Language, Literature,
and Interdisciplinary Studies (LLIDS)
ISSN: 2457-0044

The Formative and Transformative Function of Desire in Ashis Nandy's *The Intimate Enemy*: A Deleuzian Perspective

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Introduction: The Formative Function of Desire

The relationship between desire and resistance provides the primary framework for the critical project developed by Ashis Nandy's book *The Intimate Enemy* (1983). In the psychoanalytical register, desire is often defined in terms of lack and prohibition. In Sigmund Freud's Oedipus complex, the infant's sexual desire, or libido, is mediated and prohibited through the intervention of the father. The Oedipus complex, Freud (1989) explains, develops as a result of the entrapment of desire into the family triangle—daddy, mummy and me—in which the subject of desire (the child) is denied access to the object of desire (the mother) through the intervention of the Father (640). The father, therefore, represents the external authority under which the child's libidinal desire is regulated. Conventionally, the Oedipus complex represents a model of identification which "is supposed to reflect the Father's image and one which takes it upon itself to bring order to the house and discipline the psyche" (Friedman 97). Moreover, the subject's desire must be repressed because it threatens to dismantle the authority of the Father. As Eugene W. Holland puts it: "the nuclear family programs its members to submit, as good docile subjects, to any prohibitive authority—the father, the boss, capital in general—and to relinquish until later, as good ascetic subjects, their access to the objects of desire" (56). Thus, by repressing desire, the family produces obedient and docile subjects who are formulated to accept the mediation of any oppressive Authority.

Following Freud, the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan also emphasized the prohibitive function of desire. In the Imaginary order, between the ages of six and eighteen months, the subject's ego—that is the subject's perception of itself as a unified being separate from other people—is structured by identifying with its image in the mirror. The image provides the infant with a sense of unity and coherence because it is more stable and coordinate than the infant's sensation of his/her real body over which he/she has not yet developed full motor control. The process of identifying with an-other, that exists outside the Self, is equally important for the subject's articulation of his/her desires. According to Lacan (1988), just as the child identifies with an external image outside him/herself to achieve a sense of identity, the subject's desire "exists solely in the single plane of the imaginary relation of the specular stage projected, alienated in the other" (170). Thus, it is through this process of exchange with the other that the subject's ego is constructed and the subject's desires are obtained. The Oedipus complex represents a crucial stage in the subject's development: the passage from the Imaginary order to

the Symbolic order (Lacan 1993, 199). This means that to go beyond the Oedipus complex, and consequently pass into the Symbolic order, is to identify with the 'name of the father'. The subject's sense of identity only becomes functional when the subject relinquishes its relation with the 'm/other' of the Imaginary order so as to occupy a place in the Symbolic realm of identification.

Imaginary-order identification results in what Lacan calls "the ideal ego" which refers to the illusion of wholeness on which the ego is constructed in the mirror stage. After the Imaginary phase, the subject enters the Symbolic order in which the subject learns language and occupies a position in the social order. In the Symbolic order, the subjectivity of the individual is constructed also by means of identification with what Lacan (1993 [1997], 56) calls "the big Other". Unlike the "little other" or the other with which the subject identifies him/herself in the Imaginary order, the Other of the Symbolic order cannot be assimilated by the process of identification. The big Other represents "the ultimate authority or source of meaning constituted by the Symbolic order" (Bracher 23). Although the Symbolic Other cannot be assimilated, the subject's desire for identification with that Other remains consistent. The result of this urge is the setting up of "a cluster of signifiers as the ego ideal through which the subject wishes to be loved and recognized by the other" (24).

Symbolic-order identification, according to Lacan, results in "the ego-ideal"—that is a set of signifiers that functions as ideal. Lacan called these signifiers "master signifiers". Master signifiers refer to the set of signifiers that permeate the Symbolic order of a certain discourse. These signifiers represent the identity-bearing words in which the subject can recognize him/herself and can be recognized by others as well. The subject's identity and position within a certain discourse is determined by the degree to which he/she affiliates with or fight against the set of master signifiers that construct that discourse, as Bracher explains: "our sense of being or identity is determined to a large degree by what happens to those signifiers that represent us—our master signifiers—particularly the alliance our master signifiers form with or the wars they wage on other signifiers" (25). To a large extent, colonialism was a battle in which the colonizer strove to maintain as dominant a set of master signifier that represent their ideology and worldviews and the colonized resisted, or failed to resist, these signifiers.

Desire and Symbolic-Order Identification in *The Intimate Enemy*

The main point underlying Freud's and Lacan's perception of desire is that one's desire is mediated and prohibited by an external authority. This model of identification stresses the cultural and social function of desire in colonial discourse which provokes certain forms of identification, and suppresses some others, in order to maintain its order. Like the nuclear family, colonization produces oedipalization which, in turn, closes off any potential for resistance and revolution, as Deleuze and Guattari (1983) argue: "the colonized resists oedipalization, and oedipalization tends to close around him again. To the degree that there is oediplaization, it is due to colonization" (169). Colonization produces oedipalization as it codifies the colonized's desire into an image of the White man which is also perceived as universal. Therefore, "the effect consciously sought by colonialism was to drive into the natives' heads the idea that if the settlers were to leave, they would at once fall back into barbarism, degradation and bestiality" (Fanon 266). Hence, the oedipal and colonial laws of identification function according to the same logic.

In India, the Symbolic order of the colonial discourse produced mastery by constituting the dominance of certain master signifiers and the repression of the other signifiers that are not congruent with the colonizers' values. In so doing, these signifiers ordered knowledge in accordance with the colonizer's values and kept the natives' knowledge, culture and traditions in a subordinate position, as Nandy (1983) shows: "colonialism releases forces [i.e. master signifiers] within the colonized societies to alter their cultural priorities once and for all" (xi). The main purpose of introducing these "forces" in the ideological space of the colonial discourse was to change the way in which both the colonizer and the colonized perceived the world. The key signifier that brought about the major psychological changes that took place in India under colonialism was the "West". The "West," Nandy (1983) argues, functioned as the main master signifier which was transformed from "a geographical and temporal entity to a psychological category" and became "now everywhere, within the West and outside, in structures and in minds" (xi). The West, as the dominant master signifier, acted as the bearer of ultimate meaning and, thus, bestowed value and meaning on all other signifiers. It represented, Nandy claims, cultural baggage which

> ...includes codes which both the rulers and the ruled can share. The main function of these codes is to alter the original cultural priorities on both sides and bring to the centre of the colonial culture subcultures previously recessive or subordinate in the two confronting cultures. Concurrently, the codes remove from the centre of each of the cultures subcultures previously salient in them. (2)

The colonial discourse, in turn, enticed its subjects, both the Western and the non-Western, to assume certain positions in the service of the dominant master signifier, the West, in their attempts at self-definition. The Western man is defined as a colonizer as a result of his alliance with the colonial master signifier. The master signifier gives a new self-definition to the Western man as a colonizer by making him "definitionally non-Eastern and handed him a self-image and a world view which were basically responses to the needs of colonialism. He could not but be non-Eastern" (Nandy 71). That is, for the colonizers, identifying with the West as a master signifier means to embody the West's values and convey them to the uncivilized and backward people. "Colonialism", Nandy reveals, "minus a civilizational mission is no colonialism at all" (11). Therefore, the colonizer used the West as the bottom line that anchors, explains and justifies the claims of their subjugation of the Other. Its values were accepted because they were congruent with the needs and goals of the Empire. The master signifier, therefore, authorized and affirmed the superiority of the Western subject over the non-Western Other.

On the other hand, the colonized subject responded to the dominant master signifier in a similar manner. While the colonizers' identification with the West as a master signifier is reasonable as it serves their goal, what seems paradoxical is the idea of the colonized's identification with the oppressive signifier. Because it represented the ultimate source of meaning, the master signifier operated as a psychological incentive which arose in the colonized the urge to have an identity in which he/she can recognize him/herself and be recognized by others. In an oppressive discourse like colonialism, the only way to be recognized as subject is to submit to the dominant signifier which suppressed all other signifiers and sources of references in which the oppressed could invest his/her identity. To invoke Lacan's (1991) language, the master signifier is what makes a story readable and its message meaningful (189). In the colonial

discourse, the West determined the readability of the story. Thus, the colonized was forced to identify with the master signifier in order to be able to read both him/herself and the other too. In order to obtain recognition and to get his voice heard, which is necessary for one's well-being as Lacan shows, the colonized was forced to identify with the West since it represented the ultimate authority. Even in enmity and rebellion, the colonized subject acted within the limits set by the dominant master signifier.

Hence, the most salient structural feature of the colonial discourse is the dominance of the West as a master signifier which submits both the colonizer and the colonized to its authority. The process of primary identification with the West operates also on a secondary level in which the colonial discourse got its subjects to change their position by unconsciously coercing them to give up some of their basic ideological representatives and embrace new codes of identity. Thus, the primary identification with the master signifier is supplemented by the secondary identification with some other signifiers through which the dominance of the master signifier is strengthened. In colonial India, it was masculinity that played the role of the secondary signifier through which the West perpetuated itself, as Young notes:

> ...the psychology of colonialism...operated within a single culture in which a mutually responsive state of mind developed between colonizer and colonized. For both, colonial culture demanded a specific mind-set, with its own ideology, codes and rules that had to be learnt, distinct from the indigenous cultures of both. In the case of late nineteenth-century British imperialism, the framework of colonial culture was sustained through an ideology of masculinity. (325)

The ideology of masculinity became hegemonic in late nineteenth century Britain. In addition, the development of the masculine ideology in Britain was augmented by the classical Eurocentric theories that represented the European as masculine and the non-European as feminine. Colonialism constructed a homology between these sexual hierarchies and the political domination of the Other with the purpose of producing "a cultural consensus in which political and socio-economic dominance symbolized the dominance of men and masculinity over women and femininity" (Nandy 4). The ideology of masculinity supported and justified the dominance of the aggressively masculine European over the cowardly feminine Other. The imperial expansion of Britain was, thus, legitimized as a product of superior forms of knowledge and transcendental categories.

The British colonizers exported the ideology of masculinity to the colonies in the service of their imperial project. Masculinity became the basic differentia of man in the colonial culture. The British colonizer could not be recognized as Western by the Symbolic Other unless he/she embodied the attributes valued by the West, namely masculinity. Thus, in order to assert his Western identity and elicit the Symbolic Other's love and recognition, the colonizer did not only interiorize and embody masculinist appearances and practices, but also strived to enact any other signifier that bear a relationship to masculinity such as toughness, virility, and aggression. Moreover, the colonizer avoided identifying with all other signifiers that are established as incompatible with the Western identity such as effeminacy, meekness, and childhood. Thus, to be Western means to be masculine, tough, virile and adult and not to be effeminate, weak and childlike.

On the other hand, being interpellated as non-Western, the colonized man was defined as effeminate, meek and childlike since he was not able to embody the attributes valued by the

master signifier and, thus, failed to win the Symbolic Other's recognition. Yet, under the persuasion of the civilizing mission and the other psychological incentives offered by colonialism, the colonized was enticed to identify with the colonizing master signifiers. Therefore, the colonization of the minds started, Nandy (6-7) argues, when the signifier masculinity dominated the Symbolic order of the colonial discourse and began to assign certain roles to its subjects, as he explains:

> Once the two sides [i.e. the colonizer and the colonized] in the British-Indian culture of politics...began to ascribe cultural meanings to the British domination, colonialism proper can be said to have begun. Particularly, once the British rulers and the exposed sections of Indians internalized the colonial role definitions and began to speak, with reformist fervour, the language of the homology between sexual and political stratarchies, the battle for the minds of men was to a great extent won by the Raj.

Therefore, a common theme in both Deleuze's and Nandy's writings on resistance becomes the question of how can the tyranny of this psychological mechanism be challenged on the psychological level? How can the culture of masculinity and violence be contested in terms other than developing a corresponding cult of hyper-masculinity and violence? The answer does not lie in the rhetoric of revolution but in the intervention into the Symbolic order of colonial discourse, or "the hole from which the master signifier gushes" as Lacan (1991) puts it, transforming its effects in the service of the oppressed (189).

Deleuze and the Transformative Function of Desire

Following Lacan, Deleuze and Guattari claim that the repression of desire by the family accounts for all oppressive and despotic social identities. Yet, it is against this aspect of the Oedipus complex—that is its prohibition of the subject's desires—that Deleuze and Guattari developed their concept of anti-Oedipus. For Deleuze and Guattari, to be anti-Oedipus is to reject all oppressive structures, whether they are social, political or psychological, which confine desire into fixed boundaries. Anti-Oedipus is "a guide to living in such a way that we do not yearn for the enslavement of our own desires, or less dramatically the representation and interpretation of our desires by others on our behalf" (Greedharry 119). Transforming the concepts of desire offered by Freud and Lacan, Deleuze and Guattari argue that desire is a free-floating energy that cannot be regulated by law or prohibition. The aim for Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy, therefore, is to free desire from its confinement within the structure of the Oedipus complex because, in its repression of the child's sexual desires, it produces docile subjects that can be easily dominated by other social oppressive systems.

In *Anti-Oedipus* (1983), Deleuze and Guattari argue that the oedipalized subject functions as the substance of fascist social systems. They claim that the oedipal law is one that complements social oppression since it produces the types of subjectivities that enable oppression to grow (101). The codification of psychic desire by the oedipal law is a means in the service of social oppression and hegemony. Therefore, Oedipus "cuts off all desiring-production" (79) and "wards off desire's potential for revolt and revolution" (120). Like desire, which is masked as incest and thus must be repressed, revolution, which threatens to transform established power relations within a given society, is seen as chaos and must be stifled. The codification of desire thwarts off the alternative forms of both self-identification and social

organizations since it channels and orients psychic investments and social relations into ossified forms. The oedipal law supports the maintenance of existing power relations and social structures by establishing rules and limits that block the free flow of desire. Thus, the family is the "bait" or the agent which orders individuals to repress alternative possibilities of becoming in the service of other social agents—the father, the boss, man or the White. As Deleuze and Guattari (1983) put it:

> Oedipal desires are the bait, the disfigured image, by means of which repression catches desire in the trap. If desire is repressed, this is not because it is desire for the mother and for the death of the father...The danger is elsewhere. If desire is repressed, it is because every position of desire, no matter how small, is capable of calling into question the established order of a society (116).

Therefore, in order to retrieve "desire's potential for revolt and revolution," one needs to be anti-Oedipus. Whereas conventional psychoanalytic interpretations posit desire as a negative force that operates in terms of lack and prohibition, Deleuze and Guattari articulate desire as a positive and chaotic rebellion against all forms of hegemony and power. Deleuze and Guattari (1983) refuse the subordination of desire to any mediating authority. For them, desire "escapes all Oedipal, personological references" (361-62). Thus, to be anti-Oedipus is to find lines of escape from the forms of capture and containment prescribed by the oedipal code of identification. Breaking the Oedipal code allows the individual to live beyond the Father's law. Subsequently, it allows resistance to other social despotic figures—the Law, man, the boss, or the colonizer. Moreover, to be anti-Oedipus is to lead "a life style, a way of thinking and living" which contests all forms of fascism—"the fascism in us all, in our heads, and in our everyday behavior, the fascism that causes us to love power, to desire the very thing that dominates and exploits us" (Foucault xiii). This way of thinking, as Foucault explains, is explicitly revolutionary and creative since it is not territorialized within fixed laws or codes—personal, familial or social.

Yet, anti-Oedipus is not to be understood as a simple inversion of the Oedipus complex. Rather, anti-Oedipus is an attempt to retrieve the productive potential of desire. Breaking through the boundaries of the unconscious is the principal objective of desiring-production. Desiring-production is a dynamic movement that generates "a positive force, one that can break through the limitations of ego and the family scene and set free the drives to express themselves without being restricted" (Friedman 97). Thus, desiring-production is the unconscious's ability to function anti-oedipally—that is, the unconscious's ability to destroy codes that circumscribe desire and, at the same time, to create new forms of identification. In this mode of production, desire operates like a machine that rips codes apart. When the Oedipal law is broken, the torrents of desire flow and produce, releasing desire into what Deleuze and Guattari (1987) call "a permanent inventiveness or creativity" against all attempts of capture and enclosure (214). Desiring-machines produce and their production is a subject that is in a perpetual movement of becoming.

Becoming is the subject's ability to escape capture and enclosure within a fixed image of self-identity—the ability to become-other. It is a process of perpetual transformation in which the subject's identity is formed "through what is not itself rather than always retrieving some lost, mythical and originally unified image of itself" (Colebrook 135). This process of self-transformation creates lines of escape from static and hegemonic moulds of subject-formation.

Yet, the becoming-other of the subject does not mean a subservient reproduction or a servile imitation of that other—that is, it does not mean that the subject imitates or reproduces the identity characteristics of the other. Rather, it is a key element in the process of transformation that transgresses the barriers between fixed identity categories such as "white, male, adult, 'rational,' etc." (Deleuze and Guattari, 292). The transformative potential of becoming retrieves desire's potential for creativity and revolution. Because these lines of flight have no territory, they create a hybrid space of identification in which the subject becomes other than itself—becoming-minor, becoming-woman or becoming-postcolonial.

Becoming-postcolonial is a mode of representing identity as an ongoing process of transformation. The first principle of imperial domination prescribes that "there is a clear-cut and absolute hierarchal distinction between ruler and ruled" (Said 82). Becoming-postcolonial offers a critical alternative to this imperial mode of representation in which identity is based on such binary oppositions as Black/White, civilized/savage and ruler/ruled. It designates also the ability to represent the cultural differences and variations pertinent to postcolonial societies without being attached to any essentialist discourse—colonial, anti-colonial or nationalist. Nonetheless, it is not an attempt to simply reverse such binary oppositions for, as Deleuze and Guattari (1987) warn, continually confronting "the great dualism machines" of history, society, philosophy and science will only emphasize and reinforce binary relations rather than liberating the colonized form them (276). In that sense, becoming-postcolonial reconstitutes our understanding of resistance. Resistance is no longer restricted to the reversal of "great dualism machines" or the retrieval of a lost sense of identity. Resistance is, as Helen Tiffin affirms, "a process, not arrival; it invokes an ongoing dialect between hegemonic centrist systems and peripheral subversion of them" (95). Resistance as becoming-postcolonial designates a process of self-transformation that is not based on either the exclusion of the other or the appraisal of the self. It is a process of perpetual becoming which offers both the self and the other "an opportunity to redefine their modes of co-existence in ways that contest and transform post-colonial culture, social structures and the colonial identifications, norms, and assumptions these continue to rely upon" (Bignall 213). By adopting the framework of Deleuze and Guattari's anti-oedipal critique, the following section will examine Nandy’s transformative use of desire in postcolonial discourse.

Resistance and the Creation of a People to Come

Following Deleuze and Guattari, Nandy insisted that desire is not a property held by an individual subject. It is a force that saturates the entire social field. Social organizations emerge in correspondence with the forms and modes of desire operating within a given society. The way in which desire operates, oedipally or anti-oedipally, directly orients the subject towards particular forms of sociability, as Bignall demonstrates: "desire . . . 'typifies' the [social] relationship, in the sense of giving it a particular character. Different modes of desire dispose bodies to particular types of relationship or sociability" (148). Since desire is rooted firmly within the social fabric, an adequate theory of post-colonial resistance and subject-liberation must attempt to promote becoming and retrieve the dynamic movement of desiring-machines which are blocked by despotic social relations. Therefore, the construction of social arrangements that are not based on segregation and exclusion requires, first, "a revolutionary liberation of society's repressed desiring machines" (Campbell 135). These revolutionary machines function via a collective enterprise that resists "the imperialist Oedipal repressions of

state and family" and aims at "a disconnection and deterritorialization of fascist power and a reconnection with collective forms of subjectivity" (155). Thus, in order to achieve a real sense of liberation, the subject needs to resist psychic repression as well as the social structures that suppress desiring machines, as Friedman puts it:

> What must be resisted are the reactive forces that resist the structure of family/state and yet recast it nonetheless. What must be resisted is the regime that pairs people, regardless of the types of pairs. What must be resisted is the regime that prohibits alternative forms of life. What must be resisted is a culture that directs the drives into a synthesis or an integrative whole. (101)

To articulate resistance into an integrative whole is the ultimate objective of both Nandy's and Deleuze's projects. The subversive practice that often accompanies resistance has a collective significance for resistance itself is a collective activity. Resistance is collective in the sense that all the values that inform it are collective values rather than personal. This collective 'assemblage' aims at the invention of new forms of subjectivities rather than baptizing dominant forms of identification. The new emerging collective forms urges the individual subjects to give up their personal concerns and engage in a collective enterprise—a collective revolution against the forces of oppression that dominate their society.

According to Nandy, the key element of this transformative process is the natives' capacity to resist absorption into the Symbolic order of colonial discourse. They refused, Nandy argues, to be "psychologically swamped, co-opted or penetrated" (111). The colonized subjects did not accept or interiorize the ideological assumptions of the colonizing culture. They were not fully domesticated by the hegemonic persuasions of the civilizing mission. Thus, instead of being swallowed up by the dominant discourse, the seemingly interpellated subjects were able to intervene in the hegemonic schema of identification, transforming its effects in the service of their own purposes. The intervention in the dominant schema of identification involves the interjection of a new chain of signifiers based on the Hindu perception of gender identities into the basic structure of the Symbolic order of colonial discourse.

In the Hindu tradition, femininity is not as devalued as it is in the West. The Hindu culture is built on a non-binary schema of gender which gives equal weight to both men and women and "the ability to transcend the man-woman dichotomy is superior to both, being an indicator of godly and saintly qualities" (Nandy 53). The boundaries between the man-woman binary are so open and diffused that "one does not ascribe positive moral value to one gender and negative moral value to the other, but rather distributes different moral values between genders" (Greedharry 51). Moreover, according to Nandy, in the Hindu culture, activism, courage and power are perceived as more congruent with femininity than with masculinity.[1] As Nandy claims, the Hindu culture sets "a closer conjunction between power, activism and femininity than between power, activism and masculinity. It also implied the belief that the feminine principle is a more powerful, dangerous and uncontrollable principle in the cosmos than the male principle" (53-54). Thus, femininity-in-masculinity, rather than masculinity or femininity, was perceived as

[1]This concept originated in the Hindu ideology of *Shakti*. *Shakti*, or the feminine principle, represents the Cosmic Feminine Energy. Thus, energy, power and activism are seen as feminine rather than masculine. For more elaboration on the Hindu principle of *Shakti*, see Krishnaswamy pp. 34-44.

a privileged position, a position of power and activism.[2] The aspects of Hindu androgyny practiced by Indian men and activists functioned as a counter-hegemonic practice against the ideology of masculinity valued by colonialism.[3]

Femininity-in-masculinity was, then, elected as a new master signifier and a point of reference in which the natives could invest their identities. Thus, in order to assert his self-identity as Indian and elicit the Symbolic Other's recognition, the native subject enacted the new master signifier, femininity-in-masculinity, and avoided identifying with the colonial signifiers, especially masculinity, aggression and violence, because they were established as incompatible with the new master signifier. Hence, instead of developing a practice of hyper-masculinity to counter the colonial ideology of masculinity, the Indian man transformed the standard stereotype projected upon him—that is, the Indian man is effeminate, into effective means of survival, as Nandy explains:

> ...instead of trying to redeem their 'masculinity' by becoming the counterplayers of the rulers according to the established rules, will discover an alternative frame of reference within which the oppressed do not seem weak, degraded and distorted men trying to break the monopoly of the rulers on a fixed quantity of machismo. If this happens, the colonizers begin to live with the fear that the subjects might begin to see their rulers as morally and culturally inferior, and feed this information back to the rulers (11).

This process of becoming has transformed the basic structure and mechanism of symbolic-order identification in colonial India. First, the interjection of the Hindu order of gender identities tore the old schema of identification apart, with the consequence that the British master signifiers were decommissioned and the Hindu signifiers were enacted as new points of reference and identity-representatives. Instead of trying to contest the British masculinist ideals with a corresponding principle of hyper-masculinity, the Indian subject appropriated the Western stereotype of the effeminate Indian man, drawing on the rich array of masculinity, femininity and androgyny central to the Hindu culture. In that sense, for the colonized, to be effeminate means to break out of the psychological limits set by the dominant discourse. As Young notes, the transformation of the Symbolic order "was accompanied by a strategic, transgressive role-playing at the level of gender which made it difficult for the colonial government to respond in the ways with which it normally dealt with anti-colonial resistance" (325). The over-emphasis laid on feminine strategies in the discourse of the master, whose norms are emphatically masculine, disrupts the order of that discourse. The newly interjected signifiers released new forces into the structure of the dominant discourse and buckled the oppressive master signifier so that it became unable to accomplish its function and, thus, disrupted its authority.

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[2]In Hindu mythology, androgyny is a male phenomenon. That is, it is believed that when a man marries a woman, she becomes half of his body, losing half of her own substance. On the other hand, he becomes enriched by her without losing any of his substance. Thus, the feminine aspect of men is considered as a sign of power rather than weakness because power is feminine in the Hindu mythology. See note no.1 above.

[3]The most salient example of this mode of resistance in the modern history of India is represented by Mahatma Gandhi (1869-1948). Gandhi's principle of *ahimsa*, literally means non-killing or non-violence, is often cited as an example of resistance as a non-violent strategy. Gandhi, according to Nandy, Young, Jefferess and others, embodies an important transformation to the stereotype of the feminized Indian male, drawing on the Hindu principle of androgyny as an alternative to British masculinist ideals. For further discussion on Gandhi's tactics of non-violent resistance, see Young (2001) pp. 325-31 and Jefferess (2008) pp. 95-135.

Second, and more importantly, the Hindu principle of androgyny, which does not demean femininity, unmasked the authority of the masculine, virile White man as inferior. Unlike the colonizer, the Indian subject has a fluid self-definition in which the masculine and the feminine co-exist peacefully. As Young explains, the reversal of the order of gender identity in India resulted in "a shift of perspective in which the masculinized culture of the colonizer became regarded as morally and culturally inferior" (326). In other words, by enacting the very stereotype of effeminacy and by overplaying the androgynous aspects of the Hindu culture, the native subject vigorously agitated "the so-called non-masculine self of man relegated to the forgotten zones of the Western self-concept" (Nandy 49). That is, by emphasizing the Hindu principle of androgyny, in which man and woman are equal, the native subjects stand as the living symbol of the other West, the side which has been repressed. This strategy of transformation negated the very basis of the Symbolic order of colonial discourse because, as Zizek shows, as soon as "the performative mechanism which gives him his charismatic authority is demasked, the Master loses his power" (163).

Therefore, the collapse of the discourse of the master in India was brought about by the very idea that the colonizer commissioned to sustain its authority, namely the ideology of masculinity. The ideology of masculinity, which altered the ordering of colonial discourse, destroyed the social fabric in India, and disfigured the systems of reference of the colonized's traditions and lifestyles, was the same tool appropriated by the oppressed to disrupt the oppressor's authority. It is a "double entendre" which on the one hand, "a part of an oppressive structure; on the other, it is in league with its victims" (Nandy xiv). Instead of being a stabilizing force to the discourse of the master, the ideology of masculinity, ironically, led to the master's downfall. Consequently, colonialism lost its moral and ethical grounds which, as shown above, gave the colonizers an ideological license to subjugate the Other, as Greedharry notes: "the West lost colonialism's psychological battle and its attempts to make up for that loss through aggression and domination made the loss more sustained" (50). Nandy places too much faith in the colonized's ability to transform the formative effects of Symbolic identification in colonial discourse through the process of becoming-postcolonial. The revolution Nandy calls for is located in the virtual rather than the actual which is politically and socially territorialized.

While the actual is about fixity and territorialization, the virtual is about becoming and transformation. An actual body, such as the colonizer-colonized relationship, is based on a plane of composition which seeks to sustain the network of power relations and structures of which this body is a product. The stability of this emergent body requires that the natives' own distinctive social organization be reterritoialized in the service of colonial needs. This process of re-territorialization took a variety of forms: cultural, political, social and, above all, linguistic. Therefore, the colonial order is an assemblage in which the becoming-postcolonial of identity is blocked. It is a plane of representation in which the colonized people are missing. Revolution in a Deleuzian sense does not aim at reversing the colonizer-colonized dichotomy, but aims at the invention of a new people beyond such opposition. The effectuation of this virtual-becoming of the people helps to foster change and transformation of oppressive social relations:

> A central task for postcolonialism to employ is the disruption of the problematic post-colonial present that remains tied to the virtual conditions of the emergence of colonialism, and the subsequent reconstruction of an alternative present by drawing upon the resource of an alternative virtual sociability, in order to create

> new conditions of bodily and community interrelationship and complex social composition (Bignall 114).

Since the dividing line between the actual and the virtual is dissolved, the possibility of actualizing a new collectivity, which is not contaminated by colonial ideology, becomes possible. Virtual becoming offers the possibility of re-assembling the colonial plane of composition in a way that retrieves the becoming-postcolonial of identity, as Bignall states: "the permanent existence of the virtual within the actual denies the self-evident authority of the actual, and opens up the possibility of thinking alternative, virtual modes of existence and actualizing them in practice" (16-17). The revolutionary potential of the virtual lies in its ability to open new possibilities for life. According to Bill Ashcroft (2013), this is the main function of resistance: "to inspire hope: hope for change, hope for freedom, hope for the future. It affirms that another world is possible. The people to come affirm that a different world is possible."

Yet, the concept of the people to come is not to be understood as an attempt to construct the basis of a mythical or utopian community. The alternative community that Deleuze and Guattari seek to construct through their concept of becoming exists in the real world but is kept suppressed by existing social conditions, as Daniel W. Smith states: "if the people are missing...it is precisely because they exist in the conditions of a *minority*" (xlii). Because the actual people are territorialized, "only a virtual people without any relation to present or historical society can be absolutely deterritorialized and thus properly revolutionary" (Aldea 114). The function of resistance, according to Nandy, is to reveal the becoming of those minor people. The people to come is a minoritarian-becoming that has no pre-existing or pre-supposed identity and, thus, revolutionary, "a revolutionary machine-to-come," as Deleuze and Guattari (1975 17-18) put it.

Therefore, the conceptualization of desire as a collective value expands the scope of the function and practices of resistance. The object and locus of resistance should be directed towards the creation of new modes of sociability that are untainted by colonial/oedipal inscriptions—a new social consciousness, as Said states: "liberation which is by its very nature involves...a transformation of social consciousness" (83). Since the modes of desire operating within society determine actual practices and have an undeniable influence upon the emergence of the existing society, the new social consciousness towards which post-colonial critique aspires is achieved through, first, developing a critical awareness of the oppressive forces of desire operating within society. It requires also the transformation of these modes of desire into new associations and assemblages that are revolutionary, as Campbell reveals: "the revolutionary alternative to capitalist [and colonial] hegemony is a deterritorialization of the social infrastructure through the liberation of pure productive desire" (9). Thus, desire, in its collective sense, is directly connected to the liberation of the subject and society as a whole. More importantly, the transformation of the social consciousness involves a process of counter-actualization whereby a new people is created—a people to come.

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