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Literature and the Extra-temporal: Paul Ricoeur on Proust's Novels of Time

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> One of the paradoxes of modernist fiction is that extended time is often figured by brevity, the fullness of experience by absence or an empty space. In each case, the limits of the form or the delineation of a gap gesture to the unrepresentability in narrative of long duration. In this respect, there is always a dialectical relationship in the modernist novel between brevity and length and between the immeasurable and nothing.[1] (McCracken 278)

Franco Moretti defines this genre as 'modern epic' and deems it 'one that is virtually unread' (4). Its conscious embrace of difficulty also invites a new engagement with narrative (LMN 274-75). While no single novel is the standard, the second volume of Ricoeur's *Time and Narrative* (1985) is another critical text[2] on a form of narrativization which seeks 'irreconcilable' perspectives and includes the concept of 'extratemporal' (McCracken 276-78). In this work Paul Ricoeur chooses to investigate novels which detect "temporalities that are more or less extended, offering in each instance a different figure of recollection, of eternity in or out of time [...]" (101). He rejects the idea that Marcel Proust's *In Search of Lost Time* is about the life of its author (131). In *Time Traversed: Remembrance of Things Past*, Ricoeur borrows from Gilles Deleuze the notion that the hero passes through an "apprenticeship" under a triad of signs—the world, love, and sensory impressions (363–71). He interprets the role of *writing* as the means through which a consciousness of time is achieved, because it permits the writer "to posit" the extratemporal from which lost time can be regained (Ricoeur 141; McCracken 279).

In accordance with the readings of Roger Shattuck and William Carter, Gian Balsamo stresses the "total reorientation" in the novel brought about by the silent encounter between the hero and another character (589). In this interpretation the position of Mlle de Saint-Loup is that of a master trope which "stands for the cartography of convergent destinations," among which is also Marcel's love quest (Balsamo 588). Ricoeur acknowledges this identification as "the ultimate recognition scene" (Ricoeur 149; Balsamo 595).

When it comes to the function of reminiscence, there are similarities between the views of Proust and Arthur Schopenhauer (Balsamo 599). In the former, the character of a sensation experienced in the present coincides with that of a sensation imprinted in memory. With the intensification of such experience by imagination, this case becomes the fullest sensation - a past

[1]McCracken, Scott and Jo Winning. "The Long Modernist Novel: An Introduction." *Modernist Cultures*, vol. 10, no. 3, 2015, pp. 269–281 is referenced here as LMN.
[2]Together with the previously-mentioned work of Moretti

event is being concretely resuscitated. In *Le temps retrouve*, this imaginative appreciation of the present conveys the impression called "outside of time." The freshness of a previous experience is analogous to Marcel's actual situation; not bearing negative connotations, it relieves him of self-awareness and bestows the aura of "essence" on circumstances (450-51). According to Balsamo (598), in Schopenhauer's *The World as Will and Representation* (1966, 3: § 38; 1891, 2: § 38, 231–34), there is a "protocol for this mnemonic process of emancipation" from ordinary conditions. The "pure contemplation" is akin to involuntary memory (Proust); it is mediated by recollection and regulated by the faculty of phantasy (Balsamo 599).

From Balsamo's point of view (589), a permanent, integral self of the hero replaces previous selves which correspond to sentimental adventures. This affirmation of identity is expressed as self-instantiation, "not on the plane of individual life, but in the mode of existence that represents his (the artist's) true life" (Proust 1987b 548; *In the Shadow of Young Girls in Flower* 133). It follows that the only validation of a nonhistoriographic and nondocumentary autobiography is "the creation of a work of art" (Proust 1989b 457; *Time Regained*, 273; Balsamo 600). The artistic program which Marcel elaborates upon (Proust 1989b 453, 474; *Time Regained* 299) consists of: aesthetic coping with the "ecstasies" of involuntary memory, the principles of which had been mentioned by Ricoeur *(Time Traversed* 380–81); the ethics of "vision" which copes with solipsism and defines the responsible tasks of Marcel's artistic vocation (Balsamo 601). Available through ephemeral, intrasubjective analogies between present and past, the "essence of things" is in a dimension "outside of time" (Proust 1989b 450–51; *Time Regained* 262–63). If its general application is in the guise of "signs" offered to the intellect (Proust 1989b 457; *Time Regained* 273), the task is of working out a "style" that inscribes both solipsistic rapture and the way of decoding its signification (Balsamo 601).

In his summary Balsamo accentuates two aspects. On the side of aesthetics, Marcel wants to become the author of an autobiography that narrates of a vocation affirmed through a love quest; on the side of ethics, he wants to encourage his readers into a kind of self-decipherment that gives preeminence to the "signs of love" over all others, extracting out of them "laws and ideas" of applicability (602). Through such a correspondence between author and reader, the novel is given away by Proust as subjective self-instantiation (Balsamo 603). On the other hand, if *Remembrance...* (as an example of a process) cannot succeed in bringing the truth of life and its impression together, then, what it can do is make the reader aware of the act of contemplation needed to regain lost time. So, the attempt at narrative understanding of the experience of life can generate only an 'interim time' (Hans Robert Jauss), or that of "a work yet to be accomplished" (*Time and Narrative*, vol. 2: 152). This idea of 'suspended time' may also suggest that the modernist narrative project is unfinishable; it remains an ideal (McCracken 279).

In the study of fiction the topic of time usually includes the way things of past inhabit the present. The overall accent in Mark Currie's book, *About Time: Narrative, Fiction and the Philosophy of Time*, is that the experience of time has altered and fiction has been one place of this change. The idea is that a mode of being which experiences the present as the object of a future memory is characteristic for our culture (Currie 6). This approach is committed to the 'now of reading.' To say that contemporary novel is characterised by future orientation means prevalence of prolepsis in the modern world which is increasingly conscious of its own present in an anticipatory mode of being (Currie 27-8). The attention of Currie is primarily on the interrelation between storytelling, future time, and the nature of being. The reading of fictional narratives is "a kind of preparation for and repetition of the continuous anticipation that takes

place in life."(Currie 6) The decoding of the *preterite* in the act of reading is a kind of making present of that which is in the past and this presentification corresponds to a process of depresentification which might take place outside of fiction. Currie's analytical model includes asking: How might the present be structured as a future narration of the past outside of fiction? The present can be conceived and even lived in a mode of narration in the past. Experiences are recorded in the present as if recounted in the past (lived in a mode of anticipation of the act of narrating them afterwards). The mode of 'experiencing the present as the object of a future memory' has its depresentification in the following way: if my lived present is translated into the conventional preterite of fictional narrative, a temporal depresentification is involved in the transformation of present into past; further, a spatial self-distance is involved in the translation of first person pronouns into the third person (Currie 40). In this argument (for the relationship between reading and living) the hermeneutic circle makes us live life as if it weren't present and read fictional narrative as if it were. In the novel, time is both a matter of content and a matter of form: it is a theme of the novel and it is the logic of storytelling itself (Currie 86-7).

Similar questions about the world and time of an imitation of action concern Ricoeur's thesis for *threefold mimesis*. The immediate referent (*Bedeutung*) of historical discourse is real events which include the products of actions of human agents seeking, more or less self-consciously, to endow their world with meaning. Their narrativization is a "representation" of the processes by which life is endowed with meanings continuous over generations of human time (White 150). But Ricoeur grants to fictional narrativity a deeper insight into the 'human experience of temporality.' The mediation of narratives by a triple act of hermeneutic interpretation must evoke an unity of life; narrative reaches "its full meaning when it is restored to the time of action and suffering" (*Time and Narrative,* vol. 1: 70). This process is fulfilled in the reader (vol. 1: 71) who actualizes a new meaning of our world within a concrete place and moment. Bringing together the limit "points" of the *arc of mimesis—distentio animi* and *plot*—the correlation between time and narrative makes unifying meaning turn to the outside of the text (de Leeuw 75). As the notion of temporality is deepened toward the realm of existence, our concern points to our self-understanding (*Time and Narrative,* vol. 2: 4-6; Jervolino 141). We have something to say about the experience of orienting ourselves in worldly situations. "*Language is for itself the order of the Same. The world is its Other*" (*Time and Narrative,* vol. 1: 78).

Our references are to what emplotment aims to signify in a world and to the reader who must be able to place the narrative within the meaning-structure of a concrete world (de Leeuw 76-7). Ricoeur uncovers the interweaving of historical and fictional intentionalities on the basis of a common space between these two spheres. Historical retelling mixes documents with forms of creative imitation: the story of the past becomes what history "stands for"; literature, even as virtual, imaginative story, represents an idea of human action and experiences (*Time and Narrative* vol. 3: 158; de Leeuw 78-79). Fictional narratives give 'human time' its most truthful expression, yet it does not escape a level of historization in referring to a "quasi-past." As Ricoeur writes: "To enter into reading is to include in the pact between the reader and the author the belief that the events reported by the narrative voice belong to the past of that voice*."* (*Time and Narrative,* vol. 3: 190).

Fiction relates facts that are past to the narrative voice that addresses itself to the reader. In the third volume of *Time and Narrative*, the analysis of quasi-fictive history and quasi-historical fiction consists of showing that both are rooted in a temporal synthesis of the

heterogeneous (vol. 3: 190). Narrative structure always holds a fictional, *as-if* aspect. Refiguration or the origin of the so called human time is "where the standing-for the past in history is united with the imaginative variations of fiction against the background of the aporias of the phenomenology of time*"* (*Time and Narrative,* vol. 3: 192). If this reciprocal relationship evokes 'human time,' then, the subject must appear as a 'narrative identity' which aids the synthesis of elements (*Time and Narrative,* vol. 3 : 246-305). In both versions of '*narrated time*' consciousness reflects on its own world of human concerns; while the historical remains tied to Aristotle's "time of the world," the fictional is closer to St. Augustin's "time of the soul" and seeks sense over nonsense.

While permanently threatened, life narratives are motivated by the desire for cohesion and unity. With this conclusion Ricoeur emphasizes the autonomous narrating of a life-story. The projection of interpretation onto existential temporality offers a possible coincidence between knowledge of ourselves and world. Often the disproportion with the "elusive character" of living points to life-as-such (*Time Traversed* 468), but imagination responds to effective human practices. Emplotment reconciles without resolving the enigma of time. It is an anthropological coming to terms with an aporetic of time. On Ricoeur's view, the human need for narration is related to the experience of time, but the condition of *narrative being-ness* is revealed as an ethical level (*Time and Narrative,* vol. 1: 75). He characterizes 'human time' as a reverberation across poles of narration, across cosmological time and phenomenological time (de Leeuw 81-3). The tension between the first aspect of formation and its experiential background leads to a re-assessment of the roles of text and reading. The controlling claim of *Time and Narrative* is the principle of literary autonomy which refers to no actual past (Dowling 14) and offers both a refiguration of reality and of time. As an imaginative reordering, fiction uses the "unreal" to show variations of the real or the not-yet-thought. Novels come closest to an expression of the actual human temporal experience when the world of the textual structure is intersected with the *life-world* of the reader (*Time and Narrative,* vol. 2: 61-99; Jervolino 141). For Ricoeur, this opening of a work onto a world gives way to fantasizing modes of inhabiting or to playing "tales in time."

In the light of *time loci* which structure the communication - narrated, narrator and reader, Ricoeur's study of fictional time proceeds from the relationship which both Gunther Muller and Gerard Genette accentuated. He pursues the tension between narrated time (*erzdhlte Zeit*) and the time of narration (*Erzahlzeit*) in the Modernist novel. If we may call this relation a '*game with time*' (Genette), its stake is the temporal experience (*Zeiterlebnis*) intended by the narrative. Muller defines three times: narrated time (counted in years, months, days, etc), time of the act of narrating (chronology), and the time of life ("compression" of a time "set aside") (*Time and Narrative,* vol. 2: 81). In his essay, *Zeiterlebnis und Zeitgerust*, Ricoeur used the term 'armature of time' (229-311) to introduce the interplay between narrated time and the time taken to narrate. The task of *Morphologische Poetik*[3] is to uncover the way in which the quantitative relations of time agree with the qualities of time belonging to life itself. Ricoeur notes that the temporal qualities are brought to light only by the play of derivations and insertions, without grafting the thematic of time onto them (*Time and Narrative,* vol. 2: 80). Ricoeur improves on this study by claiming that fundamental time is "codetermined" by the above-mentioned tensional relation and by the resulting "laws of form" (*Time and Narrative,* vol. 2: 80-1). Accordingly, experiments

[3]Muller, Gunther. *Morphologische Poetik*. Edited by Elena Muller, Tubingen, M. Niemeyer, 1968.

with narrative techniques may be aimed against the experience of time, but the polarity between temporal experience (*Zeiterlebnis*) and temporal armature (*Zeitgerust*) is inescapable (81).

In the essay *Uber die Zeitgerust des Erzahlens*, Muller states: "the way in which the evolution of time is handled has become a central problem in epic representation, a terrain for narrative experimentation, in which it is first of all a matter not of speculation on time but of the 'art of narrating'" (392).[4] Genette draws a radical consequence from the acknowledgement that the game may take precedence over the stakes. The way he reworks the couple *Erzahlzeit - erzdhlte Zeit* is a result of different levels to which temporal features are ascribed. The relation between the statement and what is recounted is set in Saussurean terms. Meaningful is the discordance between temporal features; anachrony[5] gives rise to typology.

In the context of '*games with time*' Ricoeur is concerned with the end of anachronic variations. In the case of Proustian analepsis, whether it completes the narration (by bringing it into the light of the antecedent), fills in a lacuna or corrects an earlier interpretation, what governes the meaning is the work as a whole. This sense of *meaningfulness* opens a perspective on narrative time that goes beyond the literary technique of anachrony (*Time and Narrative,* vol. 2: 84). For example, the notion of narrative voice (the fictive "I" uttered by the narrator-hero in *Remembrance of Things Past*) does not do justice to the narrator-hero's experience of time (in its psychological and metaphysical dimensions). The latter is fictive, but is also called 'experience' by virtue of its relation to the world projected by the work; it is also crucial for giving meaning to the notions of time lost and time regained. As Ricoeur writes, the notion of the *world of the text* constitutes what is at stake in the novel (*Time and Narrative,* vol. 2: 85-6). It requires us to 'open up' the literary work to an 'outside' that it projects before itself and offers for critical appropriation by a reader. This view does not contradict the closure implied by the formal principle of configuration. The claim that a literary work '*is about'* is with respect to the 'temporality' of the virtual being-in-the-world proposed by a particular text (*Time and Narrative,* vol. 2: 100). In the intersection between this fictive experience and the reader's actual experience, the world of the work constitutes a transcendence immanent in the text itself (*Time and Narrative,* vol. 2: 101).

Ricoeur borrows the distinction between '*tales of time'* and '*tales about time'* from Adam A. Mendilow (*Time and the Novel* 16). From this angle, his analysis concentrates upon novels which explore modes of discordant concordance that affect also the lived experience of the characters. While the expression "fictive experience of time" (*Time and Narrative,* vol. 2: 100) designates the projection of a work, capable of intersecting the sphere of action, the phrase '*tales about time'* reveals unconsidered aspects of the experience of time (Jervolino 142). In Ricoeur's conception, imaginative variations of reading pertain in the first place to the refiguration of ordinary temporality. However, within the limits of the fundamental experience of discordant concordance, he picks up a work like Proust's *A la recherche du temps perdu*[6] for its exploration of the relation of time to eternity.

[4]The narrator does not have to speculate about time in order to intend poetic time; this is done by giving a configuration to narrated time.

[5]The study of anachronies (prolepsis, analepsis and their combinations) may be superimposed on Harald Weinrich's study on 'perspective' (anticipation, retrospection, zero degree).

[6]Editor's Note *(hereafter Ed. N.)*: Marcel Proust. *Remembrance of Things Past*. Translated by C.K. Scott-Montcrieff, T. Kilmartin & A. Mayor, Random House, 1981.

An alternative to the latter perspective (Ricoeur's) is Currie's emphasis on the resonance of the concept of '*aboutness*'—the hidden sense of '*backwards time*' (4). If we leave aside the differences between narrative (as a reflection on the subject of backwards motion) and the way time works in life, the present for a reader is somebody else's present related in the past tense. We are narrated to in the *preterite*, but we experience the past tense in the present. Fictional narrative encourages us to think of the past as present. Theory has explored this implication of presentifying[7] of the past through the aspects of retrospect. Along this line of thought Currie follows Peter Brooks who has in mind the tradition for which "in telling everything is transformed by the structuring presence of the end to come" (5). He also notes that many studies have been less attentive to the relationship between storytelling and the mode of continuous anticipation in which we attach significance to present moments. Narrative cannot really be understood as retrospection without also being understood as anticipation. Thus, a fictional narrative invites us to think also of the present as a future past; because of the *preterite* we know that there is a future present, in relation to which the present of the narrative is past. On this side of the correlate is the tradition, for which the action takes place before the eyes as a "kind of quasi-present (of reading)" that is in relation to the structural retrospect of tense (Brooks 22; Currie 4-5).

In his preface to *Proust et la philosophie aujourd'hui*, Mauro Carbone asserts that *Remembrance of Things Past* "addresses directly those who approach it, whether they are philosophers or literary figures, giving them material to think afresh" (13). According to Jeanne Marie Gagnebin, Ricoeur choses the text to demonstrate how it tells of a 'time' that otherwise escapes conceptual understanding (105). A parallel suggestion of Gagnebin is that Proust's manner of inscribing time allows us to experience this passing. Ricoeur reads the novel as a fable on time, because it is a quest by the hero-narrator "for whom the challenge is precisely the passage of time" (*Time and Narrative*, vol. 2: 131). He argues against reading *Remembrance*… as centred on the power of involuntary memory, because such moments have no apparent meaning for the hero (Dowling 91). The childhood narratives are dreamlike associations. Combray is the time in which "the faith which creates" (Proust, *A la recherche du temps perdu* 201) cannot yet be distinguished from the illusion of the bare and silent reality of external things. The narrator's recurrent dream thoughts and the material excess of ordinary impressions (195) create an obstacle to the history of an artist's vocation. However, for Ricoeur, the search for meaning goes first by way of words and then by way of writing (*Time and Narrative*, vol. 2: 138); until then, nothing allows us to interpret lost time; it is quite simply lost in the sense of being over and dispersed (*Time and Narrative*, vol. 2: 139). All that might suggest the idea of time regained would be the weight accorded to rare moments, summed up in: "how paradoxical it is to seek in reality for pictures that are stored in one's memory, which must inevitably lose the charm that comes to them from memory itself and from their not being apprehended by the senses" (Proust, *A la recherche du temps perdu* 462). Remembrance itself seems to be like a struggle where even the happy transforming of present and past impressions into one is overshadowed by forgetfulness (*Time and Narrative*, vol. 2: 141). Hence, *Remembrance...* is a *tale about time* to the extent that it is identified neither with involuntary memory nor with the apprenticeship to signs. The novel poses the issue about the relation between these two levels of experience and the incomparable finale. Ricoeur points out that the fortuitous experiences of involuntary memory are lacking the scope of long apprenticeship to disillusionment. Childhood

[7]See also Ricoeur's referrences in *Time and Narrative* (3: 66, 78).

memory also moves away from speculation on the involuntary; even remaining almost incommunicable (Poulet 57-69), it still points in the direction of apprenticeship to signs (*Time and Narrative,* vol. 2: 137). Always ahead of the hero's progress, the narrator comes to the revelation about the relation of art to eternity only at the climax of the story. Marcel's reappearance in Paris bears a convinction in the falsehood of an ideal, but the crucial moment in the Guermantes' library enables the perception of literature's power to bring change in the writer's and the reader's selfhood. Yet, the discovery of the extratemporal dimension of the work of art serves as an eccentric to the apprenticeship. For Ricoeur, time is at stake as soon as it is a question of making a very long journey to the final which must retrospectively characterize the preceeding.

Attentive to this interpretation, Gagnebin takes several notes: First, *Remembrance...* is structured upon the distinction between two voices. The narrator makes it possible to thematize a temporality of writing that goes forwards and backwards, and *"*gives the meaning to the experience recounted*"* (*Time and Narrative,* vol. 2: 134). The problem of time is to be understood only if we keep separate this level (present earlier in the story only to mark the conscious recreation of the voice of an earlier self) from the voice of the hero. It is significant that the narrator prepares for the birth of a writer by passing through stages, among which (Proust, *A la recherche du temps perdu* 709) is relinquishing the attempt to relive the past (if lost time can somehow be found again). This consequence is "brought by Time" which symbolizes the power of destruction (*Time and Narrative,* vol. 2: 142). The final revelation follows after a sort of nothingness or "absence of emotion," introduced in the narrator's story by reporting events and places under the sign of misfortune and decline (Proust, *A la recherche du temps perdu* 886-87; *Time and Narrative,* vol. 2: 142). These are also encounters with a detachment from life in realities which "...death has already drawn within its shadow" (890-2). It is then that the hero "receives again" experiences from his childhood, but solves the enigma of intense joy in the fortuitous conjunction. It is experienced "like a certainty" about the relation of involuntary memory and the invisible history of a vocation (*Time and Narrative,* vol. 2: 143). Second, the novel's route gradually leads to the union of the two voices, at which point the vocation is finally recognized. Ricoeur considers the extent to which this dialectic between 'we' and consciousness resembles Aristotelian *muthos,* that is, reveals a temporal structure (Gagnebin 106). In a kind of treatise on art the narrative status is maintained by thin diegetic transitions between the major scene and earlier events on the hero's path to initiation. Grafting a thematic level onto the moments of happiness and their premonitory signs, the narrator anchores the speculation on time in the narrative as a founding event. In this way, the role of origin in the history of vocation is assigned to speculation, while assuring its irreducibly narrative character. What places this speculation at a distance is the fact that it brings to light the very suspension of time (Proust, *A la recherche du temps perdu* 904; *Time and Narrative,* vol. 2: 143-44). In a vision of an art that permits a glimpse at "extra-temporal" reality, illumination by literature becomes the true life. Third, the philosopher compares the work to be done by the narrator with the lenses made by the "optician of Combray."[8] Through the prism of threefold mimesis, we may interpret this image (of seeing better) as a reconfiguration of the world of the reader, but Proust's idea of reading is

[8]Ricoeur (1985, 150) cites Proust (1981, 1089): "For they [my readers] will not, according to me, be my readers, but real readers of themselves, my book being nothing more than a sort of magnifying glass like those that the optician in Combray holds out to a customer; my book, thanks to which I will provide them with the means to read themselves."

restricted to individual psychology. Fourth, the reflection on Proust's theory of metaphor pertains to the phenomenon of 'recognition' (Gagnebin 107).

Gagnebin observes that in Ricoeur's hermeneutics the signs play a dual role - to prepare the narrator for disillusion and death, and also to form an explicit announcement at the end of the book (108). These two positions "...serve at once to separate and suture the two foci of Remembrance. Separation, through the signs of death, confirming the failure of an apprenticeship to signs that lack the principle of their decipherment. Suture, through the premonitory signs of the great revelation" (*Time and Narrative,* vol. 2: 143). In such terms, the emphasis is on the construction of the book. By "drawing" an ellipse in which remembering and visitation are the foci[9] (*Time and Narrative,* vol. 2, 151), Ricoeur takes seriously what comprises the body of the novel and avoids eliminating the issue of quest and discovery (*Time and Narrative,* vol. 2: 132). The *tale about time* is an elliptical basis for interogating the relation (established by the project of the work of art) between time regained and time lost. This proposal depends on bridging the gap, on joining together the two valences. Thus, only a decision to write straightens the dual meaning of "time regained."

These observations must strengthen Ricoeur's analysis, yet, Gagnebin discerns a dimension (in Proustian descriptions of memory) where it is the body that has the initiative (through the senses of taste, smell, touch). Anchoring involuntary memory in corporeality is essential to the sudden rediscovery. Gagnebin insists on not leaving these elements without comment.

Ricoeur argues that—from the sensation with the madeleine up to the final accumulation—the joy felt by the hero comes from the new understanding of time that the experience of 'recognition' permits, although such reasoning is explicit only in the end (*Time and Narrative,* vol. 2: 136). Therefore, a more cautious reading could yield the idea of advancing from a state of confusion to that of being awake: "...the ecstasy of the madeleine opens up the recaptured time of childhood, just as the meditation in the library will open up that of the time when the vocation, recognised at last, is put to the test. The symmetry between the beginning and the end is thus revealed to be a guiding principle of the entire composition […]*"* (*Time and Narrative,* vol. 2: 137).

For Gagnebin, the proliferation of the novel has escaped construction, as if its movement became independent of the author's will. In order to interpret it as a kind of writing that has something to do with an organic pulse (109), he refers to Anne Simon's work, *Proust ou le réel retrouvé,* where *Remembrance…* is read in the light of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology. Simon states that in Proust's writing *"the general physicality of word"* seeks *"to make meaning surge forth" "from the interior of linguistic materiality*" towards sensitivity (93). Gagnebin affirms this characteristic as a plausible way to establish a parallel (in the text) between *writing*, which escapes the control of the mind but still nourishes consciousness, and *involuntary memory* which is awoken by an olfactory and tactile sensation, or by primitive, pre-intellectual organization of vision. The body's involuntary remembering exibits also a sort of internal mode, still dulled by slumber.

> And even before my thought, oscillating on the threshold between time and form, had identified my dwelling place while reconciling it with the circumstances, it –

[9]Ricoeur uses the term '*visitation*' with its evangelical connotation.

> my body – was recalling every detail of the bed, the positions of the doors, the angle of the windows, the existence of a corridor, together with whatever I had been thinking when I went to sleep, and which I found myself thinking again upon waking up. (Proust, *Remembrance of Things Past* 1981)

The narrator dubs bodily memory a guardian of the past "that my spirit should never have forgotten," yet, being indispensable for searching and recognizing the lost time of the past, it can also deceive about chronology. For Ricoeur, this will be the case until both speculation and writing begin to restore the intention of a work to be done (*Time and Narrative,* vol. 2: 143-44).

Extratemporal contemplation does not exhaust the meaning of *Time Regained*. Meditation on the origin of art remains unconnected to actual inscription (144). This point reveals the meaning of the narrative process constituting the *'tales about time'*. The narrator also anticipates the role of mediation between the two valences of time regained: "[…] this distinctness of different events would entail very considerable difficulties" (Proust, *A la recherche du temps perdu* 903); "Always, when these resurrections took place, the distant scene engendered around the common sensation had for a moment grappled, like a wrestler, with the present scene" (*A la recherche du temps perdu* 908). Gagnebin notes that the spirit must give memory a name, but it also needs to hear a language that is mute, or it would not be able to create on its own (110). Accordingly, *Remembrance*... reflects also the importance of this listening in Proustian writing.

Ricoeur applies a similar mode of inquiry in *Freedom and Nature*: *The Voluntary and the Involuntary,* where the theme of the "broken cogito" is also linked to the necessity of opening oneself to the corporality that constitutes the subject without her/him having chosen it. To put it in phenomenological perpespective, he writes: "Extension of the cogito to include personal body in reality requires more than a change of method: the ego must more radically renounce the covert claim of all consciousness, must abandon its wish to posit itself, so that it can receive the nourishing and inspiring spontaneity which breaks the sterile circle of the self's constant return to itself." (*Freedom and Nature* 14); "Thus the intention of this book is to understand the mystery as reconciliation, that is, as restoration, even on the clearest level of consciousness, of the original concord of vague consciousness with its body and the world" (*Freedom and Nature* 18). In a parallel conclusion, Gagnebin underlines that this second enigma still nourishes thinking (110-1). The closing scenes in the final volume of Proust's novel show that *remembrance* may be a threat to narrative unity, because "in order to become visible," it "...seeks bodies and, where ever it finds them, it seizes them in order to shine upon them its magic lantern" (*Time and Narrative,* vol. 2: 146; Gagnebin 112-13).

Whether or not we must add the notion of body memory to the realm of hermeneutics, for Ricoeur, the gaze through ordinary existence to a reality outside time is also a recognition of the reality of mortal time. The last dinner party is a scene where such realization is also meant for the reader (Dowling 91-2). The narrative character of the birth of a vocation is assured by the test that follows. According to the narrator, the spectacle offered by the guests "...threatened to raise against my enterprise the gravest of all objections" (Proust, *A la recherche du temps perdu* 959-60). "Death" is what makes the difference between the two meanings of time regained (*Time and Narrative,* vol. 2: 144-45). Regarding this relation, Proustian memory may also appear as a kind of temporal '*ek-stasis*.' Connotation to the movement of the soul (St. Augustine) is not foreign to the narrative theory of Ricoeur, yet, according to Gagnebin, another essential element here is the threat that remembering poses to continuity. If the "mystery of the body" is a theme that

connects Ricoeur's early work to the legacy of Merleau-Ponty, why does he not continue the project of "carnal hermeneutics" (R. Kearney) on the occasion of the analysis of Proustian resonance? Gagnebin (111) refers to Ricoeur's *Intellectual Autobiography* (1995): in the description of the path to the second volume on philosophy of the will - *Fallible Man*, the theme of corporality is only picked up again in the theme of the "gift of life." Grondin (2013) cites passages on this problematic in *Freedom and Nature*, and underlines the fact that the second volume is dedicated to analyses of guilt, sin and the importance of will. *The Symbolism of Evil* offers a theory of the modern world as an epoch characterised by the loss of "the essential link" of man to the "sacred," interpreted as "dehumanization" (Grondin 63). In the light of ethical preoccupations, the accent on the "all-encompassing dialectic of activity and passivity" replaces Ricoeur's initial problematic of the owned body. From the point of view of a just ethic of action, hermeneutics reinterprets the necessity which is attached to cultural works that signify. But this "long detour via symbols and myths" forgets that the phenomenology of the body describes something that is not exhaustible in terms of linguistic signifiers (Gagnebin 112). From another angle, within the frame of *Time and Narrative* (volume 2), destructive time would be stronger than the vision of time regained through the work of art, if the labor of writing did not take place in a time that is the same as lost time (Proust, *A la recherche du temps perdu* 971; *Time and Narrative,* vol. 2: 146). To the artist who preserves the tension another side of time is revealed: "the power to renew in fresh forms" the identity that beings preserve despite appearances (Proust 977-78). The concept of '*recognition*' points to the reconciliation between the two figures of "time regained" (*Time and Narrative,* vol. 2: 147)

For Ricoeur, fiction retains a trace of the world of *praxis*, but it also "invents" features of experience. This prospective relation explains why Goethe, Schiller, and Schlegel expected the emergence of a new quality of time from aesthetic experience. Distant from a poetics of narrative, Genette stresses that *Remembrance of Things Past* shares the realist tendency to attribute "...the overlappings reflected in the anachronisms of the narrative" either to life or to memory (158-60; Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative,* vol. 2, 87). Ricoeur values these contradictions as central for the fictive experience of the narrator-hero and as belonging to a search under the sign of the "extratemporal." This resume of the way time experience may be ultimately interpreted skips the historical influences on the conceptions in question.

Harry Jansen begins his tropological analysis[10] by pointing out that, according to Stephen Kern's research on the chaotic first quarter of the 20th century, the conceptions of time proposed by Henri Bergson and Walter Benjamin were alternatives to Hegelian approach to the topic (5). According to Kern, novelists also rejected the romantic intrigue continuing in irreversibile, uniformal time (288). For Jansen, '*Zeitromane'* are paradigmatic for three different temporalities. On this view, while Ricoeur combines the Augustinian thematic with Aristotelian diachronic thrust, and ascribes lack of dimension to Bergsonian temporality (*Time and Narrative*, vol. 2: 28, 168; *Time and Narrative*, vol. 3: 270), Proust defends a Bergsonian heterogeneous time (Jansen

[10]Jansen, Harry, *Triptiek van de tijd*. Vantilt, 2010. shows how novels of time let us explain different temporalities in historiography. Proust's metaphor exposes a heterogeneous time. Mann's synecdoche problematizes the temporality of rise and fall. Virginia Woolf uses a metonymy founded on human atomism that takes the form of "simultaneity of the dissimultaneous." This approach is close to Reinhart Koselleck's mediation of human experiences of time—the temporal modes in *Vergangene Zukunft: Zur Semantik geschichtlicher Zeiten*, Suhrkamp Verlag, 2000—"long-term system changes" and "simultaneity of the nonsimultaneous," (132-133) which display similarities respectively to Jansen's treatment of *The Magic Mountain* and *Mrs. Dalloway*.

1-2). The latter comes to the fore when the novelist, via his narrator, rejects a cinematic approach to reality: "...and what we call reality is a certain connection between these immediate sensations and the memories which envelop us simultaneously with them - a connection that is suppressed in a simple cinematographic vision [...]" (Proust, *Time Regained* 289).[11]

Ricoeur presents Proust's configuration of time as two features which are intertwined in a double movement. The protagonist experiences in a forward direction what the narrator tells in a backward direction (*Time and Narrative*, vol. 2: 83, 134). But the experiences and the sensations are too heterogeneous to form a plot of continuous and homogeneous time. The double Marcel, hero and narrator, is suggested in the end of the novel by telling often in the form of involuntary memories and flashbacks. On Ricoeur's view, the final is a way to "...encompass in the same look the distance of the heterogeneous and the simultaneity of the analogous." Jansen offers another version of this problematic—metaphor in Proust's novel is a juxtaposition of two times which is intended to display a heterogeneous temporality (21). The sentence *"*I was made to doubt whether I was in the one or in the other*"* (Proust, *Time Regained* 262) signals this option for exploration. For Bergson, time is not an inner stream of consciousness from the past to the future or the reverse (*Time and Free Will* 98-101). It is an intuitively discovered, ceaselessly fluid, qualitative multiplicity. Bergson's comparison of the latter to empathy (2018-19) must qualify completely different, even opposing feelings and experiences. In addition, as these continually changing moments interpenetrate one another, time is also a "stretched now" —a present which endures and has nothing in common with immutability or instantaneity (*The Creative Mind* 124-132). Jansen notes that in *Time Regained* the past encroaches on the present.[12] While the novel displays contradictory characteristics, its title can be found in Bergson's *The Creative Mind* (15; Jansen 17-8). To claim that the focus on involuntary memories is borrowed, Jansen (20) refers to Shattuck (115) and other scholars who underline similarity, in disagreement with Kern (58)[13] who follows Proust's statement to the contrary.

According to Jansen, the perspective of "a work yet to be accomplished" is a turn to unilinearity. For Ricoeur, the connection between the lost time of the apprenticeship to signs and the contemplation of the extratemporal is the itinerary of the book (Jansen 21-2). The interval "from the idea of a distance that separates to that of a distance that joins together" (*Time and Narrative*, vol. 2: 151) is the third stage of his investigation; the relation that the narrative establishes between the two foci is characterized as time *lost-regained*. On the scale of *Remembrance*…, the resolution is ambiguous, because infinitesimal experiences constitute the laboratory for the relation upon which the act of regaining time is built (Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, vol. 2: 147). The entire apprenticeship to signs falls under a twofold sense that intelligence has to clarify. Sensations and memories turn into or are enclosed within "...the

[11]To single out this quote as a clear expression of the Bergsonian view, Jansen refers to Bergson (361) in Bergson, Henry. *Creative Evolution.* London, Random House, 1911. He cites also Armstrong: "This is why Bergson spends much of the chapters analyzing the cinematographic mechanism of thought. Bergson believed if we could remove ourselves from this illusionary mechanism we would finally be immersed in a true vision of the world and be closer to the fundamental principle of existence." See Armstrong, S. G. "Deleuze, Bergson and the Movement in Cinema." *A Collection of Literary and Philosophical Criticism* 1, 2012.

[12]"[...] between that distant moment [the sound of a bell] and the present one, unrolled in all its vast length, the whole of that past which I was not aware that I carried about within me" (529).

[13]According to Kern, Stephen. *The Culture of Time and Space*, Proust's narrator emphasizes "the shock and pleasure of being suddenly immersed in time which has been experienced discontinuously"; Bergson's experience of time is interpereted as showing a "continuous gnawing of the past into the present."

necessary links of a well-wrought style" (Proust, *A la recherche du temps perdu* 924-5). In this sense, for Ricoeur, *time regained* is time lost that becomes eternalized by metaphor (148).

In an essay on *Remembrance of Things Past*, Anne Henry stresses the significant question about identity.[14] Ricoeur (*Time and Narrative*, vol. 2: 132-3) disagrees with her thesis that the work of Proust shows an unbridgeable gap between mind and material world. Regarding Henry's and Ricoeur's (*Time and Narrative,* vol. 2: 152) positions, Jansen suggests that metaphor is the only trope that displays this problem. He takes Proust's title (*Time Regained*) to indicate the fulfilment of vocation (22). While the loss of time is in numerous sensations and memories, the narrator discovers that emplotment is founded on "re-creation" of impressions, or that the basis of a work of art is the deepening of memory (Jansen 23). On the same point, Proust writes: "truth... can be attained by us only when, by comparing a quality common to two sensations, we succeed in extracting their common essence and reuniting them to each other, liberated from the contingencies of time, within a metaphor" (*Time Regained* 290). Ricoeur sums up this use of metaphorical relation as the standard of the novel's temporality, or as "the matrix for all the relations in which two distinct objects are raised, despite their differences, to their essence" (*Time and Narrative*, vol. 2: 148). He acknowledges the existence of distinct moments in time, but prioritizes "concordance of the discordant." What is placed under the aegis of metaphor calls for a complementary "optical solution," that is, the experience of regained time is a question of vision (Proust, *A la recherche du temps perdu* 931). '*Recognition'* is the mark of the extratemporal on lost time. Happy moments are miniatures of stereoscopic vision—forms of recognition. In this respect, the Guermantes dinner party bears also the sign of non-recognition (971-90). Ricoeur considers metaphor and recognition (the second is the temporal equivalent of the first) as sharing the common role of elevating two impressions to the level of essence, without abolishing their difference (*Time and Narrative,* vol. 2: 149).

Jansen reads the above quote from Proust as a claim that metaphor exposes *the (in reality experienced) contingencies of time*, that is, metaphor merely underlines the heterogeneity of time. This observation is based on Bergson's way of uncovering temporality, but also points to a figure of discordance which makes conditions impossible in reality communicable in words (23). The difficulty in relating style and vision to each other touches upon the problem of the relation between writing and impressions as well as literature and life. Shattuck points out that Proust bids on recognition: "[…] the provisional nature of life disappears in the discovery of the straight path of art" (37-8). Along this trail, time regained is the impression regained. The narrator's reply to the difficulties—in preventing the substitution of literature for life, and in keeping from dissolving the impression in a psychology or sociology, divested of all narrative character—suggests that literature goes in two opposite directions at once: *"*Since every impression is double and the one half which is sheathed in the object is prolonged in ourselves by another half which we alone can know, we speedily find means to neglect this second half, which is the one on which we ought to concentrate*"* (Proust, *A la recherche du temps perdu* 927).[15] Ricoeur thinks this equation as a reversibility between the impression preserved in its trace and the work of art that states the meaning of the impression (*Time and Narrative,* vol. 2: 150-51). In this third

[14]The theme of reconciliation of mind and reality originates in the Romantic era.

[15]On the one hand, the impression must act as "...the very proof of the trueness of the whole picture" (913). On the other hand, reading the book of life is "...an act of creation in which no one can do our work for us or even collaborate with us" (913).

version of time regained the two ways of *Remembrance…*—style (metaphor) and vision (recognition)—must join and reconcile (in the fruit of the labour of writing which includes forgetfulness and death). Both make explicit the relation (between life and literature) upon which *impression regained* is constructed. If the extratemporal transforms "discontinuous periods" into a continuous duration, the work of Proust is far from a Bergsonian vision of duration free of all extension. The final images in the novel—duration and Time carrying us within it—confirm this dimensional character (*A la recherche du temps perdu* 1107; *Time and Narrative,* vol. 2: 151-52).

The function of narrative is usually thought of as the site of self-conscious reflection both on past events and on the nature of writing about them. This is the double time of *In Search of Lost Time*. With Proust, the idea of forward movement involving a backward narration might be thought of as the shape of time itself, or as the structure which, filling out the blanks of origin, always comprehends the past from the point of view of the present. The fact that the word '*recherche,*' in the penultimate sentence of *Time and Narrative*, refers to *A la recherche du temps perdu* opens the re-consideration on what may appear inconclusive or vague in both Ricoeur's (*Le Temps raconte*) and Proust's (*Le Temps retrouve*) volumes. Rhiannon Goldthorpe proposes the option that both approaches apply the absence of transcendent vantage-point as a kind of (self-)subversion. Proust's narrator reaches his aims in the narrative's linear movement, yet, the author's own hypothesis—reinstating time within the same provisional limits, is falsified by the hero's intuitions that time can be transcended (84). Ricoeur's own concern is with the stages of a process of threefold *mimesis* which effect resolutions where speculation fails.[16] The thesis of fictional mediation is based on the characters' experiences of 'transcending' the 'discordant' lived experience within verbal structures, which are offered with a view towards the refiguration of the reader's ordinary temporal experience (Goldthorpe 85-6). If Ricoeur performs a test within the frame of the novel, his contention is that Marcel's intuitions at the Guermantes party come as transitive between the experience of time lost (whether past, wasted, or dispersed) and the retrieval of lost time through the composition of the work of art (Goldthorpe 86). He argues for the hero's awareness that the latter must occur within the unstable dimension of lost time. Emplotment thus sets the intuition of eternity versus disillusion, thereby exploring the aporia of time as dispersal and as unity (*Time and Narrative,* vol. 2: 143–8).

Regarding reading, Ricoeur discloses a tension between the linear (forward movement in renewed realization of '*discordance*') and non-linear aspects of Proust's plot—the '*concordant*' moment in Marcel's intuition of the extra-temporal. The exposition of the thematic of the novel intimates a number of solutions: stylistic (metaphor), "optical" (recognition) and spiritual (the retrieved impression) (*Time and Narrative,* vol. 2: 148–51). But the process is more seriously undermined at the very moment of our reading and the undermining is not enunciated (Goldthorpe 87). It occurs at a points when the reader confronts the '*said*' with the '*unsaid*': at a place of indeterminacy (Ingarden) or a blank which arises 'out of contingency and inexperience-

[16]The aporias of time which our urge to narrate confronts are: 1, the impossibility of reconciling the phenomenological perspective of lived time with the perspective of cosmological time; 2, the problem of reconciling our experience of the dispersal of time in the ekstases of past, present and future with the notion of time as a whole. In the third stage (mimesis3) Ricoeur develops Wolfgang Iser's theory of the act of reading which suggests that the textual configuration offers instructions which the reader actualizes in order to enable, particularly in the process of rereading, the achievement of a new evaluation of time and reality. The latter must itself open out onto the world of action.

ability' (Iser). It underlies the processes of interaction between reader and text. When the '*unsaid*' comes to life in the imagination of the reader, the '*said*' takes on greater significance than might have been supposed (Iser).

In the light of this paradox and in the wake of Ricoeur's insistance that our experience of time (as distinct from temporality) is mute, Goldthorpe proceeds to investigate two levels of the text. What are we shown/told at the level of '*said*' (1)? The protagonist/narrator perceives the relationship between involuntary memory, self, and artistic creation, which brings joy, irrelevance of death, and suggests an *identity* between the present and the hitherto forgotten past (*A la recherche du temps perdu* 445–8; Proust, *Remembrance of Things Past* 898–901). In this revelation the common elements are shared outside time. Such intuition must be re-made into art; the metaphoric superimposition seals what is identical between two moments in time (*A la recherche du temps perdu* 468). What happens is also an affirmation of necessity (Goldthorpe 88). According to the explication of the articulation of time-experience at the implicit level of the '*unsaid*' (2), we are shown an undermining of the extra-temporal at the moment of its postulation. It occurs through a 'blank' in the narrative, showing (without commentary) two mutually self-cancelling memories of the same moment. Metaphor functions not as the abstracting and superimposing of a common element, but as metamorphosis, or constant redescription, which the reader percieves not by closing the gap between first and second term, but by reading the gap between successive second terms (Goldthorpe 88-9). These mobilities of memory and metaphor arise from those places of indeterminacy which are registered in the act of reading. This particular sense at the level of refiguration still depends upon the time of narrative and reading. The process, whereby the '*said*' is negated by the '*unsaid*' and moves to a new significance, exemplifies implicitly a discordance which brings back to life the earliest recollection about a book which Marcel's mother had read aloud to him (Proust, *Remembrance of Things Past* 920–21). It is exemplified in the last remembrance at the Guermantes party (Goldthorpe 89). The reader must notice that an earlier retrospective account of the reading of *Francois le Champi* had not come from involuntary memory. It had been a part of associations always within Marcel's recall (*A la recherche du temps perdu* 41-3; *Remembrance of Things Past* 44–6). For the reader, the availability of this segment maintains continuity within an otherwise discontinuous relation of revived memories. But its last involuntary recollection, along with the whole chronology, and the point in time of the retrospective narration, becomes indeterminate. Its quality remains until a new discontinuity intervenes: involuntary memory implies the narrator's having forgotten that he had always been capable of remembering the experience in question (Goldthorpe 90). This discrepancy within the narration of time—between narrated time and read time—leads to a reflection on the '*unsaid*' indeterminacies of chronology and memory in experience itself (91). For Goldthorpe, these apparent textual imperfections stimulate, at the thematic level, a more complex refiguration of experience. At the moment of rediscovery the fragility of continuity and the vulnerability of consciousness are radically dramatized, generating a sense of irony which is not registered by the narrator (91).

Therefore, in order to find other ways of satisfying the fundamental urge for coherence (Iser) in the act of reading, the reader may seek to motivate consistency at the level of the requirements of narration itself. The sudden recall dramatizes the major reversal of what is taken to be the '*plot*' of Marcel's own history (or that of Proust's fiction). Such recognition may absorb the apparent inconsistency of what is narrated into the coherence of the narrative form; it corresponds to a need for narrative pattern. The reader becomes aware of the paradoxes of time

through the implicit dramatization of the relationship (space) between experience (figuration) and emplotment (configuration) (Goldthorpe 91). Thus, the subjection of narrative to the interdependence of history and fiction (*Time and Narrative* 180–92) reminds of the elusiveness of meaning, and of discrepancies between creation and reception (*Remembrance of Things Past* 919). The charm of the book (*Francois le Champi*) may be in the sought for coherence in the background of gaps in readings (*Remembrance of Things Past* 45; Goldthorpe 92). Marcel refuses to fill in those blanks. Further, the reader may not notice the 'embedding' of the motif of loss and recovery when the older Marcel finds the book again and rediscovers the child he used to be (93). Finally, Goldthorpe reminds that reading about someones experiences might depend on vagaries of performance, knowledge, interplay of repression, wish-fulfilment, creative afterthought, and memory (94).

In conclusion, the instability of involuntary memory is a fragile basis for the extra-temporal stability of identity which Marcel thinks he has found in his trust in metaphor. For if involuntary memory is a passively undergone mediation between past, present, and future, its expression is the metaphor. This experience is a *lived metaphor* which turns contingency into necessity and the transient into the eternal. As Marcel, the narrator, tells: "[…] truth will be attained by [the writer] only when he takes two different objects, states the connexion between them—a connexion analogous in the world of art to the unique connexion which in the world of science is provided by the law of causality—and encloses them in the necessary links [circle] of a well-wrought style […]" (*Remembrance of Things Past* 924–25). Style can achieve eternity only through metaphor (Proust, "Contre" 586), or as Goldthorpe (94) notes: a superimposing of the same within the other in an invention of identity (between self and external world) outside time. He goes on to say that intuition of mystical stasis could resolve these aporias, if it wasn't difficult to read the recreations of Marcel's experiences in a way which confirms the narrator's commentary on metaphor. When read in the light of our own reading memory, their order expresses the movement of time. As moments of reading they carry their own potential for anticipation and retrospection (own retentions and protentions). For example, the metaphoric vision of the sea, from the time of the first visit to Balbec, might bring the sense of superimposed identical moments which abolish the passage of time. But the reader's mind is cast forward to a later memory with a different association, dating from the second visit, however, the change does not bring a sense of discontinuity (Goldthorpe 95). A painter in the novel had shown (by exploring the limits of sea as land) that metaphor is a matter of transposing elements, or of making difference visible, rather than identity (96-7). Goldthorpe compares permeablity to the 'other' and to human conscious *activity*, whether practical or aesthetic, to the activity which is the essence of Ricoeur's notion of *mimesis*. Thus, the concept of redescription, the process of '*seeing as*' in *La Metaphore vive*, can be read here as a crucial to developing a temporal interaction of consciousness and world (97). For Marcel metaphor is a dialectic which maintains a negation of past habituality along with a new vision, thus, enacts change in time. As a new intending of a world in which traditional categories are held in tension with their dissolution, it reminds of Ricoeur's redefinition of metaphorical truth as the preservation 'of the "*is not*" within the "*is*"'(Goldthorpe 97-8). Goldthorpe notes that a theory of metaphor as opposition of the extra-temporal to the decline through time holds narrative at a level foreshortened by a sense of closure, but this tension is replaced by a metaphor which plays on a single word. The ambiguity

of this image— '*anneaux*'—is highlighted by a divergence in the translations[17] of '*les anneaux necessaires d'un beau style.*' Marcel's word may be read either as 'rings' or 'circles' (circularity), or as the distinct but interdependent links of a chain (continuity); in short, closure is kept in tension with the progression. To the objection that the narrator aims to enclose ('*enfermer*') his experiences of involuntary memory in the chains of metaphor, Goldthorpe replies that the verb is in the mode of deferral (98). The retrieval of lost time remains a project for a future book. This ending of the novel resembles the postscript to *Time and Narrative*, where Ricoeur reminds that the effort to resolve the aporias of time has its limits. For the philosopher, success lies in defining *narrative identity* as an inclusion of change and mutability within the cohesion of a life (*Time and Narrative* 246). But the novelist's enterprise appears to be more radical: perhaps, the idea of provisional book (despite intuitions of eternity) serves to accompany the one already written, thus, both form a metaphor for a gap in consciousness which can never be closed in self-coincidence or in self-knowledge. Finally, Goldthorpe considers the sentence: "And thus my whole life up to the present day might and yet might not have been summed up under the title: A Vocation" (*Remembrance of Things Past* 936), as a suggestion that the act of reading must endlessly refigure an unwritten book which 'lies beyond' configuration (99).

In explicating the argument of Ricoeur, discussions of *Time and Narrative* tend to privilege the appropriation of Aristotle, thus, the idea of 'emplotment' is seen as crucial to the exegesis of the '*threefold mimesis*.' Narratives give plausibility structures for the experience of reality according to the idea of '*narrated time*.' Richard Rosengarten adds a theological key to this conception. He regards the *threefold mimesis* as a hermeneutic refiguration of the temporality of Augustinian *Confessions*. The central aporia of Book 11 concerns the meditation on the being and non-being of time, reflected in the tension between distension and intention (173). In this sense, controlling emphasis in *Time and Narrative* becomes the ontology of the *distensio animi*. At stake is understanding the relationship of the latter to narrative (171). Ricoeur distinguishes Augustine as recognizing the rhetorical approach. Time cannot be described without being discussed. It is always already where words about it are inevitably 'practical' rather than 'theoretical' (Rosengarten 173). The dynamic of restoring Augustine as Aristotle's counterpart crystallises in Ricoeur's formulation of '*the presumption of truth*.' The bridge in this dialogical project depends on the relation between discordance and concordance. With Augustine the problem of the soul that 'distends' itself even as it 'engages' itself remains impenetrable. But his formulation of the threefold present opens the crucial aspect of Ricoeur's reading. In the contrast of time with eternity is incipient Aristotle's formulation of *discordant concordance*. Where the Augustinian *distensio* describes an experience of discordance, Aristotelian concordance through tragic *muthos* is silent. But the *Poetics*' concern with composition cannot remain internal, with no reference to the audience. In Ricoeur's terms, the plot's 'structuration' requires a reader to achieve its completion. If the reader lives in the condition of distension gesturing to intention, then the formula of *Time and Narrative*—time elicits narrative and narrative elucidates time—must include an accent which is ontological rather than textual (Rosengarten 175). Ricoeur argues that the comparison Augustine makes pertains also to the mind. For Rosengarten, the Augustinian view that the mind's distention finds its counterpart in

[17]In the first English translation is '*the necessary circle of fine style*'; the revised version - '*the necessary links of fine style*'. See *Time Regained.* Translated by Stephen Hudson, Chatto & Windus, 1931, p. 239, and *Remembrance of Things Past.* Translated by C. W. Scott Moncrieff and Terence Kiimartin, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1983, p. 925.

time's gesture to eternity[18] "heralds" the concluding claim of volume I of *Time and Narrative*. The *distensio* concerns the controlling theme; it necessitates narrative and is also its arbiter (Rosengarten 174-75).

With this option, Ricoeur's conception of '*narrated time*' may be specified as a way towards 'thinking (simultaneously) about eternity and death' (*Time and Narrative*, vol. 1: 87). The third phase of elucidation of the *threefold mimesis* relays the modes essential to '*narrated time*,' that is, their distinction and convergence. Fiction, as standing for the intersection between world of the reader and world of the text, works inversely to history. This difference articulates[19] a version of the hermeneutical circle (Rosengarten 176-77). Identifying mimesis with the aporetics of temporality, the treatment of Augustine establishes a draft for the circle, but Ricoeur accentuates the need to arrive at the shared practice of history-and-fiction, characterized as 'time-consciousness.' According to Rosengarten, he reinstates the tension between Augustine and Aristotle in the modern version of the aporia of time, the *distensio* is the implicit conditioning agent and explicit ground from which the project is expressed (176-77). Ricoeur's demarcation of the latter employs two aspects: a '*space of experience'* and a '*horizon of expectation*.' They reflect both our ways of living (action) and, our hopes and fears (suffering). For Rosengarten, the triadic discussion on *traditionality*, *traditions*, and *tradition* mimics the necessitation of the project by the distension. At stake is the way history and fiction allow us to think about continuity and discontinuity using the resources of the past to affect the future in the present. Ricoeur formulates the possibility as a synthesis of experience and expectation in a '*presumption of truth*.' This option must balance a debt to the past with an agency towards change (Rosengarten 178).

In *Conclusions*, the second ending of his trilogy, Ricoeur identifies another limit of the capacity to achieve a '*narrated time*' in which the aporetics of temporality and the poetics of narrativity coincide (Rosengarten 178). What if the argument's mode—a way forward to the relation of time and narrative—amounts to totalising the dimension of poetics? Is the call to rational, public interrogation of tradition sufficient to its assignment?

Rosengarten also outlines two objections which affect the construal of the project, or how the expression of *mimesis*—the *distended experience* of time and *structured representation* of time—is understood. The focus from the vantage point of narrative ethics (a model ensuring intelligibility in a practical description of narrative as a structure by which disparate phenomena are held together) privileges an Aristotelian view, according to which Ricoeur does not fully appreciate the narrative order imposed on ontology.[20] From the point of emphasis on the history

[18]Rosengarten considers this formulation with reference to St. Augustine's citations of the *Psalms* throughout *Confessions*.

[19]In their relation to documents, historians may adopt a hypothesis of sameness (*re-enactment*), or of otherness (de Certeau's '*pertinent absence'*) or of analogue (White's tropes). In their relation to narrators, readers of novels may similarly adopt a hypothesis of sameness (reliability), distanciation (unreliability), or analogy (responsive to form). These parallels crucially set in the context of different frames of reference; allow the articulation of a complementarity in which history and fiction each use the other to reconfigure time.

[20]The bacis texts are MacIntyre, Alasdair. *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory.* University of Notre Dame Press, 1981, and Hauerwas, S. *A Community of Character: Toward a Constructive Christian Social Ethic.* University of Notre Dame Press, 1981. For a review of these two books see Barbour, J. "The Virtues in a Pluralistic Context." *The Journal of Religion*, vol. 63, 1983, pp. 175–82. For the range of this conception of narrative in relation to religion

of theology, Ricoeur's account is seen as a misinterpretation of the relation of psychology to cosmology. On this view, the innovation of *Confessions* is the link of *distensio* with the mind (*distensio animi*) (Rosengarten 179). As narration, it is a movement from *distentio* to *intentio*: the former is subverted by the latter and the mind has an experience of recovered unity. The difference between Books 1–9 and Books 10–13 of *Confessions* corresponds to a way from philosophy to theology; respectively, Ricoeur does not fully appreciate a revision of the classic philosophies of time, does not elicit the dialogical partner of *distentio*.[21]

The end of the current survey repeats a resume by Rosengarten (180) on the conviction and commitment in *Time and Narrative*. Both are expressed in Ricoeur's double hermeneutics: on the one hand, elaborations of fiction and history with complexity of tradition, on the other hand—a dialectic between Augustinian and Aristotelian methods. In this version subsequent reformulations do not afford phenomenological closure. Rosengarten highlights the acknowledgement that the plausibility structurations of narrative are not immune to the ontology of the *distensio animi*. He points out that a final statement hinges on one point: the fundamental experience of *distentio*. The aporetics of time and narrative poetics meet each other under the aegis of Ricoeur's maxim—"to think more and to speak differently."

see Crites, S. "The Narrative Quality of Experience." *Journal of the American Academy of Religion*, vol. 39, 1971, pp. 291–311, and Stout, J. *Democracy and Tradition*. Princeton University Press, 2004.

[21]See Marion, J.L. *In the Self's Place: The Approach of St. Augustine.* Translated by J. Kosky, Stanford University Press, 2012; Pranger, M.B. "Time and Narrative in Augustine's Confessions." *The Journal of Religion, vol.* 81, 2001, pp. 377–93; "The Augustinian Moment." *The Journal of Religion*, ed. W. Otten , vol. 91, 2011 (special issue).

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