



The Tale of *The Magic Mountain* in the Analysis of Paul Ricoeur

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I. Introduction

Even though the intention to avoid identifiable semblances between the intellectual initiative of Thomas Mann and his predecessors is probably an adequate one, the thematic of *The Magic Mountain* forms a web which becomes an ongoing “polyphony.” Rodney Symington notes that Mann acknowledged the technique of counterpoint as applied “...in the most complex and all-pervasive way.” While such a prose can be compared to a succession of musical pieces, to the extent that an inter-relation is recognized, the reader is invited to interpret a flow of ideas (Symington 9, 10). As a result, the novel offers possibilities which provoke various associations. Whether its structure is a vehicle for the expression of philosophical reflections (Symington 11) remains a question to be answered. The allusiveness of textual composition is doubled: “self-referential” and “outward,” that is, to myths, to literature, to music, to history, etc. Both kinds are related to the application of Mann’s principle that everyday events may be interpreted as mythical (Symington 20-1). In this respect, the sense of the cultural problematic of changing epochs is mixed with another dimension. To this is added the intervention of WWI which finally closes what has been a search within a very broad field which includes mind, world, and the intricacies of life. Commenting on this encyclopedian yet ambiguous accumulation, Selin Ever hints that the main achievement of the novel is its form (106).

Along this thread, *The Magic Mountain* succeeds in creating an imaginary space that is outside historical time. While at the end “discordance wins out over concordance,” the novel’s narrative brings an awareness of the multiple temporalities of modernity (McCracken 278). While the time in Sanatorium Berghof is marked by rituals (Ever 111), the Alpine seclusion hosts an option for the peculiar ‘experience’ of an altered level of consciousness. Mann’s interest in this subject promises a re-interpretation of his mature approach. For example, Ever describes the technique to present “the overpowering detachment of

time from history” (111), which draws the distinction between ‘temporality’ and ‘timelessness.’ Paul Ricoeur chooses to investigate these aspects of Mann’s writing or rather the so-called attempt to narrativize “‘irreconcilable’ temporal perspectives” (McCracken 27). For Ricoeur, the modernist novel detects “...temporalities that are more or less extended, offering in each instance a different figure of recollection, of eternity in or out of time [...]” (1985, 101). This description does not exclude ways for reaching out towards what Michael Bell has described as the ‘organization of time as myth.’

II. The play of tense and fictive reality

The introductory issue becomes complicated when ‘subjective’ and ‘progressive’ inclinations are involved, separately or together, with the above-mentioned theoretical couples. In a similar vein, Ricoeur in *Time and Narrative* (Part 3) distinguishes *tales of time* (universal time feature of the transformations that affect the situations and characters in narrative) from *tales about time* (those in which “...it is the very experience of time that is at stake in the structural transformations”) (101). Ricoeur’s claim for such a division is build upon the distinction between utterance and statement. Harald Weinrich (1973) introduced the latter starting from the first effort to verbalize experience which develops into the dissociation of the system of tenses from lived time. The structural perspective between asserting and narrating falls inside a grammar of tenses (Ricoeur 1985, 65-6). Weinrich applies “textual linguistics” in positioning the value of a tense throughout a text.¹ In his book the analyses devoted to temporal transitions—to the “...passage from one sign to the other in the course of the unfolding of the text” (199)—constitute a syntagmatic complement to the paradigmatic division of tenses. Ricoeur takes this passage from a paradigmatic point of view to a syntagmatic one as a lesson for a study of time in fiction (1985, 73). In Weinrich’s work the relation of interlocution guides the reception of the message in order to allow an initial distribution of the tenses. The ‘world’² common to the interlocutors is affected by a purely syntactic distinction (Ricoeur 1985, 67), but the typology of tenses preserves a mimetic feature where the syntactic distinctions (*i.e.* the function of signaling and guidance) result in an “initial schematic partitioning of the world” (Ricoeur 1985, 72-3) in which the relations of narrated and commented worlds to the world of *praxis* are only held in suspension.

¹A text is composed of “...signs arranged in a linear series, transmitted from speaker to listener in a chronological sequence” (198).

²Understood as the sum of possible objects of communication, without any explicit ontological implication.

Despite the established break between *tenses* and *time*, by entering the realm of fiction, the conservation of temporal intention of the tenses can be observed along the axes of communication which relay their distribution. Freeing the latter from the categories of lived time—”neutrality” with respect to time (Weinrich 44)—is crucial for defining the tenses of the narrated world. In Weinrich’s view the “*as if*” of the past and the imperfect tenses, oriented toward an attitude of relaxation (withdrawal), make the world of concern (the preoccupying surroundings) more complex. That the respective groups of tenses—of lived past and of narrative—do not mix goes to underline the persistence of an attitude of relaxation within the tension. In the novel, a genre born out of this involvement-in-withdrawal, they remain superimposed (Weinrich 35-47; Ricoeur 1985, 69-70). For Ricoeur, this relation of the past tenses (filiation and breaking-off) first expresses the past and then, “...by a metaphorical transition that preserves what it supersedes,” states an entry into fiction with an oblique reference to the past as such (1985, 75). In Weinrich’s analysis the subjection of retrospection and anticipation to temporal conditions follows from the linear character of the speech chain. He asserts that the *preterite*³ family of narrative tenses signals only an entry into the narrative and that the notions of future and past can be eliminated, while for Ricoeur these signals retain a connection with the expression of past as such as well as a filiation with the “*as if*” kind. Here Ricoeur evokes Husserl’s discussion of this filiation by neutralization—an oblique reference to the past through the process of phenomenological suspension—and Eugen Fink’s definition of *Bild* as putting mere “presentification” (*Vergegenwartigeri*)⁴ under the same terms. By neutralization of the “realist” intention of memory all absence becomes, by analogy, a quasi-past and every narrative speaks of the unreal as if it were past. In conclusion, if there are no metaphorical relations (produced by neutralization) between narrative and memory, we cannot explain narrative tenses too as parts of memory (Ricoeur 1985, 74). Without this oblique reference to the structure of time we cannot understand what anticipation or retrospection—the primitive retention-protension structure of the living present—means.

³Imperfect, perfect, pluperfect verbs, in themselves indicating that the action has taken place in a past relative to the time of utterance.

⁴According to Currie (30), Ricoeur borrows the term from Muller. See Ricoeur (1985, 78). Other connotations are Heidegger’s term ‘presencing’ and Augustine’s notion of *distentio*: the inclusion of the past and future within the present. For a discussion see Simms (82).

Maurice Natanson's book, *The Erotic Bird: Phenomenology in Literature*, is relevant to these considerations as it collates tropology and transcendental phenomenology. It presents a viewpoint where phenomenological concepts may be said to be 'in' literature. Re-deploying both the metonymical structure of reality's "spatial horizon" and the metaphorical structure of reality's "temporal horizon" amounts to 'showing forth' the results of enquiry in the context of fiction (Natanson 61, 64; Crowell 270-71). In "Phenomenology Is the Poetic Essence of Philosophy: Maurice Natanson on the Rule of Metaphor" (2005), Steven Crowell continues to expound on this matter by pointing out that it is difficult to obtain the result's content in a movement of description that notates a series of connections (which are far from being a story-line, but belong to "intentionality"). In the realm where the noetic intends the noematic,⁵ a description tracks a path traversed in consciousness' own time (Natanson 4, 14-5). A formation of correlates arises as a "purely meant modality of being" (22)—an "irreality" that carries "no ontological weight" (24). What is *meant* "...presents itself in precisely the way it presents itself" (Crowell 272-73). As "evident," it is the sense of my being in a world which is a "fictive reality" (Natanson 37). Being "for me," my encounters, experiences, etc, compete for significance in a reverie. At this point the task of getting results depends on what sort of literature we are dealing with. While Natanson's phenomenology adopts Husserlian transcendental,⁶ he takes an existential turn towards phenomena "...intersubjectively recognized as fugitive to cognition, but naggingly present in our daily lives" (9–10). The trace of the transcendental is uncovered as the uncanny which challenges the mundane (56). Seen from the borderline of experience, the familiar appears to "win out" over the strange (53). For this reason, if phenomenology explores the origin of the familiar, Crowell asks: How does it describe the essentially unfamiliar? (274). For Husserl, commitments to the "reality" of an intentional experience are bracketed. The correlative focus encompasses noematic (meaningful) built-ups and noetic acts (Crowell 274-5).

Nevertheless, phenomenology may become an art of 'reduction' by employing tropes in order to delineate the correlative field and to disclose its uncanny origins in the transcendental. Natanson dubs Husserl's reduction "a perpetual reconnoitering of the

⁵In the *life-world* the correlates are taken for granted; 'intentiveness' of consciousness is hidden from the ordinary activity of perception (Natanson 26).

⁶"[d]istinction between the empirical-psychological and the phenomenological-transcendental" (Natanson 128); the transcendental must avoid concepts that pertain to the discipline of psychology.

life-world” (Natanson 42). It is an “inherently poetic” and philosophical idea (6, 7). Adding the concepts of horizon, sedimentation, and current of existence threaten to identify the work of phenomenology with literary imagination, but in Natanson’s view its terminology is united in the notion of fictive reality (Crowell 276). Constitution has to do only with the aspects “which are born of *consciousness*” (Natanson 18). The latter is conceived on its own “terrain”—the purely *meant* order of the fictive (30). Hence, the term “constitution” is a trope that signifies the sense in which reality is “made.” Understanding this character has to do with the role of literature (Crowell 277). If we accept the dichotomy of ‘common sense’ and ‘poetic imagination,’ and say that the fictive lies in-between, we must insist that the intentional content of imagining is not identified with a psychological act. The fictive is that which is neutral, for example, the emotional charge of references to poetic entities or to reality (Natanson 31-2). The difference between these two cases is irrelevant for understanding meaning which cannot be reduced to either of the elements of a correlate (Crowell 278). The integrity of the fictive (irreducible to the content of the author’s or the reader’s minds) sets the relation of philosophy and literature. Natanson’s approach to the transcendental making that underlies the *life-world* is through the kind of constitution that belongs to literature (Natanson 31). In reading emerges a unity of meaning that transcends both the specific words and their animation in the mind. This structure exists only in a performance which is constrained by a work (*ergon*) that has freed itself from its author (Crowell 279). As a form, the intentional correlate takes hold of oneself when a moment in “internal time-consciousness” is transformed into structure. Phenomenology inquires into the horzonal structure of the *life-world*⁷ in order to uncover the origins of the *meant* (Crowell 280).

The notion of horizon sums up intentional objects standing out “...against the background of their spatial and temporal surroundings” while keeping “their halos, their fringes” (Natanson 45). According to Natanson, the trope (as a kind of messenger of the *apriori*) tracks the movement of perceptual consciousness, that is, contains the key to the nature of fictive reality (131). In a perspectival sense, the *external spatial horizon* stretches out from what is immediate to a thing into a near-complete indeterminacy. It is occupied by co-variance, presence

⁷The *life-world* involves “pre-given” (already meaningful) situations and “pre-predicative” aspects of things (Natanson 44).

and absence, concealing and revealing (Crowell 281).⁸ In tropological terms, this structure of the *life-world* has a metonymical character. Horizontal spatiality cannot be reconstructed in terms of objective determinations. Governed by relations of proximity and contiguity, it exhibits an always shifting, metonymical structure—the pre-predicative meaning of what stands out is constituted, in part, by what is “near” it. However, Natanson points to a ‘vertical’ history of the pre-predicative realm” —the ‘sedimentation’ of meaning. This dimension is “...the building up of past experience to constitute the present” (50), which belongs to an “internal horizon” (130) that also constitutes the *meant* as such. It is neither the objective genesis of some content of consciousness nor clock time. Hence, the phenomenological return to origin, which explores the internal horizon that belongs to what is encountered in the *life-world*, cannot be carried out with the ordinary resources of history. Asking about this sort of structure is an inquiry into the sources of transcendental consciousness (50). Keen on distinguishing, Husserl developed an account of passive synthesis, but his doctrine of association failed by treating the internal (temporal) horizon on the model of the external, namely, as a matter of contiguity (Crowell 282).

According to David Wood (2001, xxxvi), the analysis of representations of temporal structures must rescue its descriptions from the uncanny. As an emphasis on this position, Mark Currie adds the search for a clear relation to the structures of the novel and to their effects in the world (1). Such are his own theses in *About Time: Narrative, Fiction and the Philosophy of Time* (2007): the presence requires a kind of self-distance; the present is to a large extent apprehended as the object of a future memory. This tense-based theory starts with fiction, but aims to describe narrative as a mode of being (150). Through the formal logic of temporal structure and a form of internal time, narratology attends to the ways the present is marked by the future (Currie 28). This approach to ‘temporal reference’ is an alternative to the conception that the topic of time is specific only to few narratives, for example, the Modernist novel. Ricoeur frames fiction’s engagement with time within the latter. He builds upon the tension between narrated time (*erzählte Zeit*) and the time of narration (*Erzahlzeit*). This relation was accentuated by Gunther Muller in *Zeiterlebnis und Zeitgerüst*⁹ (1968; Ricoeur 1985, 80). He introduces the term “*armature of time*” [Zeitgerüst] (229-311) as the interplay

⁸The properties of a figure cannot be circumscribed from their functional relation to a surrounding ‘ground.’

⁹Muller, Gunther. *Morphologische Poetik*. Edited by Elena Muller. M. Niemeyer, 1968.

between narrated time and the time taken to narrate. On the other side of Muller's essay, the lived experience of time is the ground of life indifferent to meaning. No intuition can give the meaning of this time, which is never more than intended indirectly by the analysis of the "armature of time." Thus, Thomas Mann's *The Magic Mountain* is concerned with the "poietische Dimension" of "lived" time (303) which is the numinous par excellence. The program of *Morphologische Poetik* aims to uncover the way in which the quantitative relations of time agree with the qualities of time belonging to life itself. While Ricoeur insists that the fundamental time is "codetermined" by the above-mentioned tensional relation and by the resulting "laws of form" (80-1), his theory for description of narrative temporality is additionally complicated by a conjunction with cosmology and phenomenology (Currie 32-3). As Currie notes, thinking about a combination of the aspects of time does not challenge time's one-directionality. Subjective and objective time may seem aporetic, but not in such a way that the forward direction of time is questioned. In terms of a present that is crossed by protentions and retentions, there are various sequences, but the anachronous (as such) are also related to an external time. In dealing with aporias of time, Ricoeur's decision is to avoid aligning phenomenological time with life of the mind and cosmological time i.e. with the outside world (Currie 77).¹⁰ He thinks both experiences of time as distinguished parts of consciousness, but what Ricoeur demonstrates less well, in Currie's opinion, is the cooperation between them (78). In Ricoeur's solution, an anachronous arrangement in memory just confirms the order from which it digresses, and in such a way that the intelligibility of remembered events depends on the reconstruction of their chronology. The representation of memory does not question the forward movement of time (Currie 78).

III. The topic of time – between pervasive prolepsis (Currie) and implicit double temporality (Ricoeur)

As we noted earlier, Ricoeur assigns to the '*tales about time*' a special role. The very experience of time is 'what was at stake' in their developments. Such a proposal is deemed to imply specific fictional narratives where the topic of time predominates. Currie aims to translate '*aboutness*' into the claim that all novels should be viewed as such tales. He subverts the division by giving an account for the

¹⁰A point of view which conceives and perceives a kind of cosmological time, from within human experience (the mind), is not the same thing as the difference between the experience of time and actual time.

concept's area, that is, for the sense of 'on the subject of' (32): at the level of thematic content of the novels addressed to the idea of time. Saying that 'what is at stake is the dimension of time' does not solve the problem of explaining the meaning of 'aboutness.' Ricoeur must demonstrate such a sense as fundamental only for the *Zeitroman*.¹¹ When Mann calls *Der Zauberberg* (*The Magic Mountain*) a *Zeitroman*, he means that its object is "time in its pure state" (Ricoeur 1985, 76), but defining 'about time' in this case meets several topics that vie for 'what is at stake' (Ricoeur 1985, 112, 115-16; Currie 2). On a level of interrogation, for Currie, 'Is this a novel about time?' turns out to be less focused than 'What does a novel know about time?' which links to how it relates what it knows to the knowledge of life (111) or what domain of understanding contemporary novel might occupy (Currie 1). Another aspect of the area of resonance is the narrative technique which places time at the forefront of a novel's less content-based concern. Is it only because of the temporal logic of storytelling that experiments in the novel are exploration of a grand theme? Within the traditional scheme,¹² Currie classifies three types of prolepsis. *Structural* (2): between the time locus of the narrated and the time locus of the narrator, or the function inherent in all fiction as *tales of time*. This binding (to the *preterite*) is a mark for anticipation in the sense of the present as structurally retrospective (39). It generates a theory which connects the temporalities of reading and living in the way expressed as follows: there is a hermeneutic circle between the presentification of fictional narrative and the depresentification of lived experience (31-2).¹³ *Narratological* (1): the time locus of the narrated; the anticipation of future events within the universe of narrated events. *Rhetorical* (3): between the time locus of the narrator and the time locus of the reader; the anticipation of an objection and the preclusion of that objection by incorporating a counter-argument into the discourse (31). Often viewed as forms of experimentation, 1 and 3 point to features which indicate a conscious concern with narrative temporality in *tales about time*. Currie must

¹¹Editor's note: *Zeitroman* or "time-novel". This term is applied in German to novels which are primarily concerned with an author's critical analysis of the age in which he lives. Some Bildungsroman may be regarded as *Zeitromane*. source: <http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803133418787>

¹²Narrated time (1) is anterior to the time of narration (2) which is in turn prior to the time of reading (3).

¹³This formula refers to a temporal structure of the human experience of time; see Heidegger (304–11, 352–8). In living, the presentification refers to the kind of envisaged preterite we use to deprive the today of its character as present; we project forward to an envisaged time of narration in order to render the present as narrated time (Currie 30). See Heidegger's discussion of anticipation (444).

show that the three forms operate in a hermeneutic circle.¹⁴ When the boundaries between these categories of anticipation are questioned, Ricoeur's distinction between the conscious and the unconscious concern with narrative temporality also comes into question; as corollary, we see that the so-called '*about time*' aspect is relevant in the case of a novel for which time does not seem to be what is principally at stake.

Ricoeur's distinction implicates that narrative has a conventional temporal logic which is not *about time* (Currie 2-4). From this angle, the elaboration consists in analysing double narrative temporality. This option designates figures which go beyond the everyday sphere of *praxis* and *pathos*. For instance, the conflict between internal duration and external clock time, which could still be attributed to Virginia Woolf's *Mrs. Dalloway*, is not what is at stake in Mann's example. When Peter Brooks qualifies *anticipation of retrospection* as the master trope of narrative logic (Currie 23), he speaks about the tense conditions of fiction, where anticipation is structural insofar as the present is lived in grammatical acknowledgement of the time of narration, which is a future that is already in place. In reading we decode the preterite as a kind of present. In this basic structure Currie identifies a prolepsis which is involved in all narrative (30). Instructing us in the presentification of the past, fiction also robs us of the present. It encourages us to go ahead within the time locus of narrated events which creates the teleological retrospect (33).

According to Ricoeur, the "schematism of the narrative function" is an imaginative re-description which creates new meaning. While the verification of this "ordering of events" is uncertain, its ongoing validity is in a temporal structure. The primacy of narrative understanding is due to the cultural transmission which underlies our familiarity with tradition (genres) (Ricoeur 1985, 29-60; Jervolino 141). William Dowling sees the *discordant concordance* of emplotment as central to Ricoeur's logic of narrative sequence. This definition is based on the teleological movement that drives the story towards an anticipated conclusion. *Time and Narrative* treats this

¹⁴Although this account arrives at complications, what remains is the idea that the moment of the present might be structured by an anticipation of the retrospective time of narrating. Currie admits that 1 is not properly named, because the anticipation of future events in a fiction counts as prolepsis only when that anticipation is true, which would require an actual excursion into the future of narrated events; while 1 depends on the relation to an existing fictional future, 3 aims at the preclusion of the event anticipated. See Currie (39).

formal principle as a consequence of narrative structure: as two sides in the correlate of “grasping together” heterogeneous occurrences (Dowling 5-6). Ricoeur’s reinterpretation of the concept of *muthos* starts from a semantics of action; in order to explain to ourselves the other, we draw upon the *probable* (Aristotle) (Dowling 4). Furthermore, Dowling points to an implicit a-historical sense of a common humanity throughout *Poetics* (7). The purpose of *poiesis* is to represent a recurring human event (a self-contained reality). In the same sense, for Ricoeur, the structure of tragedy, as *holos*, implies a development that is not taken from experience. In other words, Aristotle offers a perspective which resembles a gaze from outside that takes creation as a timeless whole (Dowling 9-10). According to Dowling, adopting such a view on the logic of narrative causality, Ricoeur’s analysis crosses over to *mimesis*₂ (Dowling 8-9) or to the implication of plot which moves both forward and backward. Grasping as a whole means that the forward motion of events in a story comes into collision with *recognition*: Aristotle’s *anagnorisis* (or the moment *telos* is revealed). In drama this perspective is absorbed into the elements of the structure. Ricoeur concentrates on *diegetic narrative*, where the association is with a narrator who exists outside the story’s horizon and gives visibility to its *double temporality*.¹⁵ While the latter is generated by the *preterite* family of tenses, the production of unity primarily signals the sense of an ethical whole after the break with historical time (Dowling 11-2).

IV. Ricoeur on the aspects of narrative consciousness

According to Ricoeur, “...the tenses rediscover designations of time omitted by textual linguistics through “*refiguration*” (*mimesis*₃)”. This notion takes us into the region of the act of comprehension through which a story comes to life in those outside of its imaginary world (Dowling 14). Ricoeur argues that an alteration of consciousness must also take place in a world of mortality. While “*refiguration*” demands a greater respect for the claims of literary autonomy, the semantics of action guarantees moving back and forth between the fictive and the actual. The possibility for intersection is rooted in similar semantics of pre-narrative structure. Ricoeur also insists that reading another version of reality comes forth with the impossibility of not seeing it that way (Dowling 14-6). Thus, his theory of *mimesis* suggests a certain structure (or event) for conceptualization.

¹⁵1) The narrated story moves forward in the sequence of ordinary time; 2) intimations of a *totum simul* in the narrative voice serves as a continuous reminder that the story is being grasped as a whole.

According to Ricoeur, on the background of the tension which the ‘experience’ of the supposed true nature of time brings in what is needed to encompass more aspects (Currie 78). He argues that it takes more than the notion of clock time to describe the apparatus of public history and collective experience that gives the backdrop to private thoughts and actions of characters. Reminding of Nietzsche’s ‘monumental history,’ Ricoeur refers to ‘monumental time’ in his own description of the power of novels as: “[...] the variety of relations between the concrete temporal experience of various characters and monumental time. The variations on the theme of this relation lead fiction well beyond the abstract opposition we have just referred to and make of it, for the reader, a powerful means of detecting the infinitely varied way of combining the perspectives of time [...]” (1985, 108; Currie 129). A point about literary works is that the narrator’s look on events may diverge from the total perspective. The latter becomes more abstract, but nonetheless exists as an ideal possibility (Dowling 88). What are we to do when the two do not coincide? For Ricoeur, thinking about the meaning of literary narrative begins with the limitations which determine the narrative voice as a trustworthy source and involve the notion of discontinuity. The narrator observes, but does not intervene in events; recounting is without power to impinge on the fictive consciousness (Dowling 93). When characters speak, the reality to which narrator’s discourse belongs is suspended. Thus, we have two extremes: 1) in surpassing even the most perceptive characters, the total perspective is an advanced consciousness which resembles a magnetic pull towards which everything is being drawn; 2) the unreliable narrator, the sole source of information, fails to understand the details in the events, that is, obscures proper comprehension of the narrated world and allows for another point of view (consciousness) within the text—an *implied* “voice” which “carries the reader with him in judging the narrator” (Booth 159; Dowling 94-5).

To the phenomenological implications of this situation is added the fact that in the reading of a sentence, words come in one’s mind which, like the author’s, are subject to the conditions of possibility for all human experience. What Ricoeur means by this picture is that everything the reader knows comes from the words on the page, plus, s/he imagines or perceives a consciousness behind, not identical with or reducible to the words themselves. When the work is taken up to be read the immanent within a text is set free in the consciousness of the reader (Dowling 96)—a world begins to take shape as a setting of

actions/events that transcend the marks on a page. This principle holds for a narrator whose perspective is projected as a unity existing independently. Between the two mentioned extremes, a wholly immanent narrative consciousness may be visualized as a set of concentric spheres: 1) centre—characters as volitional beings in circumstances (a self-contained world of motive and action); 2) indication that the narrator has already had time to look back on the significance of a whole; 3) the consciousness in which the story comes alive (Dowling 98). If, after dwelling in the imaginary, what is brought about by *works* may be carried back into the everydayness, on what terms such an interval can happen in mortal time? (Dowling 16-7) Ricoeur's theory of '*implied reader*' pays respect to literary autonomy and to ordinary reality. He borrows this term from Wolfgang Iser for suggesting an audience projected by the work itself. Anyone who adopts the point of view of the reader addressed in the book is involved in a depersonalization of consciousness (Dowling 99). To take up this position is to divest one's own particularities and only leave a disembodied consciousness as the medium of "transcendence within immanence." The only thing kept is semantics of action (mimesis₁) —a bridge to characters who dwell within a similar realm. Their understanding of existence is rooted in the primordial stratum of social or communal consciousness. Thus, we find ourselves at the beginning; everyday life (in a time of almost unconscious dwelling) generates narrative. The universally shared grasp of volition, motives, choices, and goals, is in accordance with narrated time in which alone the world of human concern takes shape (Dowling 100-1). But in the passage from the capacity of narrative to utter the time of mankind to the ontic problems of refiguration, Ricoeur's intent is on asking: "to what degree a philosophical reflection on narrativity and time may aid us in thinking about eternity and death at the same time" (1984, 87). In Dowling's review (86-7, 98) this reaching out to absolutes is summed up into another question: What does it mean for fictive time to have permitted actual readers to get outside their own mortal time?

V. Zeitroman versus Hegelian historiography

According to Dowling (88), applying Ricoeur's general observations to *The Magic Mountain* would imply that its moment of *recognition* allows readers to grasp their own immersion (in the story) as interlude to or as insertion within their mortal time. Ricoeur sees Mann's approach partly as a "time-novel" in which the 'time of feeling' eliminates clock time; confusing the seasons also adds to the blurring of appropriate reference within a perpetual duration. On the background of this erosion of the sense of time Hans Castorp takes a

step from perplexity toward lucidity by disassociating time-as-it-appears from time measured (Mann 1969, 66; Ricoeur 1985, 119). Still, for Ricoeur, the novel unfolds through *false epiphanies* (in a dreamlike sequence the hero imagines a mystical union with Madame Chauchat; the whiteness of a snow-covered landscape looks like a vision of eternity). Supposedly leading the protagonist towards an ironic detachment, episodes like *Soup Everlasting* and *Sudden Enlightenment* (Mann 1969, 183-219) contain “the underground” of a strange, selfsame eternity, confirmed by the narrative voice: “[...] what is being revealed to you as the true content of time is merely a dimensionless present.” (183-4). Sometimes the storyteller is interested in his own thinking about ordinary time as inseparable from routine activity, while underneath is the barren ground of existence (Dowling 90). From a main point in Ricoeur’s analysis, the novel is ultimately about its own narrator. This is revealed by the reversal of the normal relation between *telos* and the perspective of the voice telling the story. At the end, after the fictive experience of time, the reader is alone with a possible clarity of perception (Dowling 91).

This interpretation of the ways to epitomize the experience of time skips the historical influences on the novel’s conception (Ricoeur 1985, 133). Harry Jansen begins his analysis with such an investigation. For example, narrator states in the forward to *Der Zauberberg* (*The Magic Mountain*) (21) that the events in the book “...take place before a certain turning point and border that has deeply fissured life and consciousness [...] it took place in former times, beforehand, in the old days, the world before the Great War.”¹⁶ (Jansen 4). Following Stephen Kern in identifying temporal perspectives in the chaotic world dating around WWI, Jansen points out that Henri Bergson and Walter Benjamin provided alternatives to Hegelian-romantic historiography (5). Ricoeur uses the notions of “*synthesis of the heterogeneous*” and “*continuing entities*” which may be counted as arguments for a homogeneous temporality. The second one is in debt to Maurice Mandelbaum and signifies the main, singular subjects in History (countries, nations, churches, religions, cultures, and subcultures) (Ricoeur 1984, 194-208). These are renamed as ‘first-order entities’ and seen as collective *quasi-personages*. The rise and fall in their identities¹⁷ show diachronic character which is the object

¹⁶Translation by Joshua Kovaloski. *High Modernism: Aestheticism and Performativity in Literature of the 1920s*. Rochester NY, Camden House, and Boydell and Brewer Limited. 2014. pg, 158.

¹⁷Defined by their members’ “participatory belonging” (197-98).

of historiographical narration (217-18). Following Steven Smith,¹⁸ Jansen notes that this thematization differs from the temporal development of the historicist “*Idee*.” It is a more pluralistic perception of first-order entities in whose endeavours are seen manifold ideas. According to Hayden White, in histories with first-order protagonists the tropology is determined mainly by the trope of synecdoche which displays a *totum pro parte* connection (Jansen 6-7).¹⁹ In Jansen’s tropology²⁰ “*Zeitromane*” are paradigmatic for different temporalities whose forms are sought for in historiography as well. In his view (1-2), while Mann attempts to remove homogeneous temporality, Ricoeur’s idea of configured temporality passes by both Benjamin’s and Bergson’s views on the topic (1985, 28, 168; 1988, 270). To the extent that White’s theory indicates a level of consciousness “...on which a world of experience is *constituted* prior to being analyzed” (1973, 33), Jansen works out a relation between figurative and fictive reality. Although tropology primarily detects meaning *in* a historical text, for Jansen, it also reveals time-experience before its narration. He uses tropes to discern a temporal reality *behind* (the text) which makes the flux of experience comprehensible (3). In this way irony undermines or amplifies one of the other three temporalities in novels (White 1973, 37; Jansen 4). Mann’s time novel displays this “metatropological” and “dialectical” aspect. For example, the words that the sanatorium (a quasi-personage) robs Castorp of his life enable an ironization of synecdoche or expose the hypertrophy of a “normal” first-order entity. Ascending to the Berghof means illness and often death; descending—a return to the real world (Jansen 11). Along this line of thought, for Ricoeur, *The Magic Mountain* confronts the time of working citizens with the “magic” time in a sanatorium; spatial division articulates the difference between calendar and “beyond-time” (Ricoeur 1985, 103-104, 112; Jansen 2). The stretching out of the chapters (*erzahlte Zeit*), combined with abbreviation of the narrative (*the Erzählzeit*), creates a perspective link which is essential

¹⁸“Historical Meaningfulness in Shared Action.” *History and Theory*, vol. 48, no. 1, 2009, p.2, note 2.

¹⁹White 1973, pp. 35-36, 39-40, 122, 127, 129, 166-167, 189.

²⁰In *Triptiek van de tijd*, Jansen shows how novels of time let us explain different temporalities in historiography. Proust’s metaphor exposes a heterogeneous time. Mann’s synecdoche problematizes the temporality of rise and fall. Virginia Woolf uses a metonymy founded on human atomism that takes the form of “simultaneity of the dissimultaneous.” This approach is close to Reinhart Koselleck’s mediation of human experiences of time—the temporal modes in *Vergangene Zukunft: Zur Semantik geschichtlicher Zeiten*. Suhrkamp Verlag, 2000, pp. 132-133—“long-term system changes” and “simultaneity of the nonsimultaneous” which display similarities respectively to Jansen’s treatment of *The Magic Mountain* and *Mrs. Dalloway*.

to the hero's musings on the sense of time (1985, 113). The composition of chapter 6 illustrates the difference between the narrated time and the time experience projected by fiction.

According to Jansen, synecdoche reveals a time of rise and fall but irony upsets it (4). Ricoeur also refers to a remaining discordance: "[...] a discontinuous structure suits a time of dangers and adventures [...]" (1985, 81), but to some extent sees Mann's novel as involving learning about oneself and the world. Jansen suggests viewing Ricoeur's interpretation in the light of his analyses of temporality (8). Like the protagonist's departure from Hamburg and arrival in the Swiss Alps, the movements of several other characters are within the frame of rise and fall, that is, between an "almost immobile time" (1988, 134) "up there" (1985, 118) and the opposite time of everyday, clock-time measurement (Jansen 8-9). While Castorp's fever dream may be another example of timelessness (Jansen 10), "Snow" (1969, 469-98) stands out of all previous episodes and deserves to be included within the "moments" that remain like a discontinuous chain, where the narrated time and the experience of time together find their culmination. For Ricoeur, the composition produces the peak of this conjunction. Yet, before this pinnacle experience, the evasion of chronology almost breaks up into irreconcilable perspectives. In losing measurable time, Castorp reaches an aporetic level—the impossibility of reconciling internal time with the cosmic aspects of time (Ricoeur 1985, 124). The encounter between two intellectual figures in the novel may be interpreted as a contradiction between the Enlightenment tradition of "civilization" (Settembrini) and the romantic tradition of *Kultur* (Naphta). This contrast of sensibilities is relevant, but according to Lucian Hölscher, the central European world after the WWI was neither of these (Jansen 10-1).²¹ Jansen concludes that the temporality of *The Magic Mountain* is affected by the deeply ironic manner of its author. In the space of exploration, the paradoxes brought to light are those that afflict the internal experience of time when it is freed from its relation to chronological time. The hero's preoccupation with the equivocality of time (the contrast between immobility and changes) (Mann 1969, 344) has been freed by the effacement of measurable time (Ricoeur 1985, 125). The novel contributes to the refiguration of time by bringing aporias of time to the "next level." For Ricoeur, ironic detachment is the most

²¹"Mysteries of Historical Order: Ruptures, Simultaneity and the Relationship of the Past, the Present and the Future." *Breaking Up Time: Negotiating the Borders between Present, Past and Future*. Edited by Berber Bevernage and Chris Lorenz. Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 2013, pp. 134-151, 148.

“elevated,” perhaps precarious victory. In this sense the consciousness of dissonances is lifted a step higher (130).

VI. The elaboration of ‘*leitmotiv*’ in *The Magic Mountain*

It is not easy to accommodate Mann’s perception of time within the approach of Jansen. The “structure” of *The Magic Mountain* may also be construed as a doubt about the mimetic aspect of emplotment which hardly fits within the theory of *Time and Narrative*. Is this a literature capable to deliver findings which differ from associationist metaphors? Natanson suggests that the employment of “*leitmotiv*” provides an insight into the phenomenological structures and an elucidation of the boundary between literature and philosophy. As a connection to the “uncanny” temporality (Natanson 99) in our daily lives, the novel shares terrain with existential phenomenology (10, 90). The concept of ‘*horizon*’ and the notion of ‘*leitmotiv*’ are interchangeable without being identical (91). Mann’s novel inquires about the sedimentation of meaning and proposes a topological uncovering of transcendental time. He states that the purpose of “symbolic and allusive formulas” is to present an entire world of ideas at any given moment (Mann 1972, 725). These networks assemble Castorp’s journey in such a way that in the present emerges a kind of correlate in which “...past and future show themselves to be quite other than a chain of isolated moments” (Crowell 283). The *leitmotiv* is the formal structure which makes the content (intended object) of the hero’s current experience possible. It gives neither a kind of similarity nor remembering or anticipating, but *Evidenz* itself which “all at once is, remembers, and portends” (Natanson 90); “...[a]ll at once” is not a matter of association, but of something that comes to be bodily “there” (90) in something else.

The series of *leitmotivs* have a meaning that persists from the level of the affective (Mann 1978, 82) to that of nameless “unconscious conviction” (Natanson 128). The impossibility of locating the beginnings of these feelings (128) counteracts a psychological explanation in linear time. From the perspective of *leitmotiv*-development, Castorp’s proleptic/metaleptic thoughts bring about a structural continuity (Natanson 92, 131) that is equivalent to the mode in which the phenomenological notion of horizon enforces depth (Crowell 284).²² To note this temporal characteristic is to say

²²For example, the quasi-identification (between Clavdia and Pribislav Hippe) (Mann 1978, 361, 630) is an element whose meaning is grounded in something which is also only articulated in the convergence of these characters.

that the constitution of meaning is metaphorical. It also shows how style helps understand the art of phenomenological reduction. Natanson's analysis implies that the idea of the *leitmotiv* aids Husserl's model on the question of how the operation of sedimentation could yield a form with the integrity of a meaning. Object-constitution becomes intelligible if the "now" moment is understood in terms of metaphorical identification. Intentional correlates arise because temporality is nothing but the transformation of experience into structure through the alchemy of identification-in-difference (Crowell 285-86) which must be an ubiquitous universal condition of experience. Anything meaningful comes as to identify with what it portends and what is sedimented in it, and finally as something that eludes all identification (Natanson 90). Grasped in its character as fictive reality, my experience has the character of "cords with knots" (Mann 1978, 233) where each encountered thing is a "knot" in a story (Crowell 286). If this is the only way to understand *identity*, then ontology will be a logic of the constituted figures of fictive reality (286). Accordingly, the world as given in experience, compels us toward an ontology of metaphor. But the consequences from Natanson's re-interpretation of the transcendental field of constitution are not enough to arrive at a "...conception of the boundaries and possibilities of both philosophy and literature" (64). For Crowell, transcendental reflection on experience may link philosophy to "reality," but cannot make the case for metaphor (as constitution). Mann's method uses only eidetic possibilities. An ontology of fictive reality would require further critical interpretation of identification: whether there might not be modalities other than the tropologic character of horizons, which also contribute to the constitution of *what is* (Crowell 287). Still, it is the elaboration of phenomenological evidence which literature achieves that guarantees its inclusion into the project of illuminating the transcendental constitution of meaning (288).

VII. A project for ontology of fiction

Ricoeur (1979) agrees with Nelson Goodman (*Languages of Art*, p. 241) that our aesthetical grasping reorganizes the world in terms of works and vice versa. He points out that fictions also "remake" the sphere of *praxis*, but in his elaboration on '*productive reference*' as equivalent to reality shaping, the main emphasis remains aesthetic. The task is to show how the emergence of new meanings in the sphere of language generates an emergence of new images (1979, 125-127). According to Ricoeur, *image* is able to play an appropriately

semantic role only if it leaves the unstableness of the sensible impression in order to pass into that of language (129). To say that poetic images are spoken before being seen is to claim that a work of discourse displays something in circumstances under the procedure of “reverberation”.²³ The latter proceeds from things said. Ricoeur’s approach of the accent on impertinence shifts one’s attention towards the restructuring of semantic fields at the level of predicative usage (Ricoeur 1979, 130).

According to Ricoeur, the experience of reading suggests that the images which exercise the iconic function (with regard to nascent significations) are “bound”, that is, engendered by poetic diction itself (133). *Reverberation* - the intermediate level of depiction - is between the schematization of the metaphorical attribution and the “free” image. On the one hand, the free image seems to disperse meaning into floating reverie; on the other hand, the bound image introduces into the whole process a negative effect which places the phenomenon of reading in the neutralized atmosphere of fiction (a dimension of *unreality*). The ultimate role of image is to condition an *epoche* of the real, to place us in a sort of disengagement with regard to perception or action, to suspend meaning in the dimension of fiction. In this state we try new ways of being-in-the-world (1979, 133-34). At this stage is also the paradox of productive reference: only the image which does not already have its referent in reality is able to display a world. If this is how fiction intimates reality, Ricoeur comments that Kant’s relegation of fiction to the reflecting judgement²⁴ has made the way to an ontology of fiction difficult (1979, 135).

Noel Fitzpatrick (2016) argues that Ricoeur’s idea about fiction should be understood as a backdrop to the development of philosophical anthropology. In other words, the ability of language to refer to possible worlds is central within his hermeneutic project (Fitzpatrick 140). The status of fictional objects is dependent on the blurring of boundaries (between fiction and history) which takes place once the question of fiction is raised to the level of construction of identity (138). In presupposing the mediation of the world through language, the question could be: How do readers distinguish between language which refers to the real world and language that refers to an imaginary one shared by the author, narrator and the reader? (Fitzpatrick 143). In Ricoeur’s scheme the distinction between

²³English for “*retentissement*,” a term which Gaston Bachelard (1969, xxi) borrows from Eugene Minkowski.

²⁴Both insisting on the subjectivity of the judgment of taste and placing fiction within the aesthetics of genius.

fictional works, as semantic-syntactic entities, and fictional objects reflects the distinction between world of fiction and fictional configuration. A characteristic of “*fiction*” is the “narrower extension” than that of “narrative configuration”. The term designates creations that do not have ambition to constitute a truthful historical narrative (Ricoeur 1985, 3; Fitzpatrick 146). Ricoeur’s focusing on the tendencies in modernist novels starts with understanding that emplotment takes as reference the overall unit of time (Fitzpatrick 147-48). From the conception of an act which attempts to include the whole, the analysis moves to the problematic of the possible world of the work/text which enables the development of a terminology of referentiality (Fitzpatrick 149), that is, “... [t]o open up the notion of emplotment – and the notion of time that corresponds to it - to the outside [...]” (1985, 5; Fitzpatrick 150). The emphasis is on the fictional experience in self-understanding that is mediated by narrative. The questions of subjectivity are framed within a narrative self-constructed through fiction and non-fiction. The continuous transitions of fiction are “*between the experience that precedes the text and the experience that follows it*” (1985, 73). Fitzpatrick points out that, for Ricoeur, it is only by losing one’s self as reader that one finds oneself through wider experience of inhabiting the possible world of the word (152). This conception is parallel to that of the ability for the literary to abolish all reference to reality (Ricoeur 2013, 69). To understand oneself before the text is to expose oneself to the propositions of possible fictional worlds; the referential aspect of the nonexistent takes place within the discourse of the world of fiction itself (Fitzpatrick 151-52; Ricoeur 2013, 73-4). In Fitzpatrick’s assessment, in order to contend that the world of the reader has an ontological status, Ricoeur marks two moments. On the one hand, readers give such status to the fiction through interpreting themselves in the light of fictional experiences; on the other hand, in the world of their imagination the character of the novel is attributed ontological status (Fitzpatrick 152).

Ricoeur connects the *iconographic function* of the image (the analyses of poetic image and pictorial fiction are included under this category) to the analysis of writing in Francois Dagognet’s *Ecriture et Iconographie* (1973). The reason for this is to show why fiction must be embodied in a *work*, so that reality in its turn can be worked by it (Ricoeur 1979, 128, 135). The perspective of this theory envisages the core of a reality which is no longer the world of manipulable objects but the world into which we have been *thrown* by birth and within which we project our innermost possibilities (139). In Heideggerian

context poetry denies the ordinary vision of reality. On the other hand, in Ricoeur's retrieval of Aristotelian concepts, *mimesis* is creative reconstruction by mediation of fiction. The imagination working in a *work* is said to produce a world out of itself. Metaphor is the key to the 'transfer' of meaning and the displacement of concepts (1979, 140-41).

VIII. The complication of configuration - 'about time'

Before turning to the issue of the type of configuration and main characteristic '*about time*' (Ricoeur), Currie elaborates on the problem of the analytical value of prolepsis. First, he notes that the three prolepses bear little resemblance to the temporality of reading. From the latter perspective, the reader's present will have embedded in it the present of the preterite, thus, 'temporal succession' is undermined by the idea of time as co-existence in a perpetual present. While the foundation of prolepses (narrated, narration, reader's time) is organized chronologically, the phenomenology of reading draws the notions of past and future into the present in such a way that the anteriority of the past and the posteriority of the future are questioned (Currie 70). As Wood remarks (247-49), it is difficult to understand any purely phenomenological account of time whether of the threefold present²⁵ (St. Augustin) or of the unity of the *ecstasies* (Heidegger) without reference to an external, cosmological, or ordinary conception of time. Ricoeur asks: How can we make sense of the *distension* of the present in the mind, without objectively referring to past, present, and future, on which depend the meanings of 'memory,' 'direct experience,' and 'expectation'? It would seem that fictional narrative most adequately explores the interaction of Husserlian protentions with actual plurality of the future or the relation between the subject and the cosmic (Currie 70-1). This kind of discourse would bring into contact the intersubjective network of consciousnesses with outside forms of time. For Ricoeur, the philosophy of time will always confront the tensions which make novel the most appropriate field for observing the dynamic dialectics of time (Currie 74).

Regarding the capacity of narrative to reveal a 'secret relationship' of eternity to death (1985, 101), *Time and Narrative* vol. 3 presents a conversation between phenomenology, history, and

²⁵If the threefold present is inescapable for the human mind, we are merely saying that the temporal distance that separates the past from the present is immanent in the present (Currie 70).

fiction. The form common to historical and fictional stories is a function of their shared content—‘*structures of time*’ which hold something fateful (White 1991, 151). In the reflection on this event histories are complemented by fictions. According to Hayden White, it is on this basis that we attribute the fascination of a classic to an allegory of temporality. This fact tells more about the poetics of narrative utterance, that is, its ‘literary’ quality (152-53). On the subject of this juncture, Currie’s concern is with defining what a novel does in relation to time (94). He notes that it is not easy to uphold the typological difference between the logic of the *whodunit* and a life which is open to an unpredictable future (86). In the former the time of narrative functions as the site of self-conscious reflection both on past events and on the nature of writing about them. This is one of the recurring features of the *Zeitroman*. Narration might be thought of as progressive improvement in understanding the past from the point of view of the present (Currie 88). In comparison, the *novel* presents more associative and less straightforward constatives. One of its propositions is that the linear time is placed in question by circularities like recollection, explanation, or anachronicity. Thus, the novel produces a tension between the chronology of events it describes and an alternative version of their representation. According to Ricoeur it “...may break away from real time” but it cannot break away from configuration. The time of novels:

[...] cannot help but be configured in terms of new norms of temporal organization that are still perceived as temporal by the reader, by means of new expectations regarding the time of fiction... [And] to believe that we are done with the time of fiction because we have overturned, disarticulated, reversed, telescoped, or reduplicated the temporal modalities the conventional paradigms the novel have made familiar to us, is to believe that the only time conceivable is precisely chronological time. It is to doubt that fiction has its own resources for inventing temporal measurements proper to it. (1985, 25)

In Currie’s opinion (93), this point means that experimental novels, at best, establish new novelistic conventions for configuring time and at worst, reaffirm the notion of real time as linear succession. The complication lies in the notion of ‘*configuration*’ which implies that fictive temporality both reflects and affects the temporality of ‘*life*.’ Configuration plays a mediating role in Ricoeur’s narrative theory. On the side of living, it makes (or abstracts) explicit syntactic

formulations over (or at a distance) from the implicit proto- or pre-narrative characteristic of life. This is done by the operation of emplotment which draws obliquely from the temporal segments of *praxis* (semantics of action) but primarily turns heterogeneity into narrative composition. Assuming that the fictional representation of time and the lived experience of time constantly modify each other (in a shared movement), Currie re-states once again the quote from above: the emplotment of a novel may depart from ‘real time’ chronology but it cannot break away from temporal organisation in itself. He comments further that Ricoeur’s conceptualization needs clarification on whether ‘*real time*’ belongs within *configuration* or lies outside it. *Time and Narrative* deploys this relation in the following way: strictly speaking, *configuration* takes place in the second phase of Ricoeur’s hermeneutic circle (*threefold mimesis*) while in the third phase the appropriation of narrative emplotment, the understanding that a reader has of real time may be modified and as such is supposed to return effectively to the world of action. Thus, as Currie remarks, the view on time experience as the essential horizon (or function-Ch.D.) of this operation is mixed with the notion of ‘real time’ as the referent which lies beyond that horizon. He objects to reintroducing the idea of chronological succession as in the motion for the *novel’s aboutness*. In regard to temporality, the latter formulation remains bound up with the question of reference. Respectively, Currie points out that the claim that language (in its discursive units from the sentence upwards)²⁶ says something about something becomes confusing when that something is ‘time.’

In order to be operative, the idea of a ‘narrative about time’ requires a real time to which language refers (Currie 95). Another example of this background motif is Ricoeur’s saying, “...[c]hronology - or chronography – does not have just one contrary, the a-chronology of laws or models. Its true contrary is temporality itself” (1984, 30). On the one side, Currie explains that if we view ‘*chronology*’ as the outside of temporality, this term appears to indicate something that exists outside of language, discourse, and mind, thus, the term bears contradictory meanings in the context of emplotment. Chronology seems to be a figure both inside and outside the temporality of configuration (96). On the other side, in *Time and Narrative* Ricoeur hints that dechronologization in narratology may also be seen as a deepening of narrative temporality (1984, 30; Currie

²⁶Ricoeur adopts Benveniste’s view that the critique of reference (Saussure) does not apply to the larger units of discourse; “With the sentence, language is oriented beyond itself. It says something about something.” (1984, 78).

95). Preceding the examination of the “...hierarchical levels that form the depth of temporal experience” (vol. 2), with the supposed content of this theme—the enigma of death, and eternity—Ricoeur refers to the Heideggerian concept of *Zeitlichkeit* (‘deep temporality’) as the level of definite limit (vol. 1, 61). Accordingly, the form in which such experiences reach expression in language is glimpsed in “tales about time” (1985, 101). Currie concludes (96) that the notion of ‘fiction *about* time’ requires both a specific hermeneutic phenomenology and a realism which views chronology as a fact (of the cosmos). Aside from a simple juxtaposition between fictional time and time of the world, what we may tentatively call ‘games with time,’ appears to be a borderline experience in consequence of which the question about another temporality comes to the front. The latter emerges in the line between different problematics but also as an option for a novel to evolve.



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