic principle refers to the general principle nuanced in most global trade policies, that trading enterprises should not be economically subsidised resulting in unfair advantage compared to other trading organisations (European Commission; see also IMF, OECD, World Bank, and WTO 9).

[3]The 2015 Nairobi Decision was a World Trade Organization policy "to ensure that the rules are simple and transparent and contribute to facilitating market access for LDCs" (least developed countries) (WCO 3).

[4]Recent articles exploring opportunities and trade implications for India can be cited here. The focus is on geopolitical opportunities (Pant and Milford), implications for skilled workers' migration and Diaspora (Chanda and Betai 289–300) and trade relations or negotiations (Tripathi 234–247; Mukherjee 3–8; Chauhan 189–198).

which makes it more EU and UK centric. In addition, we found the subject is also under-theorised as it has been less explored by diverse academics.

Policy advocacy papers, reports, and media briefings from business lobbies and industry think-tanks such as UK India Business Council (UKIBC), Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (FICCI), and Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ASSOCHAM); consulting firms like Deloitte and PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) can help researchers interpret the narratives around the changing nature of business relations between India and the UK. Data on trade and other policy initiatives between the UK and India is also available from the British Parliament and the Commonwealth Secretariat. Domestic and international observers can interpret a new focus on the Commonwealth by the UK government from this literature. Industry think-tanks from India and Indian media reports on post-Brexit India-UK trade hint at how the UK has been strategizing trade re-negotiations with India. These sources help in qualitatively assessing business trends, stakeholders' perceptions, and changing economic and business relations between the UK and India in the post-Brexit scenario.

In the second section we show how the Commonwealth nations are not overly heterogeneous in profile. There are significant differences between Australia and Pakistan or Canada and India, all of which were historically colonial members of the British Empire. There may be diplomatic sensitivities such as sudden flare ups of tension between India and Pakistan to consider (Centre for Preventive Action; International Crisis Group). The UK has indicated that negotiating a trade deal with the remaining EU27 member states is its priority post-Brexit (Sloan). Other Commonwealth countries could have exactly the same approach, choosing to finalise trade ties with the EU before beginning UK trade negotiations. That would have negative consequences for the United Kingdom, as regards its geopolitical status post-Brexit. There is an existential threat, the UK could once again become "the sick man of Europe" (Blanchflower). Barack Obama's pre-Brexit prediction that "the UK could find itself at the back of the queue" will be proved to come to pass (BBC).

Furthermore, the paper discusses the UK's constant dithering with regards to India and how it contradicts the clearly intended aim of developing a key global partnership. The UK's colonial past with India features strongly on several fronts. For example, Indian irritability caused by perceived UK prevarication on the legitimacy of the jurisdictional status of Jammu and Kashmir. The thorny issue of visa liberalisation, or differentiated visas is discussed, as is the sensitive issue of security and defence. There has been reluctance from India to increase its bilateral trade agreement with the UK (Dave) despite India having a significant trade presence in the UK. The level of UK's trade presence in India depicts reverse colonialism (Artata 623). Colonial role reversal is manifested in the way the UK heavily relies on investment from former British Commonwealth colonies, especially India. In the late 2021, the UK and India were set to discuss terms and conditions of Free Trade Agreement. Brexit beleaguered UK was keen to commit to a trade deal as the head of the Commonwealth. The UK became an independent European country, in direct competition with the EU27, on 1 January 2021.

In the fourth section the differential trade access is analysed. Various problems could arise with differential visa and trade policies for the macro stakeholders, as well as the Indian and the UK Governments, within the global trade community. Another constituent of the problem constellation is the USA's decision to remove India from its list of developing countries. In practical terms this increases the likelihood of the USA launching countervailing investigations regarding Indian exports to the US (Dhar). The increased propensity for such an investigation to happen will affect both sides of trade deals negotiated between India and the UK. Countervailing is when a country's government subsidises a business, enabling that corporation to sell its goods at lower prices than its competitors (Descartes Customs Information).[5] The United Nations (UN) Addis Ababa Action Agenda could affect trade negotiations between India and any of its international partners including the UK.[6] The nature of special and differential treatment received by India could be adversely affected by a post-Brexit trade deal (United Nations/ITFFD 110). The consequences could be quite acute, especially if India is perceived to have negotiated more favourable arrangements than other least developed or comparable countries. The paper analyses several policy drivers which may make India wary of striking a trade deal with the UK post-Brexit. India might conclude that it is not in her geopolitical interests to be seen as aligned with an isolated fading light on the international stage. Neither might It be in India's interest to unduly profit from a trade deal with the UK post-Brexit. For India, enabling more of its population to access a supposedly highly prized UK work visa may not be the panaceas it first appeared to be (Tripathi 234; Stojanovic).

Historically, membership of the Commonwealth was a controversial issue among Indian political groups in the 1950s (Srinivasan 445; Wheare 1016). But the Commonwealth was more of a strategic alliance rather than an economic one. For the newly independent India, it was a platform to make connections in the international sphere, and for the UK, it was a platform to give a new face to the changing institution of imperialism in the transition to the post-colonial era by allowing India, a sovereign republic, to stay a member (Kreling 50). The Commonwealth has started transforming since the Brexit vote (Hearne et al.). The UK government, perhaps, also views the Commonwealth nations as havens of potential economic opportunities, given that the new Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) was established recently (in 2020), merging the Department for International Development (DFID) and the Foreign and Commonwealth Development Office.

The decolonization process after the Second World War was an important juncture for the development process in newly independent colonies. The post-Brexit tilt towards the commonwealth nations is a similar strategic change. India and UK's economic relations in the Commonwealth over the past decade can be studied with a new focus. The changing nature of development goals in the economic ties needs more investigation in the context of Commonwealth Nations and UK's imperialist past. This paper aims to outline the scope for future studies in this regard, especially given the "pro-

[5]Descartes Customs Information website is a global tax and consultancy online business. The website is regularly updated with harmonised tariff code and other relevant overseas trading information. The webpage with the countervailing information we used was undated, the date of access was 12 July 2021.
[6]The United Nations (UN) Addis Ababa Action Agenda is a UN facilitated global financial package, which can be used for sustainable development.

business drift" in the economic relations between India and the UK (Kohli, "State-directed Development" 281).

The paper concludes by providing a brief theoretical overview of the main policy considerations, revealed in the literature search and following sections. Critical issues which will need to be addressed in India-UK relationships post-Brexit, are answered along the way as the paper develops. We investigate three policy drivers which indicate that newly agreed upon trade deals would be beneficial for India. First, the UK's fear of being left behind, i.e., finding itself geopolitically diminished 'at the back of the queue.' Secondly, the UK needs as many trading partners as possible to keep its supply chains functioning and large markets to sell to. Thirdly, the UK feels embarrassed by its colonial history (Gregory). Agreeing to new trade deals with former Commonwealth colonies will help level up the international playing field.

The UK Trade Policy Observatory (UKTPO) (October 2016) highlights an important aspect of the UK's former colonial history, manifest as the British Empire, as quoted below.[7] This issue has major implications for future trade negotiations between the UK and Commonwealth countries post-Brexit (Dugal 6).

> Its purpose is to inform the development of policies governing trade between the UK and developing countries in a post-Brexit era. Currently, membership of the EU Customs Union binds the UK to the preferences given to the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries under the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) and ensure that its bilateral development policies would have to be consistent with general EU obligations. (Hoekman et al. 3)

The UK wants a more laissez-faire approach to international trade, with less red tape, rules, and regulations. This motivation for choosing Brexit is a salient issue which will influence the nature of trade deals negotiated with the Commonwealth countries. UK's population is said to have voted to leave the EU because the citizens wanted to "take back control" and "reclaim their sovereignty" (Igwe 5). From an international trade perspective, "Brexit has enormous ramifications for legislation and implementation" (Rudloff and Schmieg 1). From 2015, British political leaders started indicating an allegiance towards the Commonwealth, as the 'leave' propaganda started. What was ironic though is the fact that 'leave' was also an anti-immigration narrative. Despite this, the voters from Commonwealth nations in Britain were mobilised to vote in favour of the Brexit campaign, claiming and/or fearing easier immigration for commonwealth members (Evans and Mellon 78; Namusoke 465). Evans and Mellon (2019) in their 'Immigration, Euroscepticism, and the rise and fall of UKIP' study: confirm that Commonwealth immigration was the highest source of net migration; before being replaced by migration from EU accession countries as 'the largest source of foreign immigration' (Evans and Mellon 78). This confirms that more UK net migration was sourced from non-Commonwealth countries, than from Commonwealth states. Another aspect of the paradox, is that people with a Commonwealth country heritage with dual UK citizenship, were voting to prevent other people from acquiring UK citizenship.

[7]This is a scoping report for DFID, the Department for International Development.

The UK's aversion to regulatory alignment, coupled with the recognition that fundamental changes to the UK legislation are required post-Brexit, resonates in numerous sectors. The service industry including banking and financial services is a case in point (Crowley 6). In principle the UK wants a comprehensive free trade agreement (FTA)[8] with the EU. The UK cannot sell its goods independently. As the 2020s progress the UK will probably find it can't sell its goods in EU markets without complying with EU trading legislation. However, the UK may well be able to sell its non-EU complying goods to Commonwealth countries. A bigger problem for UK trade arises if it does not adhere to World Trade Organisation (WTO) membership rules. WTO has indicated that it will take legal action against the UK for any significant breaches of its regulations. If the UK was to somehow no longer be a member of the WTO, it will have negative consequences for them to be able to secure FTAs with other nations globally (World Trade Organisation, "EU initiate WTO dispute complaint").[9]

The EU has offered a tariff-free, little or no borders check FTA to the UK. However, the UK must agree to the EU's four principles of the single market, which includes free movement of people and goods (Jacques Delors Institute 2).[10] The type of laissez-faire, tariff-free, virtually no regulations FTA the UK desires is only given to countries with an EU assessed least developed rating. The EU's four founding principles are entrenched, politically written in stone. We argue there is no realistic prospect of the EU allowing the UK to negotiate away these principles. There is no way the EU would agree to let the UK have tariff-free non-regulatory alignment access to EU27 markets without the free movement of goods. The latter point resonates in future trade ties considerations because EU founding principal terms include goods as well as people. This means that border arrangements (with by proxy associated costs) come into play in FTA negotiations (Lyons et al.)[11]

> The negotiation mandates diverge in significant respects: The European Union wants to safeguard its Single Market, with its strong, shared regulation. The United Kingdom seeks liberation from EU trade rules. These differences are substantial, and significant compromises will be needed if the talks are to reach a successful conclusion. (Rudloff and Schmieg 1)

The UK's quest for trade deals with no regulatory alignment with the EU is also impeded by the necessity of compliance with World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules (Watt).[12] The WTO often decides the health requirements by which certain goods can be sold internationally. This also includes the sanitation standards from agricultural production by which animal, food, or human organic waste can be disposed of (Swinbank). For example, WTO regulations apply to the hygiene standards of food

[8]A free trade agreement is a pact between two or more countries to reduce barriers to trade.

[9]See also, Sparrow, Andrew and Peter Walker. "Steel Tariffs to be extended despite WTO rules, Boris Johnson indicates." *The Guardian*, 26 June 2022. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2022/jun/26/steel-tariffs-plan-still-on-despite-potential-wto-breach-boris-johnson-tells-g7.

[10]The European Union has four fundamental freedoms, which are the free movement of capital, goods, people and services.

[11]See also Stewart et al. 28–29.

[12]This is a BBC Newsnight interview discussing a UK Government letter from the Chancellor's Department to the Business Department. The letter alerts people to the possibility of the WTO taking legal action against the UK for non-compliance of their regulations.

preparation before it can be sold on the global market. Although voluntary, key purchasers, for example large corporates, will not buy food from international suppliers whose produce does not have the WTO's seal of approval. In addition, other compliance and certification standards are set out by various other global agencies. In practical terms international trade will be difficult for companies which are unable to match up to the expected international standards. In the event of the UK negotiating a trade deal delivering non-regulatory alignment with the EU27, many other countries would probably not buy from UK companies (Wright et al. 29; Menon and Hall 2). Rudloff and Schmieg make this point succinctly: "[I]n the medium term the UK will have to orientate on EU standards" (5).

One of the main principles to consider when negotiating trade deals between a Commonwealth country and the UK is whether both parties will benefit economically. Boris Johnson, the UK Prime Minister (in office from July 2019 to September 2022) (UK Government), argued that Commonwealth economic growth rates at 4.4% are higher than the EUs 2%. India, a large Commonwealth country, achieved growth of 7% in the financial year from April 2019 to March 2020 (McBride). This means that trade deals negotiated post-Brexit with Commonwealth countries offer greater opportunity for the UK. But in a globalized world, Commonwealth countries including India are not as dependent on the UK market compared to when they were under the British Empire.

The economic principle is affected by the likelihood that current preferential access agreements for developing countries would need to remain in place post-Brexit. One policy instrument which will clearly remain in position in some form or other post-Brexit is Aid for Trade (A4T) (United Nations/ITFFD 114–115). One of the rationales behind the UK's decision to leave the EU is the amount of money it pays for membership. That figure included a payment element towards A4T, which is about 6% of the EU's total annual contribution of €750 million (Hoekman et al. 41). This means the UK's A4T contribution for 2020 was approximately €4,500,000 over £4 million. The UK's financial contribution towards the EU ceased other than for previously agreed payments, when the transition period ended on 31 December 2020 (Sandford). The UK disburses its A4T payments on an independent unilateral basis, whilst for an EU member state these payments were classed as EU contributions. This means the UK having left the EU can use the £4million, it is saving by not paying EU, for international trade purposes. The UK can unilaterally, without the agreement of others, use this money to facilitate trade with developing countries. The remaining EU27 member states continue to pay A4T disbursements, which effectively is public expenditure for additional EU contribution for international development.

Post-Brexit, the UK could choose to pay less in A4T contribution, or stop paying this money altogether, which is used to help least developed countries to trade. The latter means that the EU27 will have no UK funds for EU initiatives to improve trading conditions for least developed countries.

> Trade policy today has many facets and dimensions, cutting across the remit of many domestic ministries as well as regional and global competencies. From a development perspective a key challenge is to ensure that economic development considerations are integrated coherently into trade policy and that they are

> consistently applied and pursued. A4T is one mechanism to do so. Ensuring the coherence of trade policy with A4T and more generally development policy is a challenge confronting all governments and many different models have been adopted by countries that aim to inform policy formulation and to act as co-ordination mechanism. (Hoekman et al. 41)

The UK has existing preferential trade arrangements for lesser developed countries, which originate from non-EU sources; commitments which increase the propensity that Commonwealth countries will be able to negotiate more favourable trade deals with the UK post-Brexit. The UK is anxious to continue to honour its international obligations, for example, compliance with the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) agreement. The GATT came into being after a signing ceremony in Geneva on 30 October 1947, coming into force on 1 January 1948. The GATT became the WTO on 1 January 1985 (Chase 12; McKenzie 1;[13] Palmeter 453). The UK is also equally committed to behaving in line with trading requirements indicated by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Services Trade Restrictiveness Index (OECD STRI)[14] (Jackson 42). The UK's STRI rating (before the COVID-19 global pandemic) suggests that the UK could lower its trade restrictions on some services. A post-Brexit UK looking to develop new international trade links will be more conducive to using its STRI headroom in agreements with Commonwealth countries.

The problems that could emerge in future trade negotiations between India and the UK post-Brexit are very complex. These potential difficulties are likely to arise because of the problems the UK is facing while negotiating with the EU in the early 2020s. The UK is facing operational difficulties in trading with each of the 27 remaining EU states, because each member state has slightly different trading rules with non-EU states. This means that often a separate set of rules and regulations apply, requiring a separate set of paperwork to trade with each EU country. The result of the additional paperwork has led to substantial delays and the interruption of supply chains, especially in perishable goods like fresh food and vegetables (Bakker et al. 12; Helm). It is likely that this will also apply to trade deals with most of the Commonwealth countries including India, unless cautiously negotiated.

Joe Biden's administration (the US president) has indicated a reluctance to sign a trade agreement with the UK. This is mainly due to the US perceiving a threat of the UK EU Withdrawal Agreement on the Northern Ireland Good Friday Agreement (Northern Ireland Assembly)[15] (O'Carroll).[16] The threat of the creation of a hard border between

[13]The information referenced is on page 1 of the copy of the journal we accessed. The article is 23 pages long. The University of Melbourne only stores unpaginated copies of archived issues of the *Melbourne Journal of International Law* in their repository. Therefore, the reference entry listed is marked pp. 1–23.

[14]The STRI provides information on regulations affecting trade in services in 22 sectors across all OECD member countries and Brazil, the People's Republic of China, Costa Rica, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Russian Federation, and South Africa.

[15]The Northern Ireland Good Friday Agreement is the more common name of the Belfast Agreement, which was agreed on Good Friday 10 April 1998; hence its name. The Belfast Agreement is a social, political, and economic template, signed up to by most of the political parties in Northern Ireland, which decides how Northern Ireland is governed.

[16]O'Carroll (March 2022) describes the initial threat of legal action regarding the Northern Ireland Protocol. The UK Government (May 2022) explains how it intends to address the Northern Ireland border

Northern Ireland and all of Ireland is also perceived by many others. In June 2022, the UK signalled its intention to unilaterally change the UK EU Withdrawal Agreement, so that the island of Ireland remains border free. This was due to the mounting operational difficulties the UK was encountering in importing and exporting EU goods in and out of Northern Ireland. This is in direct contradiction of the Withdrawal Agreement the UK negotiated and signed up as part of being an independent non-EU sovereign state. The EU signalled its intention to take legal action against the UK in early March 2021(BBC Newsnight 0m–3m). The pending EU legal action against the UK came a step closer to enactment, when the UK Parliament passed the Northern Ireland Protocol Bill in June 2022 (Mason and Boffey).[17] As regards a potential trade dispute, the EU and the UK have been here before, experiencing some political near misses detailed as follows. In January 2021, the export of COVID-19 vaccine dispute resulted in the actual triggering of Article 16 of the Northern Ireland Protocol (The Irish News),[18] which itself is part of the EU UK Withdrawal Agreement (Campbell).[19] This situation was, for both parties, a politically uncomfortable trade war near miss. Observers maintain that this potential political ticking time bomb could yet explode, on this or some other import or export issue (Curtis), for example, in the case of potential sanctions for breaching WTO regulations. These are substantial ongoing trade problems the UK has and will continue to face throughout the 2020s. They are geopolitically very damaging, they give potential non-EU trade partners, for example India, considerable reasons for hesitancy.

Several EU27 member states are concerned about the knock-on effects of Brexit. These fears include being politically manoeuvred into acceptance of certain aspects of the EU they disagree with. Non-Eurozone EU member states such as Denmark and Sweden have, to varying degrees, opposed greater Europeanisation or subsidiarity. "In addition, the northern member states, worry that the EU, pushed by Macron, will adopt a more protectionist outlook on issues like competition, industrial policy and trade policy" (Brattberg et al. 2). Different EU states have social concerns regarding the safety and general well-being of their citizens in the UK post-Brexit. The UK EU Withdrawal Agreement (12 November 2019) ensures that the rights of EU nationals residing in the UK will continue post-Brexit. Some Central European EU countries have expressed reservations that what is intended in the Withdrawal Agreement (2019) will materialise. For example, although EU nationals in the UK will be safe, future changes in legislation post-Brexit could reduce remittance flows.

problems that adversely affect EU-UK trade. Blenkinsop (July 2022) details why the EU have commenced formal litigation against the UK again, due to stresses caused by UK Brexit on the Good Friday Agreement, the Northern Ireland Protocol.

[17]Mason and Boffey (13 June 2022) inform us that the UK Government is aware that the Northern Ireland Protocol Bill, if enacted, would not meet the UK's obligations under international law. The Northern Ireland Protocol Bill would create different border check and trade arrangements regarding trade between the EU, All of Ireland, Northern Ireland, and the UK.

[18]Article 16 of the Northern Ireland Protocol describes the process by which either the EU or the UK can take unilateral action to safeguard their social, economic, and political interests; if either party, the EU or the UK, conclude the Protocol will have a serious adverse effect on their trade.

[19]The following explanation from UK in a Changing Europe (UKICE) (2021) alerts us to how potentially damaging the difficulty in importing lifesaving COVID-19 vaccine would have been in the long-term: "It is common for trade agreements to contain provisions which enable either, to take unilateral action, if the implementation of the agreement gives rise to negative consequences" (Rice).

> Out of the approximately 3 million EU citizens in the UK, Central European residents are among the top nationalities. There are nearly 827,000 Poles, 86,000 Hungarians, 64,000 Slovaks and 44,000 Czechs living in the UK. These Central European countries worry that their citizens' ability to live and work in the UK could be jeopardised. (Brattberg et al. 3)

Another concern which can affect new trade policies post-Brexit is the status of people's employment rights, access to healthcare (especially during and after the COVID-19 pandemic), and housing and welfare payments. Some observers feel it is likely that the UK will experience an economic downturn post-Brexit, putting pressure on its public services (Hope 69; Ries et al. 2). A drop in the UK economic growth will act as a policy driver, resulting in relaxation of employment legislation that protects workers. The UK's commitments to preferential trade access for least developed countries, enabled, for example, by GATT and STRI, have been discussed previously. On the one hand, these commitments could become conditional, especially in trade negotiations with Commonwealth countries, predominantly in the global south region, wanting to protect people's rights. On the other hand, the commitments could find themselves under pressure from non-EU global north countries, who do not view preferential trade access as a priority. It must also be said that the various groupings of countries might act in the reverse, conversely, completely opposite to most predictions. An exogenous shock, for example, a repeat of the 2008 global financial crisis or the COVID-19 global pandemic, may render such predictions invalid.

> However, the political and economic contexts provide reasons for concern that in practice there will be downward pressure after Brexit, especially on workers' rights. In the past UK governments have pushed back against regulations on working time and the right of part-time and agency workers. Taking back control may in this case mean diluting protection, especially given the need to attract inward investment once outside the EU. Worker's rights are also likely to be affected by trade agreements. Commitment to matching EU social and employment rights could very well be a condition of a close trade relationship with the EU. But if such an arrangement is not reached, rights might become vulnerable in attempts to secure trade deals with other countries. (Stewart et al. 9)

Geopolitically, the UK is at a critical juncture having chosen to leave the EU, severing its formal ties with the supranational. The EU is the UK's largest trading partner (Goldsworthy 2; Ward 3). India and the UK both recognise the joint benefits of effective bilateral trade ties. During the early 21st century it was clearly apparent that India was a major international player at the dawn of the global digital world. Due to the Indian population's skills and availability to work in the sector, the UK also realised the growing geopolitical edge this gave to India. The UK Prime Minister, Tony Blair, visited India in January 2002, leading diplomatic and trade delegations. A subsequent UK Government 2003 white paper advised that the UK must seek to agree a "strategic partnership" with India (FCO 57WS). Blair's diplomatic and trade delegation visit in 2002 was mirrored by his Indian counterpart, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit in September 2004. A joint statement signed by both was produced after the diplomatic visits of 2002 and 2004 (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India). This joint statement provides a contemporary context for developing new trade ties between India and the UK post-Brexit (Scott 169).

Boris Johnson, the UK Foreign Secretary (2016–18), and UK's Prime Minster (2019–2022) had said, "We in the UK are beneficiaries of reverse colonialism" (Canton). These comments at a UK function to celebrate seventy years of Indian (and Pakistan) independence were quite telling. They tend to signify the UK's fear of slowly being taken over by formerly subjugated people. Subconsciously, Johnson's light-hearted remark shows a sense of embarrassment regarding the British Empire's colonial past. Artata aptly articulates the UK's schism with being a fading global light and its shameful colonialist history "But fantasies of reverse colonization are more than products of geopolitical fears. They are also responses to cultural guilt" (623). Boris Johnson's 2017 statement highlights the thought process underpinning the UK's Brexit strategy. A strategic approach which is significantly dependent on maintaining good trading relations with former British colonies, in this case India. Trade deals would be atonement for colonialism. Modern 20th century events, for example, mass consumerism, global depression and industrial concentration, also explain why reverse colonialism has occurred (Thomas and Thompson 162).

> The first point to note is that the talk in 2002 of being *partners* in various areas was further pursued in the 2004 joint declaration with its announcement of an overarching *strategic partnership*, its claim that 'as India emerges as a global [economic] power … India and the UK are natural economic partners,' its welcoming of growing trade, and its assertions that the 'real partnership lies in the strength of the partnership in both directions.' (Scott 169; italics in original)

There are security and defence implications post-Brexit, which will affect forging new UK trade ties with Commonwealth countries including India. Many have predicted that UKs economy will shrink after Brexit (Fitch Ratings; Lawrence 14). Observers question if the UK will be able to continue its current level of NATO engagement post-Brexit in case of a deep recession. Experts feel that a withdrawal from the EU could imply a diminished role geopolitically for the UK (Kassim 8; Whitman 528). Post-Brexit, the EU and NATO may view the security and defence landscape, minus the UK, as an opportunity to re-orientate remaining existing relationships. The UK could see a more integrated level of cooperation between the EU27 and NATO, a more united EU working with the Alliance. The UK may feel the need to invest in NATO to protect their standing on the international stage (Oliver and Williams 549, 565–566). To remain geopolitically relevant, the UK needs to negotiate trade deals with other NATO members, especially Canada which is also a Commonwealth country. Paradoxically, increased calls for social support, as unemployment rises due to UK Brexit, will increase political pressure to reduce defence spending. The effect of this paradox could be to incentivise the UK to streamline its defence expenditure. The UK's geopolitical standing would be less diminished post-Brexit by pooling its defence spending, making joint investments with other NATO allies (Black et al. 148).[20]

[20]See also Puntel, Angelica. *A "Global Britain" in a Post-Brexit Scenario*. Centre for Geopolitics & Security in Realism Studies, 2018. http://cgsrs.org/files/files/file-1552946695.pdf.

> The UK may need to invest more heavily in NATO and its bilateral partnerships, especially in the near term, in order to demonstrate its continuing or reenergised engagement with the world after Brexit. As well as to offset its diminished influence as part of a European bloc. The need to also establish trading relationships with the rest of the globe may accelerate and already-growing shift towards a UK security interest in securing global lines of communication and partners in Asia-Pacific, the Indian Ocean and other economies. (Black et al. 149)

To interpret the trade relations between the UK and India over the past decade, it is important to elaborate upon the trade statistics, the key sectors for trading partnerships, and the changing nature of support that the UK government lends to India's development. The two countries also share a common historical relationship—that of a colony and imperialist ruler, when put in the binary of the dependency view.[21] From this perspective, the impact of colonization on the Indian economy is well documented.[22] The analytical approach to this paper does not disregard that, but studies it with a postcolonial lens. India's post-colonial developmental trajectory: economic relations with Britain after joining the Commonwealth and in the post-Brexit times are the main junctures that form the subject of discussion in this paper.

Table 1: Macro-economy Profiles: The UK and Key Commonwealth Trade Partners

	Population (In Thousands)	GDP (In Million, Current US$)	GDP Per capita Purchasing Power Parity (Current International$)
Australia	25,687.04	1,330,900.93	51,420.0
Canada	38,005.25	1,643,407.98	48,072.6
India	1,380,004.39	2,622,983.73	6,454.3
United Kingdom	67,215.20	2,707,743.78	44,916.2

Source: World Bank Data (2020–21 figures and estimates)[23]

While India surpassed the UK's rank among top economies with highest GDP in 2018–19, the size of the population implies lower per capita income and poorer standards of living of the population. This also points to income inequalities and lack of equitable distribution in India. The data used gives a macroeconomic view of the countries discussed here.

> Policies pursued by India's pro-business rulers since the 1980s have generated both rapid economic growth and growing economic inequality, the latter

[21]The dependency view for understanding international political economy is implied in this context. Colonial past of a nation and continuing economic dependence adversely impacts the socio-economic development of nations according to dependency theories. (For commentaries on dependency theories, see Namkong; Ghosh).

[22]See, for example, Tomlinson; Sen; Chandra who highlight the impact of the colonial past on independent India's economy.

[23]*World Bank Data*. World Bank. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator.

> especially during the post-1991 period, leading to only modest gains for those at the bottom of Indian society. (Kohli, "Poverty amid plenty in the new India" 144)

Poverty levels in India are high and have been a developmental concern for not just Indian policymakers but also for various international agencies. In the 1990s, new poverty estimation methodologies were developed ("Report of the Expert Group on Estimation of Proportion and Number of Poor"). A headcount of the number of poor in India was estimated. Between 1993–94 and 2004–05, the headcount of the number of poor people living below under the poverty line increased from 403.7 million to 407.1 million ("Report of the Expert Group to Review the Methodology for Measurement of Poverty"). There have been recent reforms in India's top policy institutions since 2014, namely, the Planning Commission of India. It was responsible for assessment of the poverty line, but Indian economics experts cannot form a consensus on the poverty line methodology since NITI Aayog reforms (Gupta).

Analysing differences in poverty and inequality between industrialized countries and developing nations is quite complex. The differences can be considered from a dependency and postcolonial perspective. The narrative of inequality from the industrialized countries focuses on how institutions allow the richest to corner more wealth (Stiglitz 1). More wealth also gives them more agency. This approach is used by agencies such as Credit Suisse ("Global Wealth Report 2019") to show how the richest one percent corners 90% of the wealth of the world. There is little in the way of regulation, governance or oversight, making it difficult to keep predatory corporates in check. In developed countries where the State ensures social security, the poorest are at least able to maintain a better living standard compared to the developing countries. In developing countries, there are layers of economic exclusion that come from social, racial, and cultural demographic factors. Some of these economic exclusion layers are peculiar and particularly apply to their specific, subaltern social settings. Given these complexities, it is beneficial to consider the effect of Brexit on India-UK relations using a post-colonial lens (Strongman 1343).

Challenges for Indian policymakers towards inequality are substantially different from the UK. India is home to about 17% of the world's population (according to 2011 census estimates) and its share in the world's GDP was 6.77% in 2020 (Statista). The distribution of income and opportunities to India's population strikes as the first challenge. India is starting from a low base comparatively; the poorest of the poor in India are much worse off compared to most of the world. The distribution of not just income and resources, but also of public goods such as sanitation, transport, healthcare, education, quality of air and drinking water, is also a governance challenge. The size of the population and the lack of sufficient and effective public infrastructure imply poor physical quality of life for India's large population. The role of international development governance is a vital issue to consider during India-UK trade negotiations. Reducing inequalities and the eradication of poverty is not just limited to checking income distribution. International development is also about making public goods equally accessible to all of India.

Other aspects of regional inequalities in India come from a large (69%) rural population. Rural and agricultural sectors don't grow at the same rates as industrial sectors. In 2015, Moody's report had indicated that India's slow growth of the rural economy was impacting overall growth indicators (The Economic Times). Indian states (provincial governments) also show growth variations in terms of size, geography, resources, urbanisation, health indicators, and education levels. Additional Indian population demographics, along the lines of tribal or scheduled castes people, also experience differences in economic growth. One policy response could be to target development funding in specific Indian regions assessed as being a priority. There needs to be a "Rawlsian framework of "differential treatment" (or "special status") to realise both vertical and horizontal equity in a genuinely federal system" (Kumar).

India had been among the net beneficiaries of aid from the UK, given its high poverty levels. In 2014, India was the top recipient (among the Commonwealth Nations) of Official Development Assistance (ODA) from the UK. "The largest amount of ODA the UK contributes is US$459.43 million to India" (The Commonwealth Secretariat). In 2015, the UK stopped giving aid to India, since it had started on a trajectory of economic growth (Rowlatt). In 2018, political leaders from the opposition started raising objections in parliamentary debates in relation to the £98m aid money given to India by the UK government ("Fury over UK's 'unjustifiable' £98m foreign aid injection for India"). But by this time, the assistance to India from the UK government was in the form of "investments" and "technical assistance," not aid. The Department for International Development (DFID), now known as Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), is responsible for disbursement of the UK's foreign aid budget. DFID claims that these initiatives benefit both the poor and marginalised in India and help create opportunities for the citizens of the UK ("UK aid to India"). India's economy has seen marked shifts under the contemporary political regime (between 2013 to 2022). Older institutions of development policy have been reformed with changing economic conditions. The role of the state has transformed from 'welfare facilitator' as in the flagship schemes under the older political regime, to a 'business facilitator.' India's economy has shifted markedly in the early 2020 decade due to the COVID-19 global pandemic and India-UK economic ties and future trade agreements will be continuously influenced by such factors.

The top trading sectors where UK and India partner are advanced manufacturing and engineering, digital innovation, higher education, and life sciences. There are also UK-India joint partnerships trading in healthcare, food and drink, financial/legal/ professional services, and sports and gaming.[24] There is no certainty that growth in these sectors will percolate to the rural economy or for the benefit of the least advantaged in India. The government needs to implement a differential re-distributive approach towards the development of these trading sectors. Skill and education initiatives must be targeted in rural regions of India for more employment opportunities for them as well as to pull these potential consumers out of poverty.

[24]See London-based UK India Business Council's report "UK India Business Council: Advocating Business Success in 2020."

Immediately after the Brexit vote in 2016, Indian business groups were uncertain about trading future with the UK.[25] But trade ties between India and the UK grew. With 'business facilitating' policies, India's Ease of Doing Business world ranking improved from 160th in 2016 to 63rd in 2019. This has been particularly encouraging for foreign investors, including the UK, as was noted in the UK India Business Council advocacy reports ("UK India Business Council's 5th Annual Doing Business in India Report: The UK Perspective, 2019"). Due to India's much improved business landscape, India-UK trade agreements should be more easily formed post-Brexit in the 2020s.

The UK had the largest trade deficit with India among the Commonwealth nations in 2019. India's share of imports for the UK, overall, was 2.2%. Among the commonwealth nations, India was the largest source of UK's imports in 2019, with almost a 25% share (House of Commons Library Briefing). The UK exports to India increased in value by nearly a fifth (19.3%) between 2017 and 2018. Of these, nearly 70% were goods, with total goods exports from the UK to India totalling £5.5 billion in 2018 ("Department of International Trade"). In 2016, the UK was the third largest investor in India. About 8.0% of the total FDI inflows in the country came from the UK. Since then, several British companies have become interested in forming business links and investing in India, especially after the launch of the Make in India campaign (FICCI, India Report). By 2020 India became the second largest investor in the UK (Business Standard).

Another key strategy in India's trade promotion is the idea of *Competitive Federalism.*[26] India has a federally structured government which tilts towards the union. The state governments in the states were also given autonomy with respect to trade agreements by mid-1990, after the liberalisation reforms. The coalition central government of the United Front in 1996 was led by leaders from regional parties, who reformed the Foreign Investment Promotion Board (FIPB) (Jenkins 1999). This restructuring placed a development onus on the chief minister in each Indian state to negotiate for economic growth in their state (Rudolph and Rudolph 231). Competitive Federalism also implies that the state governments must negotiate their share in the central government's allocation of resources for development. They also must compete for investments and reduce bureaucratic delays or red tape. Business lobbies, such as the UK India Business Council (UKIBC),[27] acknowledge India's regional diversity in this context too. Subaltern heterogeneity of India's regions will impact the new discourses of development from the FDI investment point of view.

Trade negotiations are difficult at the best of times. They can become derailed if factors not prevalent at the time of successful completion of a trade negotiation gain increased significance. It has been indicated earlier how a country's least developed country status could be re-designated over time. The EU, WTO, UN, or some other

[25]A survey was conducted among business groups to understand their perceptions about India-UK trade relations post-Brexit by FICCI. Report based on the survey was published in July 2016, Titled "BREXIT: Views and Suggestions from India Inc."
[26]See NITI Aayog, Government of India, mandate, "Competitive Federalism," https://www.niti.gov.in/competitive-federalism.
[27]See UK India Business Council's 15 Oct. 2015 online post "Competitive Federalism in India," https://www.ukibc.com/competitive-federalism-in-india/.

supranational agency or the USA could re-position a country's development effecting preferential or differentiated trade access. Special conditions enable the UK to remain compliant with WTO regulations and insulate India from a future upgrading of her development status. There is broad harmony among other global supranational agencies, for some of the principles of the WTO regarding agriculture. The WTO uses a decision-making tool called Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS) to assist least developed countries in selling their crops. The AMS is a price support mechanism where qualifying countries get subsidies for their agricultural produce. There can often be a shortfall between the domestic procurement price of a developing country's crops compared to the external reference price set by the WTO. Using AMS, the WTO can give a least developed country up to 10% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to subsidise its agricultural produce. For a developing country, AMS price support is capped at 5% of the country's GDP. There is a WTO differential between the amount of AMS a least developed country can receive, compared to the cap applied to developed countries. This cap is called the de minimis percentage level of support (WTO, "Examples of provision for differential and more favourable treatment of developing countries"). Other global supranational entities have similar agricultural crop price support schemes, which can also be used to pay import. They can choose to change the differential de minimis percentage from that of the WTO's 5%. The WTO itself has special conditions to suit individual commitments prevailing at a given time. This flexibility with de minimis WTO AMS price support has resonance in future trade negations between India and the UK post-Brexit.

> (e) special and differential treatment in respect of commitments has been provided a set out on the relevant provisions of the Agreement and embodied in the Schedules of concessions and commitments. In the Schedules the developing country Members with a total AMS have had to make reductions of 13.33 per cent as against 20 per cent for the developed country Members. Similarly the single average reduction of tariff for the developing countries Members was only by 24 per cent (subject to a minimum of 10 per cent) as against 36 per cent (subject to a minimum of 15 per cent) for the developed country members. (WTO, "Examples of provision for differential and more favourable treatment of developing countries")

Complexities surrounding the rules of origin of various goods, from agricultural produce to car parts, can make trade negotiations problematic. The EU has list rules, known as Product Specific Rules of Origin, to abide for obtaining preferential originating status when exporting goods. The two main EU principles to consider under the list rules are: one, 'wholly obtained products,' where just one country is involved in the materials used to manufacture the goods; and two, 'sufficiently worked or processed products,' which is applicable when one country supplies some raw materials, and a different country partly manufactures the articles for export. Appraisal of the sufficient proportion of 'working or processing' required to obtain preferential origin trading access is decided by the EU list rules. There are other existing trade agreements and rules-based stakeholders that India and the UK will need to consider in their trade negotiations post-Brexit. For example, both CETA (EU-Canada Comprehensive and Economic Trade Agreement) and PEM Convention (The Regional Convention on pan-Euro-Mediterranean preferential rules of origin) combine additional preferential rules of origin criteria to exporting manufacturers. These criteria generally fall within the following basic classifications: 'Wholly obtained requirement,' 'Change in tariff classification,' 'Value or weight limitation,' and 'Specific working or processing' (European Commission 16–17).

> These list rules describe the working or processing of non-originating materials that have to undergo to acquire preferential origin. Each preferential arrangement contains list rules.
>
> Products which have been "produced exclusively from original materials" will always be considered as originating products either by being wholly obtained, sufficiently worked or processed, or having used originating materials from a partner country through cumulation. This is mentioned in some preferential arrangements as a third criterion, like CETA. (European Commission 16)

The WTO AMS price support mechanism, and/or the policy harmonisation around EU rules of origin regulations, provide an early warning. India and the UK will have to be aware of these complexities in complying with such regulations. They need to consider the effects of any future trade negotiations on existing FTA and international relationships elsewhere post-Brexit. Both parties could be diminished geopolitically, if a negotiated trade deal results in unintentionally damaging other countries. Externalities beyond the control of either India or the UK could be problematic to one or both parties. A new trade agreement could tip the balance, resulting in certain suppliers now not being able to sell their agricultural or other goods. India has been involved in a legal case between a European company and an EU Customs Office, regarding Non-preferential Origin assessment. The Claimant alleged the Defendant had allowed the dumping of unfairly subsidised goods, in breach of EU rules of origin legislation (CJEU Case C-373/08).

Our conceptual theoretical review has shone a critical lens on some causal factors, which will have traction in the UK's post-Brexit trade negotiations. We found there are two main principles which may influence the development trajectory of new trade relationships between Commonwealth countries and the UK post-Brexit. The 'Preferential access' principle was manifest in many forms. We discovered several potential problems with suggested policy formulation regarding visa liberalisation. There were also foreseeable difficulties with differential access for some citizens compared to others. Student exchanges maybe curtailed if the Erasmus+ type schemes prevent participation of Commonwealth countries in the UK post-Brexit. Our review of literature harmonised with findings from other research studies which predict a significant economic downturn for the UK post-Brexit. The likely prospect of a shrinking UK economy has security and defence implications too. Questions have been raised regarding the UK's ability and/or desire to continue to contribute to NATO at pre-Brexit levels. In 2020, the UK Government reconfirmed assurances given earlier in the affirmative. NATO is not part of or controlled by the EU.

We found a multitude of compliance and trade regulations issues, which would have to be addressed in future trade negotiations post-Brexit. To understand which subsidies can be applied, where and when, is exceedingly complex. The appraisal landscape continually keeps shifting when we consider policy, protocol, and what is intended by various legislations. We found the critical review challenging due to the numerous externalities which could affect trade negotiations. Trade subsidies could change if India's development status were to be re-designated by a supranational organisation, for example the EU or the WTO. This could make negotiating trade deals in, for example, food, commodities, or IT even more complex. The British Commonwealth will remain after Brexit, but its former importance, along with the geopolitical status of the UK will diminish. The United Kingdom may disintegrate altogether if Scottish, Welsh, or Northern Ireland people were to choose independence. There is an increasing swathe of the UK citizens living in these regions who are unhappy at being forced to leave the EU. In the event of successful regional votes for independence, the United Kingdom may begin to collapse.

India and the United Kingdom have a long history of trade relations. It can be traced back to colonization by the British East India Company, an enterprise formed by the Royal Charter of 1600. The Company operating in India even had judicial powers at the beginning of the establishment. It was deemed necessary by the Crown to vest judicial powers with the company for its smooth functioning. Until 1726, when the Mayor's Courts were established, the company was all powerful, able to administer justice according to "equity and good conscience" (Cowell 11). The trading elites had extensive legal agency, concordant with considerable societal power in the seventeenth and eighteenth century. But as India became an independent state, the membership of the Commonwealth was a contentious issue among the political elites from various factions. However, the Indian government decided to stay in the Commonwealth because it did not want to be isolated internationally. The Commonwealth offered a degree of autonomous flexibility and was compatible with the non-aligned policy as well (Brecher 65). At this point, India was a closed economy, remaining so until the 1990s. The Commonwealth was not an economic platform, but the UK did provide aid and technical assistance to its members.

Within the Commonwealth, India's share of trade as a percentage of all of UK's trade (imports and exports balance) with the Commonwealth was the highest at 18.5% in 2019 (House of Commons Library Briefing). This indicates India's increasing economic importance within the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth has positioned itself as the mediator for trade ties between the UK and the member-nations post-Brexit. However, a former Prime Minister of Australia has been boldly critical of the Commonwealth, serving as the post-Brexit saviour for the UK (Rudd). But the Indian government and business lobbies have used UK Brexit to their advantage, at least in the popular narrative. With the growth spurt in the economy, India has become a popular destination for investments. Since the Brexit vote in 2016, direct investments between India and the UK have increased. The two nations share a common historical, cultural, and economic relationship; their post-Brexit relations should be conducive to trade. Postcolonial and dependency frameworks can complement each other by critiquing their extremities and filling up the analytical gaps left by each (Kapoor 647). Both India and UK can redefine industrial policy by making it more socially inclusive, as well as economically empowering for some of India's population.

The UK's colonial past manifest in the form of the British Empire will affect future trade negotiations with Commonwealth countries post-Brexit. However, the nature of that effect may well work in the former colony's favour. The perception of who will benefit from these changes largely depends on a particular stakeholder's remit and standpoint. Increased sales from India to the UK on some goods could produce geopolitical tension. The effect Brexit will have on the Commonwealth as a whole will be more nuanced. We found three policy drivers which increased the likelihood that trade deals would be finalised between India and the UK relatively swiftly. One factor is the UK's self-esteem; it would not want to be seen as having difficulties establishing trade ties with the Commonwealth countries. The second policy driver is pragmatics, the UK will need to conclude trade arrangements quickly, having severed internal trading relations with the EU27. There are acute UK domestic problems manifest as supply chain blockages caused by ongoing trade problems with the EU. The third policy driver is that the UK is genuinely ashamed of its exploitative colonial past with India. Securing trade deals which are mutually beneficial to both parties will help assuage some of the guilt. The UK-India new trading relationship will flourish post-Brexit, with a reversal of the commercial roles from the colonial times (Giddens).[28]

[28]Anthony Giddens gave the Reith Lectures series in 1999. There were five lectures in the series, each discussed some of the main concepts in Anthony Giddens' book *Runaway World*. This is a transcript of Lecture 1 from the Reith Lectures 1999 called "Globalisation." Giddens here elaborates on the reversal of colonial roles of the East and the West in the globalized world.

Works Cited

Artata, Stephen D. "The Occidental Tourist: "Dracula" and the Anxiety of Reverse Colonization." *Victorian Studies,* vol. 33, no. 4, 1990, pp. 621–645.

Bakker, Jan David, et al. *Post-Brexit Imports, Supply Chains, and the Effect on Consumer Prices*. UK in a Changing Europe, 2022. https://ukandeu.ac.uk/wpcontent/uploads/2022/04/UKICE-Supply-Chains-Report_Final.pdf.

BBC. "Barack Obama says Brexit would leave UK at the 'back of the queue' on trade." *Politics,* 22 April 2016. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-36115138.

BBC Newsnight. 4 March 2021. https://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/m000stq1/newsnight-04032021.

Black, James, et al. *Defence and Security after Brexit: Understanding the possible implications of the UK's decision to leave the EU: Compendium report,* RAND Corporation, 2017, https://doi.org/10.7249/RR1786.

Blanchflower, David. "'Britain is fast becoming the sick man or Europe' - experts debate Brexit data." *The Guardian*, 24 July 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/jul/24/britain-is-fast-becoming-the-sick-man-of-europe-experts-debate-brexit-data.

Blenkinsop, Philip. "EU sues Britain again, saying Northern Ireland bill erodes trust." *Reuters*, 22 July 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/uk/eu-launches-four-legal-procedures-against-uk-over-northern-ireland-2022-07-22/.

Brattberg, Erik, et al. "Contending European Views on a New Post-Brexit Balance." *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, March 2020. https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Brattberg_Post-Brexit.pdf.

Brecher, Michael. "India's Decision to Remain in the Commonwealth." *Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, vol. 12, no. 1, 1974, pp. 62–90.

Business Standard. "India moves up a rank, becomes second-largest foreign investor in UK." 10 July 2020. https://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/india-moves-up-a-rank-becomes-second-largest-foreign-investor-in-uk-120071001461_1.html.

Campbell, John. "Brexit: What is Article 16 of the Northern Ireland Protocol." *BBC News*, 17 May 2022. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-58790419.

Canton, Naomi. "We're beneficiaries of reverse colonialism." *The Times of India*, 17 August 2017. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/uk/were-beneficiaries-of-reverse-colonialism-boris/articleshow/60092530.cms.

Capoccia, Giovanni. "Critical junctures." *The Oxford Handbook of Historical Institutionalism*, edited by Karl Orfeo Fierotos, Tulia Gariella Falleti and Adam D. Sheingate, Oxford UP, 2016, pp. 89–106.

Centre for Preventive Action. "Conflict Between and India and Pakistan." *Council for Foreign Relations: Global Conflict Tracker*, 12 May 2022. https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-between-india-and-pakistan.

Chandra, Bipan. "Colonial India: British versus Indian views of development." *Review*, 1991, pp. 81–167.

Chanda, Rupa, and Neha Vinod Betai. "Implications of Brexit for Skilled Migration from India to the UK." *Foreign Trade Review*, vol. 56, no. 3, 2021, pp. 289–300.

Chase, Kerry. "Multilateralism compromised: the mysterious origins of GATT article XXIV." *World Trade Review*, vol. 5, no. 1, 2006, pp. 1–30. http://people.brandeis.edu/~chase/research/wtr06.pdf.

Chauhan, Pradeep S. "BREXIT and India: Challenges and Opportunities." *Brexit and After*, 2021, pp. 189–198.

Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). *Judgement of the Court (Third Chamber) Case C-373/08, 11 February 2010*. Court of Justice of the European Union. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62008CJ0373&from=EN.

Cowell, Herbert. *The History and Constitution of the Courts and Legislative Authorities in India*. ThackerSpink and Co, 1884. https://indianculture.gov.in/history-and-constitution-courts-and-legislative-authorities-india-0.

Crowley, M. "Trade." *Brexit: what next?* edited by Anand Menon, The UK in a Changing Europe, 2020, pp. 5–6. https://ukandeu.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Brexit-what-next-report.pdf.

Curtis, John. "Northern Ireland Protocol: Article 16 and EU vaccine export controls." *House of Commons Library*, 2 February 2021. https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/northern-ireland-protocol-article-16-and-eu-vaccine-export-controls/.

Dave, Aaditya. "Integrated Review: The UK's Approach to India." *RUSI (Royal United Services Institute) Commentary*, 5 May 2020. https://rusi.org/commentary/integrated-review-uks-approach-india.

Descartes Customs Information website. *What are Antidumping and Countervailing Duties?* 12 July 2021. https://www.customsinfo.com/knowledge-center/what-are-antidumping-and-countervailing-duties.

Dhar, Biswajit. "In U.S. trade action, an Indian Counter Strategy." *The Hindu*, 19 February 2020. https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/in-us-trade-action-an-indian-counter-strategy/article30854131.ece.

Dugal, Manleen. “Special and Differential Treatment in Fisheries Subsidies Negotiations: Priorities for Pacific SIDS.” *Commonwealth Trade Hot Topic*, no. 158, 2020.

European Commission. *Preferential Trade: Guidance on the Rules of Origin*, June 2020. https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/01_2019_guidance_preferential_origin.pdf.

Evans, Geoffrey, and Mellon, Jonathan. “Immigration, Euroscepticism, and the rise and fall of UKIP.” *Party Politics*, vol. 25, no. 1, 2019, pp. 76–87.

Evenett, Simon J. “Beyond tariff preferences and trade deals.” *The impact of the UK’s post-Brexit trade policy on development: An essay series*, edited by Max Mendez-Parra, Dirk Willem te Velde and L. Alan Winters. Overseas Development Institute (ODI) and UK Trade Policy Observatory (UKTPO), 9 September 2016, pp. 28–29. https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/10852.pdf.

FICCI, India Report. “BREXIT: Views and Suggestions from India Inc.” July 2016.

Fitch Ratings. “Fitch Downgrades the UK to ‘AA-’; Negative Outlook.” *Rating Action Commentary*, 27 March 2020. https://www.fitchratings.com/research/structured-finance/fitch-downgrades-uk-to-aa-negative-outlook-27-03-2020.

Foreign and Commonwealth (FCO). “FCO Strategy White Paper: UK International Priorities.” *Hansard*, vol. 415, 2 December 2003, col. 56WS–58WS, https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2003-12-02/debates/5926ffae-fd01-446b-bce6-49203779477b/FcoStrategyWhitePaperUkInternationalPriorities.

“Fury over UK’s ‘unjustifiable’ £98m foreign aid injection for India.” *Sky News*, 3 Sept 2018. https://news.sky.com/story/fury-over-uks-unjustifiable-98m-foreign-aid-injection-for-india-11489332#:~:text=The%20UK%20is%20to%20hand,%C2%A346m%20in%202019%2F20.

Ghosh, Baidyanath N. *Dependency Theory Revisited*. Routledge, 2019.

Giddens, Anthony. “Globalisation.” *The Reith Lectures 1999: Runaway World*, Lecture 1, 7 April 1999. http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/rmhttp/radio4/transcripts/1999_reith1.pdf.

“Global Wealth Report 2019.” *Credit Suisse*, Zurich, Switzerland. https://www.credit-suisse.com/about-us/en/reports-research/global-wealth-report.html.

Goldsworthy, Chris. *UK Trading Partners and Trade Relationships: 2020 – A detailed analysis of UK international trade relationships by partner country*, 2 December 2020. Office for National Statistics (ONS). https://www.ons.gov.uk/businessindustryandtrade/internationaltrade/articles/uktradingpartnersananalysisoftraderelationships/2020/pdf.

Government of UK. "UK aid to India: UK no longer gives money to Indian government." *DFID in the News*, 27 December 2018. https://dfidnews.blog.gov.uk/2018/12/27/uk-aid-to-india-uk-no-longer-gives-any-money-to-indian-government/.

---. "Department of International Trade." 2021. https://www.great.gov.uk/markets/India/.

Gregory, Andy. "Britain misses its empire more than other major post-colonial powers, polls find." *The Independent*. 11 Mar. 2020. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/british-empire-colonialism-slavery-yougov-poll-nationalism-brexit-a9393486.html?r=31008.

Gupta, Moushami Das. "Govt panel fails to define 'poverty line', says form another group to do the job." *Hindustan Times*, 12 Sept. 2016. Online Edition. https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/a-govt-panel-on-poverty-doesn-t-know-what-it-is/story-bsPvj90skcTbKJRFdxtAsM.html.

Hall, Sarah. "The economics of UK financial services post Brexit." *The Economics of Brexit: What have we learned?* Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), pp. 63–69, June 2022. https://cepr.org/sites/default/files/publication-files/168056-the_economics_of_brexit_what_have_we_learned_.pdf.

Hearne, David, et al. "The Commonwealth: a panacea for the UK's post-Brexit trade ills?" *Contemporary Social Science*, vol. 14, no. 2, 2019, pp. 341–360.

Helm, Toby. "Food scarcity fears prompts plan to ease post-Brexit checks on EU imports." *The Guardian*, 6 March 2021. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2021/mar/06/food-scarcity-fears-prompt-plan-to-ease-post-brexit-checks-on-eu-imports.

Hoekman, Bernard, et al. *UK trade with developing countries after Brexit: What is the evidence base? Where are the research gaps?* UK Trade Policy Observatory (UKTPO), October 2016. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5b69baa6e5274a1504efd535/DFID_scoping_paper.pdf.

Hope, Mike. *The economic impact of Brexit on London*. Greater London Authority, October 2019. www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/brexit-analysis-final.pdf.

House of Commons Library Briefing. "Statistics on UK Trade with the Commonwealth." Briefing Paper No. CBP 8282, 19 June 2020.

Igwe, Paul, Agu. "The Paradox of Brexit and the Consequences of Taking Back Control." *Societies* (MDPI), vol. 12, no. 69, 2022.

International Crisis Group. "Keeping Kashmir on the Radar." *Commentary: Asia*, 27 Jan. 2022. https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/india-pakistan-kashmir/keeping-kashmir-radar.

Jackson, Mark. *Global Talent, Global Reach: An economic analysis of UK architecture exports and the impact of Brexit*, Royal Institute of British Architects (RIBA), December 2017. https://www.architecture.com/-/media/gathercontent/core-cpd/additional-documents/ribaglobaltalentglobalreachreportpdf.pdf.

Jacques Delors Institute. *The Four Freedoms in the EU: Are They Inseparable?* Jacques Delors Institute, 2017. https://institutdelors.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/171024jdigrundfreiheitenenwebeinzelseitena4.pdf.

Jenkins, Rob. *Democratic Politics and Economic Reform in India*. Cambridge UP. Kindle Edition. 1999.

Kapoor, Ilan. "Capitalism, Culture, Agency: Dependency versus Postcolonial Theory." *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 23, no. 4, 2002, pp. 647–664.

Kassim, Hussein. "Relations with the EU." *Brexit: what next?* edited by Anand Menon, The UK in a Changing Europe, February 2020, pp. 7–8. https://ukandeu.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Brexit-what-next-report.pdf.

Kohli, Atul. *State-Directed Development: Political Power and Industrialization in the Global Periphery*. Cambridge UP, 2004.

---. *Poverty Amid Plenty in the New India*. Cambridge UP, 2012.

Kreling, Beth. "India and the Commonwealth: A Symbiotic Relationship?" *The Round Table*, vol. 98, no. 400, 2009, pp. 49–66.

Kumar, Ashwani. "Has Bihar been betrayed?" *Business Standard*, 2 October 2013. http://www.business-standard.com/article/opinion/ashwani-kumar-has-bihar-been-betrayed-113100200953_1.html.

Lawrence, Matthew. *Future Proof: Britain in the 2020s*, IPPR (Institute for Public Policy Research), December 2016. https://www.ippr.org/files/2017-07/future-proof-dec2016.pdf.

Lyons, Gerald, et al. "The Implications of Brexit for the UK Economy." *LSE EUROPP*, 2 April 2020. https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2020/02/04/the-implications-of-brexit-for-the-uk-economy/.

Mason, Rowena, and Daniel Boffey. "EU poised to take legal action UK over Northern Ireland protocol bill." *The Guardian*, 13 Jun. 2022. https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2022/jun/13/uk-risks-brexit-eu-trade-war-as-northern-ireland-protocol-bill-is-published.

McBride, James. "The Commonwealth of Nations: Brexit and the Future of 'Global Britain.'" *Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder*, 5 March 2020. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/commonwealth-nations-brexit-and-future-global-britain.

McKenzie, Michael. "Case Note: European Communities – Conditions for the granting of tariff preferences to developing countries." *Melbourne Journal of International Law*, vol. 6, 2005, pp. 1–23, https://law.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0010/1681147/McKenzie.pdf.

Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. *India-UK Joint Declaration*, September 20, 2004. New Delhi, Ministry of External Affairs Government of India. https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/7462.

Menon, Anand, and Sarah Hall. *Services and Brexit*. The UK in a Changing Europe, June 2020. https://ukandeu.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Services-and-Brexit.pdf.

Mukherjee, Bhaswati. "Negotiating with the EU and the UK Post Brexit: Opportunities and Challenges for India." *Journal of Polity and Society*, vol. 13, no. 1, 2021, pp. 3–8.

Namusoke, Eva. "A Divided Family: Race, the Commonwealth and Brexit." *The Round Table*, vol. 105, no. 5, 2016, pp. 463–476.

Nwankwo, Cletus Famous. "Brexit: Critical Juncture in the UK's International Development Agenda?" *Open Political Science*, vol. 1, no. 1, 2018, pp. 16–19.

Northern Ireland Assembly. Education Service. *The Belfast Agreement/Good Friday Agreement 1998*. https://education.niassembly.gov.uk/post_16/snapshots_of_devolution/gfa.

O'Carroll, Lisa. "US 'will not entertain' UK trade deal that risks Good Friday agreement." *The Guardian*, 24 March 2022. https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2022/mar/24/us-will-not-entertain-uk-trade-deal-that-risks-good-friday-agreement.

Oliver, Tim, and Michael John Williams. "Special relationships in flux: Brexit and the future of the US-EU and US-UK relationships." *International Affairs*, vol. 92, no. 3, 2016, pp. 545–567.

Palmeter, David. "The WTO as a legal system." *Fordham International Law Journal*, vol. 24, no. 1, 2000, pp. 444–480, https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1744&context=ilj.

Pant, Harsh V., and Tom Milford. "The UK Shifts to the Indo-Pacific: An Opportunity for India-UK Ties." *ORF Issue Brief No. 444*, February 2021, Observer Research Foundation. www.orfonline.org/research/the-uk-shifts-to-the-indo-pacific-an-opportunity-for-india-uk-ties/.

"Report of the Expert Group on Estimation of Proportion and Number of Poor." *Planning Commission of India, Government of India*, New Delhi, 1993.

"Report of the Expert Group to Review the Methodology for Measurement of Poverty." *Planning Commission of India, Government of India*, New Delhi, 2014.

Rice, Clare. "Article 16 of the Northern Ireland Protocol." *UK in a Changing Europe: Explainer*, 8 February 2021. https://ukandeu.ac.uk/explainers/article-16-of-the-northern-ireland-protocol/.

Ries, Charles P., et al. *The End of the Beginning: Assessing the Potential Economic Implications of Prolonged UK-EU Trade Policy Uncertainty*, RAND Corporation, 2020. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR4265.html.

Rosamond, Ben. "Brexit and the problem of European disintegration." *Journal of Contemporary European Research*, vol. 12, no. 4, 2016.

Rowlatt, Justin. "UK ending aid to India: Where does the money go?" *BBC News*. 7 October 2015. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-34398449**.**

Rudolph, Lloyd I, and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph. "Iconization of Chandrababu: Sharing Sovereignty in India's Federal Market Economy." *India's Economic Transition: The Politics of Reforms*, edited by Rahul Mukherji. Oxford UP, 2010, pp. 231–264.

Rudd, Kevin. "Think the Commonwealth can save Brexit Britain? That's utter delusion." *The Guardian*, 11 March 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/mar/11/commonwealth-save-brexit-britain-utter-delusion-kevin-rudd.

Rudloff, Bettina and Evita Schmieg. "Brexit: A Pragmatic Trade Agreement, Time is Tight but Deal Remains Possible." *SWP Comment No. 18* (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik), 15 April 2020. https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2020C18/.

Sandford, Alasdair. "Post-Brexit Guide: Where are we now – and how did we get here?" *Euronews*, 11 June 2020. https://www.euronews.com/2020/06/11/brexit-draft-deal-first-of-many-hurdles-to-a-smooth-exit.

Sen, Anupam. *The State, Industrialization and Class Formations in India: A Neo-Marxist Perspective on Colonialism, Underdevelopment and Development*. Routledge, 2017.

Scott, David. "The Rise of India: UK Perspectives." *International Affairs*, vol. 93, no. 1, 2017, pp. 165–188.

Sloan, Geoffrey. "The Geopolitics of Post-Brexit Britain." *Foreign Policy Research Institute*, 11 June 2020. https://www.fpri.org/article/2020/06/the-geopolitics-of-post-brexit-britain/.

Srinivasan, Krishnan. "India and the Commonwealth." *The Round Table*, vol. 88, no. 351, 1999, pp. 445–448.

Stewart, Kitty, et al. "What does Brexit mean for Social Policy in the UK? An explanation of the potential consequences of the 2016 referendum for public services, inequalities and social rights." *SPDO research paper 3*, Social Policies and Distributional Outcomes in a Changing Britain, February 2019. https://www.nuffieldfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/spdorp03.pdf.

Stiglitz, Joseph. *The Price of Inequality*. Penguin Books Ltd. Kindle Edition, 2012.

Stojanovic, Alex. "Will the UK benefit from an Independent Trade Policy." *Institute for Government Comment*, 3 April 2019. https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/blog/will-uk-benefit-independent-trade-policy.

Strongman, Luke. "Postcolonialism and International Development Studies: A Dialectical Exchange?" *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 35, no. 8, 2014, pp. 1343–1354.

Swinbank, Alan. "4. Possible implications of 'Brexit' for Australia's trade with the UK and the European Union." *Parliamentary Business*, 11 April 2019, Parliament of Australia. https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Foreign_Affairs_Defence_and_Trade/tradewithUK/Interim_Report/section?id=committees%2Freportjnt%2F024101%2F25068#footnote39ref.

Statista. "The 20 countries with the largest proportion of the global gross domestic product (GDP) based on Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) in 2020." 2020. https://www.statista.com/statistics/270183/countries-with-the-largest-proportion-of-global-gross-domestic-product-gdp/.

The Commonwealth Secretariat. *Brexit: Its Implications and Potential for the Commonwealth*, 2016. https://thecommonwealth.org/sites/default/files/inline/160920_CFMM_BREXIT_FINAL_GENERAL%20VERSION.pdf.

The Economic Times. "Rural economy of India weakens; development is credit negative for India warns Moody's." 1 July 2015. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/indicators/rural-economy-of-india-weakens-development-is-credit-negative-for-india-warns-moodys/articleshow/47877915.cms.

The Irish News. *EU invokes Article 16, introduces controls on vaccine exports to Northern Ireland*, 29 January 2021. www.irishnews.com/news/healthcarenews/2021/01/29/news/eu-invokes-article-16-introducing-controls-on-vaccine-exports-to-northern-ireland-2203719/.

Thomas, Martin, and Andrew Thompson. "Empire and Globalisation: from 'High Imperialism' to decolonisation." *The International History Review*, vol. 36, no. 1, 2014, pp. 142–170.

Tripathi, Dhananjay. "Evaluating Brexit Implications for India's Relations with the EU and the UK." *International Studies*, vol. 58, no. 2, 2021, pp. 234–247.

Tomlinson, Brian Roger. *The Economy of Modern India, 1860-1970*. Cambridge UP, 1996.

UK EU Withdrawal Agreement. "Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Norther Ireland and the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community." *EUR-Lex*, 12019W/TXT(02) 2019/C 384 I/01, pp. 1–77, 12 November 2019. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1580206007232&uri=CELEX%3A12019W/TXT%2802%29.

"UK India Business Council's 5th Annual Doing Business in India Report: The UK Perspective, 2019." London, UK.

United Kingdom Government (GOV.UK). *The Rt Hon Boris Johnson*. GOV.UK, 8 September 2022. https://www.gov.uk/government/people/boris-johnson.

United Nations/Inter-agency Task Force on Financing for Development (ITFFD). *Financing for Sustainable Development Report 2021*. https://developmentfinance.un.org/fsdr2021.

Ward, Matthew. "Statistics on UK-EU Trade." *House of Commons Library Briefing Paper*, Number 7851, 3 December 2021. https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-7851/CBP-7851.pdf.

Watt, Nick. "Interview discussing letter from Liz Truss to Michael Gove." *BBC Newsnight*, 8 July 2020, BBC. www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/m000kqz3/newsnight-08072020.

Wheare, Kenneth Clinton. "The Nature and Structure of the Commonwealth." *The American Political Science Review*, vol. 47, no. 4, 1953, pp. 1016–1028.

Whitman, Richard. G. "Brexit or Bremain: What future for the UK's European diplomatic strategy." *International Affairs*, vol. 92, no. 3, 2016, pp. 509–529.

Wood, Geoffrey, and Mark Wright. "What Brexit tells us about institutions and social action." *Socio-Economic Review*, vol. 14, no. 4, 2016, pp. 832–836.

World Bank. *Figures and Estimates (Data Country Profile Indicator)*, 2021. https://data.worldbank.org/country/AU.

World Customs Organisation. *Practical Guide to the Nairobi Ministerial Decisions on Rules of Origin for LDCs*, World Trade Organization, June 2018. http://www.wcoomd.org/-/media/wco/public/global/pdf/topics/key-issues/revenue-package/practical-guide-to-the-nairobi-ministerial-decision-on-rules-of-origin-for-ldcs_en.pdf?la=fr.

World Trade Organisation. "Examples of provision for differential and more favourable treatment of developing countries." *Technical Cooperation*, 2020. www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/teccop_e/s_and_d_eg_e.htm#top.

World Trade Organisation. "EU initiate WTO dispute complaint regarding UK low carbon energy subsidies." *Events and News*, 30 March 2022. www.wto.org/english/news_e/news22_e/ds612rfc_30mar22_e.htm.

Wright, Georgina, et al. "Implementing Brexit: Securing more Time." *Institute for Government*, May 2020. https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/implementing-brexit-securing-more-time.pdf.